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ABSTRACT 
 
BRIDLED TIGERS: THE MILITARY AT KOREA’S NORTHERN BORDER, 1800–1863 
Alexander Thomas Martin 
Siyen Fei 
 
The border, in late Chosŏn rhetoric, was an area of pernicious wickedness; living near the border 
made the people susceptible to corruption and violence. For Chosŏn ministers in the nineteenth 
century, despite two hundred years of peace, the threat remained. At the same time, the military 
institutions created to contain it were failing. For much of the late Chosŏn the site of greatest 
concern was the northern border in P’yŏngan and Hamgyŏng provinces, as this area was the site 
of the largest rebellion and most foreign incursions in the first half of the nineteenth century. This 
study takes the northern border as the most fruitful area for an inquiry into the Chosŏn dynasty’s 
conceptions of and efforts at border defense. Using government records, reports from local 
officials, literati writings, and local gazetteers, this study provides a multifaceted image of the 
border and Chosŏn policies to control it. This study reveals that Chosŏn Korea’s concept of 
border defense prioritized containment over confrontation, and that their policies were successful 
in managing the border until the arrival of Western imperial powers whose invasions upended 
Chosŏn leaders’ notions of national defense.  
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Introduction 
 
“Sakchu was a county that was difficult to manage from the beginning. It is far from the 
civilizing influence of the sovereign, and we continue to send military men to administer 
it. The towns are corrupt and the people in distress, nothing is as it should be.” — King 
Chŏngjo, 17901 
 
This study analyzes the Chosŏn dynasty’s (1392–1910) response to institutional 
decay in border and national defense in the first half of the nineteenth century. It takes the 
northern provinces of P’yŏngan and Hamgyŏng, the site of the largest rebellion and most 
foreign incursions of the time, as the clearest test cases for border defense concepts in an 
era of general peace. Chosŏn responses reflected a conception of the border itself as 
hazardous to the moral fiber of residents and the paradoxical realization that the border, 
while closer to the font of civilization was nonetheless deficient in rectifying its subjects’ 
personal integrity.  
In late Chosŏn Korea, the border represented a threat to national integrity and 
sovereignty, not simply in the context of invasion but also on a metaphysical level. The 
border influenced those living near it to indulge in corruption, smuggling, and criminality. 
                                                             
1 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi (SJW) 1680:70a [1790/7/13 20th entry]. Citations for the SJW are from the 
online resource maintained by the National Institute of Korean History (Kuksa p’yŏnch’an 
wiwŏnhoe) at http://sjw.history.go.kr. Chŏngjo was exhorting Paek Sagŭn, newly appointed 
magistrate of Sakchu defense command, to greater diligence during Paek’s leave-taking 
ceremony. Dates in the notes are lunar. Dates in the body of the dissertation are solar. 
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The perception of the border’s multiple threats persisted even though by the nineteenth 
century, the Chosŏn Dynasty had passed almost two centuries without a significant 
breach of its borders by a foreign power. The threat of invasion was nearly nonexistent, 
but the two hundred years were not devoid of violence. Uprisings and local political and 
military disturbances, particularly in the northern provinces, caused growing worry on the 
part of Chosŏn leaders. In their rhetoric, the populace became a source of instability and 
concern. Discussions of the border and northern security were fraught with tension, 
which affected the policy and personnel choices of the central authority.  
As the likelihood of invasion decreased, the possibility of military examination 
passers obtaining higher rank posts within the bureaucracy also decreased. Those who 
were appointed to the higher ranks skewed toward the civil branch throughout the late 
Chosŏn era due to longstanding biases against the military arts in general. Without major 
breaches of the peace, those who had passed the military examination had few 
opportunities to showcase their martial talent or knowledge of military principles and 
their utility to central authorities.2 Even so, patrolling the border and staffing border 
counties remained areas where military men maintained a majority of bureaucratic and 
institutional positions.3 These military men gained experience in border affairs and 
interacted with foreigners more often than many of the central bureaucrats. Magistrates 
                                                             
2 Eugene Y. Park, Between Dreams and Reality: The Military Examination in Late Chosŏn Korea, 
1600–1894 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007); and on opportunities to 
showcase talent, see Eugene Y. Park, “Status and ‘Defunct’ Offices in Early Modern Korea: The 
Case of the Five Guards General (Owijang), 1864–1910,” Journal of Social History 41.3 (2008): 
737–757. 
3 Ku Wanhoe, “Sŏnsaengan ŭl t’onghae pon Chosŏn hugi ŭi suryŏng,” Pokhyŏn sarim 4 (1982): 
189–232. 
3 
 
 
and commanders called up border residents for patrols on the border or miscellaneous 
duties associated with the military offices without compensation. The military was 
rhetorically a vital defense force, fierce as tigers, but used more like a beast of burden. 
They were bridled tigers, an incongruous image that fails to take advantage of the 
ferocity of a tiger or the strength of a horse. Understanding how the military approached 
border and border security has a direct bearing on understanding Chosŏn leaders’ 
approaches to foreigners and the West in the latter half of the nineteenth century. The last 
half of the nineteenth century represented a new paradigm in border defense, but to 
understand where Chosŏn leaders ended up, knowing where they started is essential. 
This study will approach understanding Chosŏn border policies through three 
lenses. The first is isolation and reform. Chosŏn kings were keen to maintain a strict 
policy of preventing cross border traffic to the extent that it restricted and managed flows 
through a few sanctioned hubs. On its surface this policy looks like a desire to retreat 
from the world. This study will argue that the Chosŏn dynasty was interested in the world 
outside its borders, but that it sought to control the flow of people and information to 
manage the harmful effects the border could impart to its subjects. Chosŏn leaders were 
well aware of a need for reform in their military policies, especially at the border, but the 
ability to effect necessary change was hampered by the desire for control.  
The second lens is the borders of empire. The Chosŏn dynasty’s relationship with 
the Qing was fraught, due in part to Chosŏn’s reverence for the fallen Ming empire. The 
Qing decision to appoint predominantly Manchu bannermen as envoys to the kingdom, 
while part of the Qing’s multifaceted imperial rule, could not help but reinforce Chosŏn’s 
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recognition that the Qing was a conquest dynasty. The hostility Chosŏn felt declined over 
time, but left a lasting impression on Korea’s border policies, which were aimed mostly 
at their northern border. The suspicion of Qing intentions reinforced Chosŏn leaders’ 
desire to keep the border free of settlement and undue foreign influence.  
The final lens is regional discrimination. Chosŏn leaders perception of the north, 
and northern elites was never very positive. Some kings, such as Yŏngjo (r. 1724–1776) 
and Chŏngjo (r. 1776–1800), however, effected the elevation of northern elites and their 
greater participation in military pursuits in order to increase the monarchy’s power 
against the bureaucracy. This increased the visibility of military examination graduates’ 
duties at the border, and both kings spoke more frequently of border control and 
management than the early nineteenth-century monarchs. Despite a once again assertive 
bureaucracy in the nineteenth century, the border magistrates did maintain some of the 
status increases Yŏngjo and Chŏngjo’s policies effected. This study shows that for key 
magistracies in the north, Kanggye and Hoeryŏng primarily, service there was reserved 
for military men of talent. Serving well in these areas led to higher offices until the 
middle of the century. Regional discrimination did play a role in the duties of magistrates 
at the border and the lives of people there. To central officials, the people were simple 
and easily corruptible, border policies had to be strict and diligently enforced. Chosŏn 
subjects’ lives at the border were correspondingly harsh. The latter half of the nineteenth 
century saw a turn away from the northern border and a new focus on maritime counties 
and Western powers, but the lessons of terrestrial border protection could not easily be 
forgotten. The next few sections will delve more deeply into each of these lenses. 
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I. Isolation and Reform 
Scholars of the late twentieth century often portrayed early nineteenth-century 
Korea as a reversal of reformist and modernizing trends that began in the late eighteenth 
century. The inability of many scholars of Reformed Confucianism (sirhak) to maintain 
positions of influence in the Chosŏn court after King Sunjo (r. 1800–1834) ascended to 
the throne evidenced the turn away from participation in global trends.4 Scholars such as 
Pak Chega (1750–1815) and Chŏng Yagyong (pen name Tasan 1762–1836), and the 
sovereigns Yŏngjo and Chŏngjo, loom large in the historiography of reform and 
modernity. Their place in the historiography is not based on concrete reformations of 
Korean society, as most of the historiography suggests reforms were constantly frustrated 
by partisan politics, but rather for their writings and efforts to reverse a purported decline 
into stagnation that left Korea vulnerable to Western encroachment in the latter half of 
the nineteenth century.5 Much of this historiography overlooks the fact that in general, 
there was not much difference—technologically, militarily or politically—between 
Chosŏn Korea and its neighbors through the middle of the nineteenth century.6 
                                                             
4 Han Yŏngu, Tasi ch’annŭn uri yŏksa (P’aju: Kyŏngsewŏn, 2004); Yi Kibaek, Han’guksa sillon 
(Seoul: Ilchogak, 1999); and Palais, Confucian Statecraft and Korean Institutions. 
5 Palais’ Confucian Statecraft presents a picture of constantly frustrated reform and paralysis in 
the beginning of the nineteenth century. 
6 While a work like Kenneth Pomeranz’s The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making 
of the Modern World Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000) has not been written 
for Korea, there is a growing body of work, mostly on the economy, that recognizes Korea’s 
participation in global trends via its connections to China. See for example: Anders Karlsson, 
“Famine Relief, Social Order, and State Performance in Late Chosŏn Korea,” The Journal of 
Korean Studies 12.1 (fall, 2007): 113–141; Seong Ho Jun, James B. Lewis and Han-Rog Kang, 
“Korean Expansion and Decline from the Seventeenth to the Nineteenth Century: A View 
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The argument of stagnation arises from the portrayal of Korea as a “hermit 
kingdom,” especially in older Western historiography and by those who sought to justify 
Japan’s colonial takeover of Korea.7 William Elliot Griffis’ 1882 monograph, Corea: The 
Hermit Nation, was the first broadly read publication to use this terminology and image. 
The book described an isolated monarchy controlled by self-serving in-laws (“in-law 
politics” or Korean sedo chŏngch’i in the historiography) unable to understand the global 
currents in which it swirled. Relying on similar sources and Griffis own work, later 
Japanese scholarship only reinforced this image. C. Kenneth Quinones outlined the 
history of this idea of in-law politics, pointing out that the Japanese historian Kikuchi 
Kenjō relied heavily on the A Political History of Modern Korea (Kŭnse Chosŏn 
chŏnggam, 1886) for his history of Korea published in 1895.8  
Of disputed authorship, A Political History of Modern Korea was a late 
nineteenth-century work purported to be a true account of court politics from 1800 to 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Suggested by Adam Smith,” The Journal of Economic History 68, 1 (2008): 244–282; and for the 
military:  No Yŏnggu, “‘Kunsa hyŏngmyŏngnon’ kwa 17–18segi Chosŏn ŭi kunsajŏk pyŏnhwa,” 
Sŏyangsa yŏn’gu 36 (May, 2007): 33–57. 
7 William Elliott Griffis, Corea: The Hermit Nation (New York: Scribner, 1882) . Yi T’aejin has 
an excellent accounting of Griffis’ process and intent in compiling his work: Yi T’aejin, “Was 
Korea Really a Hermit Nation,” Korea Journal 38.4 (Winter 1998): 5–35. Griffis’ perspective 
was strongly biased toward Japan. The Royal Geographic Society of London in their proceedings 
up through the end of the 1860s noted Korea’s closure to the West, but also remarked on its 
extensive trade and relations with its East Asian neighbors. By the early twentieth century, it 
appears in rather more negative terms that justify Japan’s takeover of Korea. See: Allen Young, 
“On Korea,” Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society of London 9, no. 6 (1864): 296–300; 
W. Lockhart, “Notes on Peking and its Neighbourhood,” Proceedings of the Royal Geographical 
Society of London 10, no. 4 (1865), 154–158. For the later uses on justifying the Japanese 
takeover see: “The International Status of Korea,” The American Journal of International Law 
1.2 (April, 1907): 444–449; and William Elliot Griffis, “Japan’s Absorption of Korea,” The North 
American Review 192, 659 (October, 1910): 516–526. 
8 C. Kenneth Quinones, “The Kunse[sic] Chosŏn Chŏnggam and Modern Korean 
Historiography,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 40.2 (December 1980): 507–54 
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1863, and its historicity is problematic. Its author was undoubtedly a member of the 
Enlightenment Party (Kaehwadang) whose bias against the monarchy was pronounced, 
and the work was reportedly based on court rumors and other unsubstantiated hearsay.9 
Quinones excludes Griffis’ book in his outline of in-law politics because it predated the 
publication of A Political History of Modern Korea, but both books’ descriptions of court 
intrigues are similar. Griffis more than likely used the same source, or at least learned the 
early nineteenth-century history of Korea from members of the Enlightenment Party. 
Well after the end of the Chosŏn dynasty, A Political History of Modern Korea continued 
to influence scholarship in Japan and Korea, including eminent Korean historians such as 
Ch’oe Namsŏn and Yi Kibaek.10 
Korea may have sought to restrict access to its land and resources by outside 
forces, but it was neither unaware nor uninterested in the world around it. Korea 
maintained regular diplomatic contact with its neighbors, and obtained a great amount of 
information about the wider world and the West through these contacts.11 Envoys sent to 
the Qing court on the thrice-yearly missions returned with news, books, and goods from 
around the globe.12 Sometimes these were unwelcome intrusions or heterodox ideas, but 
more often than not they were opportunities for scholars to engage in exchange and 
                                                             
9 Quinones, “The Kunse Chosŏn Chŏnggam,” 507–510. 
10 Ch’oe Namsŏn, Chosŏn yŏksa (Kyŏngsŏng: Tongmyŏngsa, 1936), and Yi Kibaek, Kuksa sillon 
(Seoul: T’aesŏngsa, 1961), 269–271. 
11 George McAfee McCune, “Korean Relations with China and Japan, 1800–1864” (Ph.D 
dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1941), 94–95; and No Yŏnggu, “Chŏngjodae 
pyŏngsŏ kanhaeng ŭi paegyŏng kwa ch’ui,” Changsŏgak 3 (2000), 61–66. 
12 Kwon Naehyun, “Chosŏn-Qing Relations and the Society of P’yŏngan Province during the 
Late Chosŏn Period,” in The Northern Region of Korea: History, Identity & Culture, ed. Sun Joo 
Kim (Seattle: Center for Korea Studies, University of Washington; University of Washington 
Press, 2010), 55–58. 
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broaden their perceptions. Pak Chega composed one of his most well-known works, 
Discourses on Northern Learning (Pukhak ŭi), after returning from multiple diplomatic 
missions to China. Chŏngjo himself recognized the frequency and serious nature of 
exchange on these trips; in his concern to prevent the spread of the heterodoxy of 
Christianity, he repeatedly issued injunctions against returning with religious texts and 
eventually banned the importation of books outright for a time.13 
Despite the rhetoric and injunction, this conduit for information was never fully 
shut down. Envoy missions continued throughout the Chosŏn period, and by the end of 
the dynasty, a significant amount of trade occurred through this channel.14 This trade in 
knowledge and goods was not limited to merchants or other politically marginalized 
groups. No Yŏnggu, a historian of Chosŏn military science, describes Chŏngjo’s great 
desire for obtaining information on cannon and uses of cavalry in battle.15 Recent 
research on late Chosŏn Korea suggests it was not so much an ignorant and closed 
society, as a tightly regulated but informed one.16 Instead of shutting their country off to 
                                                             
13 Gregory N. Evon, “Korea’s Aristocratic Moods: Re-Examining Chosŏn Social and Political 
History,” Asian Studies Review 35, no. 2 (2011), 255; see also, Ch’oe, Lee, and de Bary., Sources 
of Korean Tradition, vol. 2 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 134–135, for a 
translation of Chŏngjo’s own perception of the Chinese role in bringing heterodox knowledge to 
Korea. Chŏngjo eventually rescinded the ban on books in part because of his recognition of the 
importance of understanding the wider world. 
14 Kwon, “Chosŏn-Qing Relations and the Society of P’yŏngan Province,” 51–55; See also, 
Lockhart, “Notes on Peking and its Neighbourhood.” His description is of a rather large 
contingent of merchants (over two hundred trade officers) and a sense that the trade entourage 
was a familiar and integral part of the mission. 
15 No, “Chŏngjodae pyŏngsŏ kanhaeng ŭi paegyŏng kwa ch’ui,” 61–66. 
16 The view of exchange influencing Chosŏn society and development is especially prominent in 
scholars of the northern regions such as Sun Joo Kim, Marginality and Subversion (Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 2007), Kwŏn Naehyŏn, “Sippal segi huban – sipku segi chŏnban 
P’yŏngan-do ŭi Taech’ŏng sahaeng chiwŏn kwa muyŏk suse,” Sach’ong 56 (Mar. 2003): 67–91, 
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the world, Chosŏn kings sought to filter out what they deemed undesirable. Their position 
became all the more firm as the rhetoric of the “small font of civilization” (Sohwa or 
Sojunghwa, Ch. Xiaohua, Xiaozhonghua)17 increased, meaning as Korea came more and 
more to see itself as the last bastion of civilization, it sought greater restriction on 
negative influences it found coming primarily from China under the Manchus, whom 
many Chosŏn literati regarded as usurpers.18 
The historiographic narrative portrays the late Chosŏn as a traditional Confucian 
society that had little regard for the military arts in general,19 but this portrayal is correct 
only in relative terms. It is true that the status of military skills compared to one’s ability 
in learning classical Chinese and mastering Neo-Confucian doctrine was much lower 
when judging a candidate’s potential for advancement in the Chosŏn government 
bureaucracy. All the same, military learning was an avenue for enhancing one’s status 
and allowed a degree of social mobility in Chosŏn Korea, which suggests that military 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
and O Such’ang, Chosŏn hugi P’yŏngan-do sahoe palchŏn yŏn’gu (Seoul: Ilchogak, 2002). Mun 
Chungyang in his work Uri yŏksa kwahak kihaeng (Seoul: Tong Asia, 2006) notes that the 
Korean envoy missions frequently brought back scientific knowledge from the West such as star 
charts, though the information was filtered through a Chinese lens. 
17 This phrase is sometimes translated “Little China,” but while Chosŏn literati associated the 
ideograph hwa (Ch. hua, “China,” “splendid”) with what we now call China, the character is not 
synonymous with a political entity. Use of “Little China” has reduced in frequency in work from 
Korean studies scholars but is still prominent in China Studies. See Weiguo Sun, “An Analysis of 
the “Little China” Ideology of Chosŏn Korea,” Frontiers of History in China 7, no. 2 (2012): 
220–239. 
18 On the influence of the “small font of civilization” ideology and views of Qing emperors as 
illegitimate see JaHyun Kim Haboush, “Contesting Chinese Time, Nationalizing Temporal 
Space,” in Time, Temporality, and Imperial Transition: East Asia from Ming to Qing, ed. Lynn A. 
Struve, 115–141 (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2005); and Sun Joo Kim, “Negotiating 
Cultural Identities in Conflict: A Reading of the Writings of Paek Kyŏnghae (1765–1842),” The 
Journal of Korean Studies 10, no. 1 (Fall 2005), 99–100 and 116n52. 
19 Ch’oe, Lee, and de Bary, Sources of Korean Tradition, 5, is a representative description. 
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matters were not completely ignored.20 Military examination passers far outnumbered the 
civil degree holders in positions at the Chosŏn border with the Qing and the maritime 
counties in the south. For most of the late Chosŏn era, border defense was military work. 
 
II. Borders of Empire 
Relations between the Chosŏn and Qing received intense scrutiny and significant 
revision over the past few decades with the advent of New Qing history. The common 
Western interpretation of the relationship between the two is best characterized by John 
K. Fairbank’s analysis of the relationship as the closest to an ideal tributary relationship 
in the Qing world order.21 The qualified assertions included in his edited volume The 
Chinese World Order have become reified and reinforced by later scholarship on Korea’s 
historical relationship to China. This resulted in a conflation of the Qing empire with 
modern China and cemented the impression of Korea as dependent on a succession of 
Chinese empires performing as a model tributary state. However, in the late 1990s a new 
generation of scholars reevaluated the Qing as a multifaceted empire that did not 
prioritize its representation as Han Chinese. Rather the Qing employed a variety of 
techniques and strategies to control a vast, multiethnic empire, revealing a different face 
to different ethnicities and regions within the empire’s influence.22 Nonetheless, even in 
                                                             
20 Park, Between Dreams and Reality, 179–184. 
21 John K. Fairbank ed., The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign Relations 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1968). 
22 Joanna Waley-Cohen analyses several of the more prolific New Qing Historians in her review 
essay “The New Qing History,” in Radical History Review 88, no.1 (2004). See also: Pamela 
Kyle Crossley A Translucent Mirror: History and Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1999); Evelyn S. Rawski The Last Emperors: A Social History of 
11 
 
 
New Qing history, there still remained a sense that Confucian ritual and propriety 
determined the course of Qing interaction with the Chosŏn Dynasty.  
Inspired by New Qing studies, some scholars have called into question the 
accuracy of this portrayal, suggesting instead that Confucian ritual was a frame that 
articulated more practical decisions Chosŏn leaders made. Ku Pŏmjin, in analyzing how 
the Qing appointed envoys to the Chosŏn court, found that the honor was mostly reserved 
for Manchu Bannermen, and that Han Chinese were generally discriminated against in 
appointments to Korea. He suggests the Qing viewed relations with Chosŏn as more akin 
to those with the Mongols than the other Confucian polities of Ryukyu and Vietnam.23 
The frequency of envoys of Manchu descent visiting Chosŏn could not have gone 
unnoticed in the Korean court and would have encouraged the view of the Qing as 
usurpers held by many of Chosŏn literati. Seonmin Kim argues that practical 
considerations like the production of ginseng drove a significant amount of the 
relationship between the Chosŏn and Qing.24 She considers Chosŏn’s northern border 
with the Qing an area under frequent negotiation. 
Participation in the Qing system of international relations has often been taken to 
suggest an acceptance on the part of Chosŏn officials of a dominant position of Chinese 
dynasties in a Sinitic hierarchy of civilizations. This has been problematized extensively 
in scholarship in Korean history with scholars such as Jahyun Kim Haboush noting the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Qing Imperial Institutions (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998); and Mark C. Elliott, 
The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2001). 
23 Ku Pŏmjin, “Ch’ŏng ŭi Chosŏn sahaeng insŏn kwa ‘Taech’ŏng cheguk ch’eje,’” Inmun 
nonch’ong 59 (June 2008), 13–18. 
24 Seonmin Kim Ginseng and Borderland, (Oakland: University of California Press, 2017), 2–12. 
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resistance of many Chosŏn literati to accepting Qing hegemony as legitimate and the 
concurrent argument for Chosŏn retaining civilization in the face of a conquest dynasty.25 
Yet, a growing acceptance and even encouragement of Qing relations in the form of the 
Northern Learning (Pukhak) school acted as a counterweight to belief in Chosŏn’s role as 
protector of civilization. The Northern Learning scholars, such as Pak Chega and Kim 
Chŏnghŭi (1786–1856), saw a practical benefit in developing a knowledge of Qing 
advances in the fields of technology and statecraft.26 
Chosŏn’s northern border with the Qing empire had become quite stable by the 
nineteenth century, relative to other polities surrounding the Qing empire. But, despite 
the stability of the agreed upon borders, the Yalu (Ko. Amnok) and Tumen (Ko. Tuman) 
Rivers, the exact location and source of those rivers caused confusion and confrontation 
along Chosŏn’s northern border. The lack of a definitive survey of the border’s location 
allows for a degree of ambiguity in the literature regarding the exact nature of the border. 
The dominant perception of borders in the field now is well represented by scholars like 
Seonmin Kim and Bradley C. Davis who see borders before the arrival of Western ideas 
of national sovereignty as zones more than lines.27 Much of the work on this concept of 
border zones is from scholars in the field of Southeast Asian studies. Though the work of 
Southeast Asia scholars on border perception is geographically contingent, it is often 
                                                             
25 Haboush, “Contesting Chinese Time.” 
26 Kanghun Ahn, “A Study of Ch’usa Kim Chŏng-hŭi: The Introduction of Qing Evidential 
Learning into Chosŏn Korea and a Reassessment of Practical Learning,” Sungkyun Journal of 
East Asian Studies 18, no. 1 (April, 2018), 105–107. 
27 Bradley C. Davis, Imperial Bandits: Outlaws and Rebels in the China-Vietnam Borderlands 
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2017). 
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extrapolated to separate cultural and geographic contexts where its utility may be 
suspect.28 
The clearest case for geographic contingency is James C. Scott’s concept of 
Zomia in Southeast Asia. To Scott, the natural terrain of Southeast Asia determined the 
method and level of interaction the kingdoms in the region had with their subjects, and as 
subjects felt an increasingly intrusive government hand they could use geography to their 
advantage to avoid the power of the authorities, to become illegible, in Scott’s 
terminology. Scott then extrapolates to suggest that populations unwilling to be governed 
can take advantage of terrain in this way.29 Recent scholarship on the region pushes back 
on the idea of illegible communities, in the sense of state recognition, and illuminates a 
broad network of ties between people in the highlands (difficult to navigate terrain) and 
lowlands (site of official power) that defies Scott’s description.30 Nonetheless, scholars of 
borders in Southeast Asia generally eschew the concept of a borderline in favor of 
frontiers and zones of indeterminate sovereignty.31  
                                                             
28 For instance, note the frequent citation of Tongchai Winichakul’s Siam Mapped (Honolulu: 
University of Hawai’i Press, 1994). A corrective to over-extrapolation is James Millward’s 
survey of the Qing empire’s contingent approaches to border management in “New Perspectives 
on the Qing Frontier,” in Remapping China: Fissures in Historical Terrain, ed. Gail Hershatter., 
113–130, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996). 
29 James C. Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Southeast Asia (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2009). 
30 Davis, Imperial Bandits; also, John D. Phan’s work on vernaculars in Vietnam illustrates a 
network of language use that follows a highland/lowland dichotomy, but shows significant 
overlap and movement between the two, for some of this work see: “Rebooting the Vernacular in 
Seventeenth-Century Vietnam,” in Rethinking East Asian Languages, Vernaculars, and 
Literacies, 1000–1919, ed. Benjamin A. Elman, 96–128 (Leiden: Brill, 2014). 
31 Representative works include Davis, Imperial Bandits; Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed; 
and Leo Shin, “Ming China and Its Border with Annam,” in The Chinese State at the Borders, ed. 
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 Geographic specificity is important to not only the conception of borders, but also 
the process of border creation. For Peter Perdue, determining borderlines is a final step 
after war and negotiation, a Westphalian perspective that privileges the European 
experience of constant war between nations as formative for national integrity.32 For the 
Qing’s wars against the Zunghars and confrontations with the Russians in the late 
seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries this perspective maps well onto actual 
experience, but for other areas, the process was reversed. Southeast Asian boundary 
negotiations are a clear contrast where the Ming and Qing first drew lines then enforced 
them militarily.33 In the Northeast, Mark Elliott, in his work on Manchuria, also noted a 
different process for determining borders with the Chosŏn kingdom, among others. There, 
the process between the Qing and Chosŏn was nominally begun after war but the 
negotiation came after settlement of the lines. That is, after the Chosŏn court had 
capitulated and the Qing court had defeated most of the remnants of the Ming, the Qing 
Emperor declared the border between the Qing and Chosŏn would be the Yalu and 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Diana Lary, 91–104 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2007); and Winichakul, 
Siam Mapped. 
32 Peter C. Perdue, “Boundaries, Maps, and Movement: Chinese, Russian, and Mongolian 
Empires in Early Modern Central Eurasia,” The International History Review 20, no. 2 (1998), 
264. 
33 Leo Shin, “Ming China and Its Border with Annam,” and for contrast Benjamin A. Elman, 
“Ming-Qing Border Defense, the Inward Turn of Chinese Cartography, and Qing Expansion in 
Central Asia in the Eighteenth Century” also in The Chinese State at the Borders. While the time 
frame is more modern, Morris Rossabi ed., Governing China’s Multiethnic Frontiers (Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 2004) provides a varied analysis of the processes on multiple 
borders. 
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Tumen Rivers, but the exact location of those rivers was not defined.34 It would take 
nearly two hundred years of negotiation to finally settle where those lines were. 35 
 
III. Regional Discrimination 
 The rhetoric of Chosŏn officials at the border reveals a prejudice against the 
region of the border that is not easily explained by the simple threat of foreign invasion. 
The border itself exerted some influence on the residents there. In Confucian cosmology 
and geography, the closer one is to the font of civilization, the more civilized one 
becomes. In the case of the northern border, this conception faces some contradictions. 
Even though the border is closer to the seat of the Son of Heaven, a title Chinese 
emperors assumed to signify their dominion over the whole earth, the people of the 
northern regions both at and over the border were less civilized and in greater danger of 
moral corruption. The conception that the Qing were not true heirs to civilization and the 
“small font” ideology may also explain some of this rhetoric. Nevertheless, Chosŏn 
officials displayed a consistent prejudice against the northern provinces in general, which 
predated the Qing conquest.36   
                                                             
34 Andre Schmid, Korea between Empires, 1895–1919 (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2002), 132. 
35 Schmid, Korea between Empires, 132. Also see Mark C. Elliott, “The Limits of Tartary: 
Manchuria in Imperial and National Geographies,” The Journal of Asian Studies 59, no. 3 (2000): 
603-646; and Seonmin Kim, Ginseng and Borderland, 145–150. 
36 Sun Joo Kim, Voice from the North: Resurrecting Regional Identity from the Life and Work of 
Yi Sihang (1672–1736) (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013); and O Such’ang, Chosŏn 
hugi P’yŏngan-do. 
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 This regional discrimination had multiple effects on the society and management 
of the north and the northern border. The cause and effect relationship between 
discrimination and social development is not firmly established, but scholars like Kang 
Sŏkhwa and O Such’ang trace greater investments in local Confucian schools and greater 
participation in commercial markets in the north during the late Chosŏn compared to the 
southern provinces.37 Eugene Park in his research on military examination passers also 
found an increase in passers among the residents in the northern provinces as the late 
Chosŏn progressed and more commoners and non-elites sought status markers that had 
been devalued by the central elites.38 These scholars and others also point to the efforts of 
Yŏngjo and Chŏngjo to contest the power of the bureaucracy through elevating regional 
elites that had been neglected by the center.39 Perceptions of the border as less civilized 
and prone to corruption, though, reinforced discrimination against the north. Northerners 
also had to contend with a general distrust of merchants who were over-represented in 
P’yŏngan province. While at the same time, the alternate markets held at Chunggang in 
P’yŏngan, and Kyŏngwŏn and Hoeryŏng in Hamgyŏng Province necessitated military 
men with some understanding of trade and the needs of merchants. The conflicting 
                                                             
37 Kang Sŏkhwa, Chosŏn hugi Hamgyŏng-do wa pukpang yŏngt’o ŭisik (Seoul: Kyŏngsewŏn, 
2000); O, Chosŏn hugi P’yŏngan-do sahoe. 
38 Park, Between Dreams and Reality. Ironically this may have increased discrimination as the 
central elites closed ranks to prevent dilution of their own status. 
39 Sun Joo Kim makes similar points in Voice from the North. See also Sun Joo Kim, ed., The 
Northern Region of Korea: History, Identity & Culture (Seattle: Center for Korean Studies, 
University of Washington, 2010). 
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pressures of specialization and discrimination created difficulty in finding magistrates 
well-skilled enough and willing to go to distant posts, especially for Hoeryŏng.40 
The economic development of the northern region also created tensions within the 
bureaucracy and the central court. The development of a more mercantile economy in the 
northern region has been tied to the frequency of envoy missions to and from the Qing 
passing through the region and the trade in tribute material like ginseng that followed 
them.41 The distrust of merchants redounded to perceptions of the border residents that in 
turn affected the requirements of officials to patrol the border for not only border 
crossings, but also illegal harvesting and smuggling. The regulations created a climate of 
mutual distrust between residents and officials sent to manage the border compounding 
the difficulty of managing the border well. In turn, the Chosŏn court fixated on the virtue 
of its magistrates as a corrective to the distrust and moral culpability inherent in border 
residents. 
Border magistrates were by no means the only officials exhorted to greater virtue. 
The sources are replete with rhetorical calls to morality and the language of personal 
integrity. As James Palais noted this is a feature of Neo-Confucian politics: all 
conversations in the political arena were necessarily couched in terms of morality.42 It is 
true that Chosŏn officials did use the language of morality to advance personal agendas, 
but the central conceit of decrying the fixation on morality as baked into the structure of 
                                                             
40 This difficulty is further explicated in Chapter two. 
41 Kwon, “Chosŏn-Qing Relations and the Society of P’yŏngan Province;” and Seonmin Kim, 
Ginseng and Borderland, 105–128. 
42 James B. Palais, “Records and Record-keeping in Nineteenth-Century Korea,” Journal of Asian 
Studies 30, no. 3 (May 1971): 583–591. 
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Chosŏn politics is that the fixation is a façade. In this estimation, humans are rooted in 
self-interest and a focus on morality probably hid more basic motivations for status or 
power. On the other hand, taking the discussion of instilling virtue and preventing 
corruption at the border at face value will certainly present a distorted picture of sage 
kings and advisers much like the characters from the classical canon those leaders quote. 
The truth lies somewhere in between, and while morality was the language of discourse 
being steeped in the pursuit of virtue must have affected Chosŏn subjects. Some people 
dissemble, but most try to live up to the words they use. 
 This dissertation comprises four chapters which analyze decline in Chosŏn 
military preparedness during the more than two centuries of peace since capitulation to 
the Manchus in 1637 until the arrival of Western fleets in 1866. Many literati and 
officials at the time were aware of the poor state of the provincial armies, but reform was 
not a simple undertaking. From the end of the seventeenth century to the end of the 
nineteenth, Chosŏn literati like Yu Hyŏngwŏn (1622–1672), Chŏng Yagyong, Pak Kyusu 
(1807–1877), and Sin Hŏn (also known as Sin Kwanho, 1810–1884) proposed reforms 
for the military system with only a small degree of success.  
Chapter 1 uses the most comprehensive reform proposal in the early nineteenth 
century, Tasan’s work On the People’s Bastion (Minbo ŭi), as a framework to discuss the 
state military preparedness in the early in the nineteenth century. To Tasan, the failures of 
the local forces during the Hong Kyŏngnae Rebellion of 1812 in P’yŏngan province, and 
the chaos it inspired in the far away Chŏlla province where he was serving exile, 
demanded a new method of national defense, for if a local insurrection could result in 
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such disarray, what hope did Chosŏn have of fending off a real invasion? The chapter 
traces the development of the people’s bastion through to Sin Hŏn’s reform ideas. Sin 
conceived of the bastion as a national defense program that was specifically geared 
toward border defense to resist foreign incursion. The Taewŏn’gun ultimately 
implemented some of Sin’s reforms at the end of the 1860s.  
 Understanding the state of military preparedness is only half of the equation in 
border defense. The other half concerns management of the border and border counties. 
To understand the perception of the border and its defense, Chapter 2 examines the 
sixteen counties that lined the northern border.43 The data reveals that the central 
bureaucracy had trouble finding the right individuals to staff key counties along the 
border. Counties that were considered essential to defense had higher rates of rescinded 
appointments while many border magistrates were removed from positions for 
malfeasance and corruption. In looking at the data it is apparent that while military 
preparedness may have been lacking, the bureaucracy was functioning the way it was 
designed for most of the late Chosŏn. The second half of the chapter examines why that 
design, based on the perceived virtue of magistrates, was not adequate for the practical 
aspects of border defense. 
Chapter 3 takes a closer look at the border itself, both the process of its creation 
and its protection. The Collection of Diplomatic Documents (Tongmun hwigo), a 
collection of diplomatic exchanges between the Chosŏn and Qing Dynasties, provides an 
                                                             
43 Portions of this chapter appeared in the December 2018 issue of the Seoul Journal of Korean 
Studies under the title “Specialization and Status: Late Chosŏn Period Magistrates on the 
Northern Border, 1623–1894.” I would like to thank the journal for permission to reprint it. 
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excellent window into border policies and perceptions. In its records on illegal border 
crossings (pŏmwŏl) and the border (kanggyŏng) we find that Chosŏn concerns were more 
focused on territorial integrity while Qing concerns were with resources. The chapter also 
presents a case study of a border operation to remove over two-hundred Qing settlers in 
the defense command (tohobu) of Kanggye in P’yŏngan province. Through a close 
examination of the local reports a picture of border management emerges that shows 
Chosŏn officials prioritized national integrity and the moral integrity of its people in 
creating a strong defense. 
 Throughout the late Chosŏn era, the population along the border continued to 
increase, but little is known about the people who eked out a living at the border. Chapter 
4 delves into what we can know about the people at the border by closely examining two 
prominent defense commands, Kanggye and Hoeryŏng. Local office reports on criminal 
border crossing and interrogations, rules and regulations that magistrates had for 
administering the region, and diaries and recollections offer glimpses of the commoners’ 
lives at the border. The need to patrol the border was high, magistrates were expected to 
send patrols to the border three times a month, but their concerns were local. Ginseng, 
lumber harvesting, and illegal settlements, not military preparedness, were primary 
concerns. Simply harvesting reeds on the wrong side of the river could end in the 
perpetrator’s execution. Those who lived in the shadow of the border knew the risks of 
crossing, but opportunities for making money or eking out a living without landlords 
existed in this region that did not elsewhere in the peninsula. Such temptations weighed 
heavily in the duties of magistrates and military units at the border.  
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 The conclusion critiques the narrative of failure so prominent in histories of early 
nineteenth century through the evidence mustered in this study. Moving beyond this 
narrative will highlight the Chosŏn border control policies and concern with corruption 
and virtue. The kingdom focused intently on the threat embodied in the northern border, 
and Chosŏn sensitivity to the Qing presence informed the two countries’ troubled 
relationship. But it was not the only border relationship that mattered by the middle of the 
century. Still, the influence of the border on Chosŏn imagination, and the experience of 
those who served there affected Chosŏn leaders’ decisions in facing the new Western 
threat. New skills and new conceptions of the military were needed; the bridled tigers 
faced a world that valued ferocity over formality. It would be a difficult transition.  
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Chapter 1: Protection for Whom? 
Provincial Military System and New Theories of National Defense 
 
“It has always been much easier (because it has always seemed much safer) to give a 
name to the evil without than to locate the terror within.” — James Baldwin44 
 
 This chapter is an examination of Chosŏn Korea’s provincial military institutions 
and reformist ideas in the nineteenth century. The military philosophy that held sway 
through much of the late Chosŏn era was centralization, indeed it was the governing 
philosophy from the beginning.45 From the latter half of the seventeenth century, the 
central military in the form of the Five Military Divisions (Ogunyŏng), in particular the 
Military Training Directorate (Hullyŏn togam), consumed the lion’s share of resources 
available for defense, depriving the provincial military of funds to pay for training and 
equipment.46 This was a deliberate choice on the part of the Chosŏn kings not only 
because they feared rebellion but were also reluctant to reduce the five divisions which 
were tasked with protecting the capital, palaces, and the king’s person.47 As the late 
Chosŏn era progressed the corruption of the taxation system and a social prejudice 
against military service (kunyŏk) or even inclusion on military tax registers (kunjŏk) led 
                                                             
44 James Baldwin, “Nothing Personal,” in The Price of the Ticket: Collected Nonfiction, 1948-
1985 (New York: St. Martins, 1985), 383. 
45 Yi Chonhŭi, Chosŏn sidae chibang haengjŏng chedo yŏn’gu (Seoul: Ilchisa, 1990), 143. 
46 Ha Myŏngjun, “Chosŏn sidae ŭi hyangch’on pangwi silchŏng kwa Minboron,” Yŏksa kyoyuk 
114 (June 2010), 330. 
47 Ha, 330; Ch’a Munsŏp, Chosŏn sidae kunsa kwan’gye yŏn’gu (Seoul: Tan’guk taehakkyo 
ch’ulp’anbu, 1996), 83–84. 
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to a decline in funds and bodies available for service. The provincial military suffered the 
most from these privations, becoming little more than paper soldiers. Ministers and 
officials at all levels of the bureaucracy noted the malady, lamented by kings through the 
end of the dynasty; the remedies, however, were not easy nor universally agreed upon. 
This chapter examines a significant proposal, the “people’s bastion” (minbo), that took 
hold in the early nineteenth century and eventually enjoyed partial implementation under 
the Taewŏn’gun during the first years of King Kojong’s reign (1864–1897; emperor, 
1897–1907). 
 
I. The Provincial Military 
At the turn of the nineteenth century, Chosŏn Korea was in flux. King Chŏngjo  
had died rather unexpectedly at forty-seven se.48 Chŏngjo had faced questions of  
legitimacy in his succession as the child of Prince Sado, who had been heir apparent 
before King Yŏngjo put him to death. His response to such questions was to become the 
most Confucian of kings especially in his filial devotion. Veneration of his father through 
projects like building Hwasŏng fortress, and elevation of his father’s works like the New 
Explanation of Martial Arts (Muye sinbo) also had the benefit of legitimizing Prince 
Sado and by extension Chŏngjo’s own ascension.49 Like his grandfather and predecessor, 
Yŏngjo, Chŏngjo had been a strong monarch who sought to contain bureaucratic partisan 
                                                             
48 Ages in Korea, and East Asia generally, were reckoned by the number of calendar years during 
which a person lived, so at birth a person was considered one se. 
49 Haboush provides a complex portrait of Crown Prince Sado’s death. See The Confucian 
Kingship, 166–233. Sun Joo Kim argues that Chŏngjo’s production of books and valorization of 
martial heroes were related to his project to legitimize his ascension. See Voice from the North: 
Resurrecting Regional Identity Through the Life and Work of Yi Sihang (1672–1736) (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2013), 139. 
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politics through the policy of impartiality (t’angp’yŏng) whereby he promoted men of 
talent regardless of affiliation with an eye to even out the weight of partisanship.50 
Chŏngjo was also a martial king; he oversaw the construction of Hwasŏng in Suwŏn, 
south of the capital, the most advanced fortress built in Korea before the arrival of 
Western powers; commissioned multiple military manuals, including the Illustrated 
Manual of the Martial Arts (Muye tobo t’ongji); and instituted the Robust Brave Division 
(Changyongyŏng), a new military unit based at Hwasŏng that specially recruited 
martially talented men to protect the king’s person.51 But, at the same time, Chŏngjo 
increasingly allowed provincial military preparedness to languish, cancelling seasonal 
training sessions at the highest rate of any king to date, allowing military finances to 
continue their decline by failing to reform the cloth tax and support payer system, and 
engaging in expensive construction projects such as Hwasŏng.52 
                                                             
50 Haboush, The Confucian Kingship, 117–136. Haboush explains the background and inception 
of the policy in Yŏngjo’s reign; O Such’ang argues that in the application of the t’angp’yŏng 
policy during Yŏngjo and Chŏngjo’s eras, the promotion of men of talent, in particular military 
men from the northwest, had political motivations, that is to contest the power of the bureaucracy. 
See O Such’ang, Chosŏn hugi Pʿyŏngan-do sahoe palchŏn yŏn’gu (Seoul: Ilchogak, 2002), 332–
333. 
51 No Yŏnggu analyzed multiple aspects of Chŏngjo’s reign from a military perspective, 
including book publishing and the construction of Hwasŏng. See No Yŏnggu, “Chŏngjodae 
pyŏngsŏ kanhaeng ŭi paegyŏng kwa ch’ui,” Changsŏgak 3 (July 2000): 59–85; and No Yŏnggu, 
“Chosŏn hugi sŏngje pyŏnhwa wa Hwasŏng ŭi sŏnggwak sajŏk ŭi ŭimi,” Chindan hakpo 88 
(December 1999): 291–320. Ch’a Munsŏp examined the creation of the Robust Brave Division in 
Chosŏn sidae kunsa kwan’gye yŏn’gu, 81–83.  
52 Kim Uch’ŏl, Chosŏn hugi chibang kunjesa (Seoul: Kyŏngin munhwasa, 2000), 216. The failure 
to hold training sessions and reform the tax system will be discussed more fully later. The final 
tally for cost of Hwasŏng listed in the record of its construction (Hwasŏng sŏngyŏk ŭigwe) was 
873,517 yang which was nearly triple the original estimated expense. See No Yŏnggu [Roh 
Young-koo], “The Construction and Characteristics of Hwaseong Fortress in the Era of King 
Jeongjo,” Korea Journal 41, no. 1 (Spring 2001), 200. 
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Chŏngjo’s untimely death meant his son and successor, King Sunjo (r. 1800–
1834), only 11 se upon accession, could not rule without a regent dowager, Queen 
Chŏngsun (1745–1805), the second wife of King Yŏngjo. Chŏngsun’s sympathies lay 
with the Faction of Principle (Pyŏkp’a) that had urged Yŏngjo to execute Prince Sado and 
later resisted much of Chŏngjo’s efforts to reform the bureaucracy.53 She oversaw a 
resurgence of bureaucratic authority and solidification of power in the hands of the 
Patriarchs (Noron) party and Faction of Principle during her short tenure. One of her first 
acts as regent was to reorganize the financial structure of the Robust Brave Division to 
curtail its independence.54  
Beyond financial restructuring and increasing bureaucratic power at the expense 
of the monarchy, the regent and her ministers also sought to confront what they viewed as 
a heterodox infiltration from the West, Christianity, overseeing a dramatic increase in the 
persecution of Catholics.55 Outright violent expressions of discontent continued to 
increase until the end of the century, including a rebellion in 1812 and scores of riots in 
1862. In the early nineteenth century, the elites grew increasingly fearful of the 
population at large. This, combined with poor harvests, a depletion of the treasury, rise of 
heterodox learning, and rebellions large and small, deeply unsettled the government 
                                                             
53 The queen’s father, Kim Han’gu, was instrumental in Prince Sado’s execution. See Palais, 
Confucian Statecraft, 1069, note 206; Park, Between Dreams and Reality: The Military 
Examination in Late Chosŏn Korea, 1600–1894 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia 
Center, 2007), 83–84. 
54 Pae Hangsŏp, 19-segi Chosŏn ŭi kunsa chedo yŏn’gu (Seoul: Kukhak charyowŏn, 2002), 21. 
See also O Chongnok, “Chungang kunyŏng ŭi pyŏndong kwa chŏngch’ijŏk kinŭng,” in vol. 2, 
Chosŏn chŏngch’isa 1800–1863, by Han’guk yŏksa yŏn’guhoe, 19-segi chŏngch’isa yŏn’guban 
(Seoul: Ch’ŏngnyŏnsa, 1990), 427–433.  
55 Don Baker and Franklin Rausch, Catholics and Anti-Catholicism in Chosŏn Korea (Honolulu: 
University of Hawai‘i Press, 2017), 93–95. 
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whose responses might be aptly described as an inability to confront “the terror within.” 
Most of the literati and bureaucrats recognized that the military institutions, especially the 
provincial military and its excessive duty and taxes, played a part in the growing 
dissatisfaction of the populace. Reform was desperately needed to both protect the 
country and recover the government’s financial health, but any meaningful change would 
be long in coming.  
 
Military Institutions 
In the late Chosŏn, the military comprised capital and provincial forces. The 
central military consisted of the five military divisions stationed in Seoul and surrounding 
fortresses primarily in Kyŏnggi Province. The provincial army mostly drew from poor 
commoners and slaves pressed into service through corvée. The bulk of soldiers in the 
provinces served in a few types of units: the Sogo Armies (Sogogun), a national militia; 
the Ivory Soldiers (Abyŏng), soldiers attached to the local magistrate offices; Clerk/Slave 
Platoons (Inodae), yamen clerks and slave soldiers attached to other local offices; some 
specialty cavalry units in the northern border provinces; and other small and ad hoc 
forces assembled as needed. Nominal naval forces also existed on the coasts, but had few 
seaworthy vessels, and officers in naval commands could be appointed to the army and 
vice versa. Naval commanders were tasked with observing the coasts more than 
patrolling the seas. 
The soldiers in military service both in the capital and provinces consisted mostly 
of subjects who served rotation duty for a short period of time, generally a few months. 
Some regular soldiers that were permanent troops were stationed in Seoul, attached to the 
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Military Training Directorate or other military divisions. Commanders and officers were 
predominantly men from prominent military elite families, the muban, who passed the 
military examination for bureaucratic service. Constituting a military aristocracy based in 
Seoul and its vicinity, these families dominated top military positions within the 
bureaucracy and maintained virtually exclusive marriage ties, effectively excluding the 
lower strata, including the chungin (“middle people”) and commoners, from their ranks.56 
Government soldiers were clothed, fed, and some earned a stipend, though stipends were 
generally reserved for officers and commanders. The financing came in the form of a 
cloth tax paid for by support taxpayers who were eligible for the military service tax for 
commoners (yangyŏk) and rice taxes on land. Food and stipends also came from colony 
farms run by the military (tunjŏn).57 By the nineteenth century, eligibility for service had 
essentially devolved into a designation for taxation in goods as those who had a corvée 
obligation under the military service tax could hire or provide a replacement, most often a 
private slave.58 Those with corvée obligations could also pay provincial commanders to 
avoid service altogether.59 
In theory, regular training and drill were requirements of soldiers on duty and 
officers in the capital and provinces, but by the nineteenth century, stipends and training 
were inadequate. The government paid stipends with taxes extracted from the countryside, 
and already in the eighteenth century, government military revenues were failing to cover 
                                                             
56 Park, Between Dreams, 132–134. Military positions were available to civil examination passers 
as well, so the muban did not have a complete monopoly on such positions. 
57 Sŏ T’aewŏn, Chosŏn hugi chibang kunje yŏn’gu: yŏngjangje rŭl chungsim ŭro (Seoul: Hyean, 
1999), 88–92. 
58 Kim Uch’ŏl, Chosŏn hugi chibang kunjesa, 222–229.  
59 Palais, Confucian Statecraft, 399–401. 
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expenditures fully.60 Kings frequently cancelled training and drills on the advice of 
ministers who argued that the soldiers were poor and needed to harvest their crops to 
survive. The trend was not easily reversible as declining pay through the middle of the 
nineteenth century meant soldiers were even poorer and needed relief from training more 
frequently.61 The financial problems of the central military had knockdown effects on the 
provinces as resources were constantly diverted to the central military, from whose ranks 
officers and commanders were sent to manage the provincial military. 
The two intertwined institutions that defined provincial military structure during 
the late Chosŏn era were the Sogo Armies and the Garrison Command System (Yŏngjang 
chedo). The Sogo Armies were originally a militia system based on Ming Chinese 
precedents that the government adopted during the Imjin War (1592–1598) as a response 
to the Chosŏn army’s initial failures. The Garrison Command System was later adopted 
after the Sogo Armies’ disastrous performance during the Chŏngmyo War (1627).62 Both 
systems continued in some form until the second half of the nineteenth century, though 
their military character had deteriorated significantly.63  
 
The Formation of the Sogo Armies and Garrison Command System 
                                                             
60 Palais, Confucian Statecraft, 552–553, 565–568. 
61 Kim Uch’ŏl, 215–217 
62 Ch’a Munsŏp, Chosŏn sidae kunje yŏn’gu (Seoul: Tan’guk taehakkyo ch’ulp’anbu, 1973), 179–
184, 231–234. 
63 Kim Uch’ŏl remarks that the transformation of the Sogo into a corvée labor force was complete 
by Hŏnjong’s region (1834–1849). See Chosŏn hugi chibang kunjesa, 222; Sŏ T’aewŏn found 
that the garrison commanders’ main responsibilities by the nineteenth century were in such 
realms of public safety and pacification as thief-catching and tiger killing. See Chosŏn hugi 
chibang kunje yŏn’gu, 162–186. 
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The reformation of the military system in the late Chosŏn was a response to 
regional currents that affected all of East Asia. The Imjin War was the largest armed 
confrontation on the Korean peninsula since the Koryŏ-Khitan War (993–1019). In terms 
of destruction and loss of life, the war was the worst since the Koryŏ-Mongol War 
(1231–1259).64 As with most large-scale conflicts, the Imjin War ushered in significant 
changes in government and society and caused a great deal of debate on new methods of 
military preparedness.65 In the midst of the war, the Chosŏn military adopted new 
techniques, technologies, and organizational structures that enabled them, with the help 
of Ming armies, to repel the Japanese from the peninsula. Among these new imports was 
a work of military strategy called the New Work of Effective Techniques (Jixiao xinshu), a 
sixteenth century text by the Ming general Qi Jiguang (1528–1588) describing the 
organization, strategy, and technologies he used to defeat enemies and rebels in the 
Ming’s southern border and coastal regions. The New Work of Effective Techniques 
became the basis of a number of late Chosŏn military texts, and influenced much of the 
military reforms in the aftermath of Japan’s invasion. Another crucial text, the Treatise 
on Armament Technology (Wubei zhi, 1621) by Mao Yuanyi (1594–1640) followed a 
little later in the seventeenth century. These texts created the backbone of Chosŏn 
military thought for much of the remainder of the dynasty, inspiring several subsequent 
works such as Han Kyo’s Thorough Explanation of Martial Arts (Muye chebo), Prince 
Sado’s New Explanation of Martial Arts (Muye sinbo), and military training manuals like 
                                                             
64 Kenneth M. Swope, A Dragon’s Head and a Serpent’s Tail: Ming China and the First Great 
East Asian War, 1592–1598 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2009), 5–11. 
65 See Yu Sŏngnyong, Chingbirok: pukkŭrŏun yŏksa rŭl igyŏ naen widaehan kirok (Seoul: Ŭryu 
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the Guidebook to Military Science (Pyŏnghak chinam) and the Military Science Reader 
(Pyŏnghakt’ong).66 Qi’s work also inspired King Sŏnjo (r. 1567–1608) and his ministers 
to develop the institution of the Sogo Armies, the largest reform in organization the 
military had undergone since the early Chosŏn. 
The Sogo Armies were militia style organizations where the local magistrates or 
army commanders organized families, villages, and counties into hierarchical structures 
of command. Five households each contributed an able-bodied man to form the basic unit, 
an o. The o’s in a village or town were progressively amalgamated and arranged into 
eleven-man squads (tae) including a squad leader (taech’ong), three-squad banners (ki), 
three-banner companies (ch’o), and five-company battalions (sa), five battalions 
constituted a regiment (yŏng) of approximately 2,475 men.67 The Chosŏn king and 
ministers envisioned that the communal nature of the defense forces would prevent the 
populace from running away and allow the country to respond more quickly to invasions. 
This reform coincided with the creation of the Military Training Directorate that was 
responsible for training the Chosŏn military in the new tactics and technologies that the 
armies had encountered, particularly firearms.68 
A novel aspect of the Sogo Armies was the requirement that all social classes 
serve in them, not just commoners (yangin) but also the yangban69 and the lowborn 
                                                             
66 Chŏng Haeŭn, Han’guk chŏnt’ong pyŏngsŏ ŭi ihae (Seoul: Kukpanbu kunsa p’yŏnch’an 
yŏn’guso, 2004), 177–509. 
67 Ch’a Munsŏp, Chosŏn sidae kunje yŏn’gu, 190–191. Regiment is James Palais’ translation. 
68 Ch’a Munsŏp Chosŏn sidae kunje yŏn’gu, 158. 
69 The yangban were the highest stratum of Chosŏn social hierarchy, comprising hereditary 
families who drew legitimacy from historical and continued participation in the civil and military 
examination systems. These two lines, civil (munban) and military (muban) emerging in the late 
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(ch’ŏnin), that is slaves.70 It was a broadly egalitarian ideal that arose from the need for 
raw manpower in the largest war the Chosŏn dynasty had yet faced, and during the war it 
may have been successful. Still, the Chosŏn dynasty’s stratified society and the acute 
status consciousness of its people made service in a military organization with slaves a 
fatal proposition for the yangban and chungin, as well as more aspirational commoners.71 
Almost from the beginning, the Sogo Armies had issues with poor management and 
outright corruption. As originally organized, the units were under the control of the 
county magistrates, allowing magistrates access to the resources for maintaining and 
rewarding the soldiers. This, according to Third State Councilor (Uŭijŏng) Chŏng Inhong 
(1535–1623), was an incentive for the magistrates to pack the divisions with the old, 
weak, and infirm. The fear of corrupt magistrates was one of the key points which 
influenced King Injo’s (r. 1623–1649) institution of the Garrison Command System.72  
The other key event that influenced Injo’s decision to establish the Garrison 
Command System was the failure of the provincial military during the Chŏngmyo War, 
which revealed a need to strengthen regional defense.73 Injo established the Garrison 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
sixteenth century, maintained their distinction and privilege through exclusive marriage ties and 
protection appointments to the bureaucracy. See Park, Between Dreams and Reality, 49–50.  
70 Chŏng Kyŏnghyŏn, “19-segi ŭi saeroun kukt’o pangwiron—Tasan ŭi Minboŭi rŭl chungsim 
ŭro,” Han’guk saron 4 (March 1978), 335. 
71 Palais Confucian Statecraft, 566–568; Eugene Park examined non-elite participation in the 
military examination and found that many sought the degree and other devalued status markers 
such as “military student” (muhak) to avoid military taxation and service requirements. See 
Between Dreams, 154–168. 
72 Kwanghaegun ilgi 59:1a [1612/11/1]. Quoted in Ch’a Munsŏp, Chosŏn sidae kunje yŏn’gu, 197. 
73 Ch’a Munsŏp, Chosŏn sidae kunje yŏn’gu, 197. More recently, Hŏ T’aegu analyzed the Chosŏn 
response to the 1627 invasion and concluded that Chosŏn knew its militaries lacked trained 
soldiers and were underprepared to defend the country before the Later Jin invaded. However, 
after 1627, most resources were diverted to strengthening mountain fortresses, which, he argues, 
was a clear-eyed strategic decision based on the Later Jin army’s effectiveness at mountain sieges 
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Command System after the war, in the following year. This system was originally 
intended to take over training and military preparation in the provinces and separate the 
military administration from civil interference of the magistrates. The garrison 
commanders (yŏngjang) were responsible for most of the provincial military structures in 
addition to the Sogo Armies, including the special cavalry and border forces in P’yŏngan 
and Hamgyŏng Provinces.74 On top of this, in 1665, garrison commanders also received 
the concurrent role of sheriff (t’op’osa).75 In principle, each province was supposed to 
establish five garrisons, but in the seventeenth century, most provinces lacked enough of 
a population base to maintain more than three. By Yŏngjo’s reign, however, the system 
had grown to forty-nine garrisons, with nine in P’yŏngan Province and six in Hamgyŏng 
Province. The other provinces each had at least five, except for Kangwŏn which could 
still only maintain three.76  
The increase in garrison commands occurred despite a rapidly diminishing threat 
of invasion from either the Qing or the Japanese into the eighteenth century. Instead of 
military defense, the garrison commanders’ primary duty began to shift to catching 
criminals and suppressing local unrest. Also, magistrates were frequently appointed 
concurrently as garrison commanders, only nominally separating their duties. In the south, 
military men could be appointed separately to a garrison command without a concurrent 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
and fear that another invasion would be conducted similarly. Unfortunately, this plan led to 
exposure of the capital to a swift moving invasion force such as the Qing dispatched in January 
1637 (twelfth lunar month of 1636), “Pyŏngja horan ŭi chŏngch’i, kunsa sajŏk yŏn’gu,” (Ph.D. 
dissertation, Seoul National University, 2009), 59–66. 
74 Sŏ T’aewŏn, Chosŏn hugi chibang kunje yŏn’gu, 100–104. 
75 Sŏ T’aewŏn, Chosŏn hugi chibang kunje yŏn’gu, 166. A more literal translation would be thief-
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magistrate posting (paech’i).77 Nonetheless, the garrison commanders throughout the 
peninsula were increasingly responsible for civil policing activities at the expense of their 
military duties.78 Without strong advocates for training and military preparation in the 
form of separate garrison commanders, memorials urging for maintaining biannual 
military training for the Sogo and other units became less frequent. At the same time civil 
duties like tiger hunting and thief-catching overwhelmed the garrison commanders in the 
north.  
 
Sogo Effectiveness and Tax Reform 
While the effectiveness of Chosŏn military units is impossible to gauge given the 
infrequency of armed conflict, the Sogo Armies appeared ill-equipped as a fighting force 
during the Pyŏngja War (1636–1637). After its failure, Injo disbanded the force, but his 
son and successor, King Hyojong (r. 1649–1659), later revived it. Still, even after 
reviving the force, Hyojong did not allocate adequate resources for training and 
equipment.79 The Sogo Armies suffered further from the stigma attached to military 
service, not to mention service alongside slaves, that worked to reduce participation by 
all but the most unfortunate subjects. By the end of the seventeenth century, the Sogo 
Armies comprised mostly slaves and commoners who were too poor or unlucky to avoid 
service.80 Despite these manifest shortcomings, the Sogo Armies continued to exist well 
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into the nineteenth century. In the intervening years between its reinstatement and mid-
nineteenth century reforms, financial mismanagement and corruption of the corvée and 
military cloth tax systems worked to hollow out the institution. During the same period, 
Chosŏn officials frequently proposed reforms geared to either reducing the people’s tax 
burden or improving the effectiveness of the forces. They were rarely successful. For 
example, in the reign of King Sukchong (r. 1674–1720), Sixth State Councilor 
(Chwach’amch’an) Cho Sasŏk (1632–1693) suggested that a reduction in the number of 
soldiers in the Forbidden Guard (Kŭmwiyŏng), responsible for protecting the king, could 
rectify the sorry state of financing for the provincial armies. Sukchong, however, gave a 
wrathful response and rejected the proposal.81 James B. Palais analyzes several 
suggestions for reform from Hyojong’s reign (1649–1659) to Sukchong’s reign but notes 
that none were implemented.82 In general, kings throughout the late Chosŏn era were 
loath to bolster the provincial military, especially if it came with a reduction of central 
military preparedness. By Yŏngjo’s reign, though, finances in the realm necessitated 
some action.  
By the middle of the eighteenth century the taxation system for military service 
had become burdensome and corrupted. All eligible men were required to pay two p’il of 
cloth for the support of soldiers on duty in the capital. These tax registers, however, 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
chibang kunjesa, 225, and Yi Kyŏmju, “Chosŏn hugi sahoe sinbun pyŏnt’ong munje e taehan 
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included several exemptions for the yangban, local officials, military students (muhak), 
and students enrolled in local academies, among others. Military commanders in the 
provinces also offered to excuse duty soldiers for less onerous payments of one p’il of 
cloth instead of two. The result was that the central government was not receiving the 
revenues it expected, while rosters of military men were paper armies. To make matters 
worse, support taxpayers were required to pay for Sogo Army units as well, further 
exacerbating the burden and requiring double payments from some households.83 Yŏngjo 
considered the situation dire and sought an effective reform to relieve the regressive tax 
burden and reform the government’s finances. For a time, Yŏngjo considered 
implementing a progressive tax on households regardless of class or status. Ministers 
prevailed on him to not institute such a far-reaching reorganization of the tax structure 
and to maintain some yangban exemption and privileges. The king was persuaded that he 
could not effectively institute such a tax in the face of yangban resistance. In the end, 
through the equal service reform, the king reduced the tax from two p’il to one and 
attempted to broaden the tax base by granting fewer exemptions. The equal service 
reform law, however, did not result in the expected increase in government revenue nor 
did it effectively prevent the further decay in provincial military preparedness.84 
 
Failure and Neglect 
Despite Yŏngjo’s implementation of the largest reform of the military financial 
system, it was not adequate to recover the military character of the provincial armies. In 
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place of effective reform, maintaining the required biannual training and drills would 
have maintained some familiarity among the military tax subjects with military 
commands and duties. Kim Uch’ŏl, however, found that over Yŏngjo and Chŏngjo’s 
reigns, a delay or cancellation of these required training exercises became increasingly 
common. Under Chŏngjo, the rate was over ninety percent.85 The predictable result was a 
provincial army unfit for military duty. 
By the early nineteenth century, to say military service in the provincial armies 
went unrewarded would be an understatement as the Sogo Armies became little more 
than another source of corvée for the local magistrates and garrison commanders. 
Building dams and managing waterways were the Sogo Armies primary duties.86 Still, in 
the northern provinces at the border, military service tax subjects were required to 
perform some services related to the military. For example, in the middle of the 
nineteenth century, the local authorities arrested a party of seven—a Chosŏn official and 
his servants—for crossing the border without authorization. In deposing the seven men, 
the P’yŏngan governor’s office found that three of the men were conscripts through the 
corvée system and were forced to carry supplies and rations. The defense provided by the 
more senior officials was that they were compelled to provide aid to the Qing military 
who were conducting an operation to clear the border of Qing subjects who had settled on 
the Chosŏn side of the border.87 This did not aid the unfortunate conscripts, who were 
sentenced to death, though their sentences were later reduced to imprisonment. The 
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magistrates were also allowed to call up Sogo units for ginseng patrols, but how 
frequently the patrols actually occurred is unclear.88 
 The deficiencies of the provincial military system were obvious to most everyone 
in the Chosŏn bureaucracy, yet solutions were nearly impossible to agree on and even 
harder to implement.89 Further, in the early nineteenth century, the central government 
faced growing financial strain and internal crises, namely the expansion of Catholicism 
and peasant rebellions, that it viewed as threats to its power. An increasing frequency of 
poor harvests and famine, especially in the northern provinces, exacerbated both the 
financial strain on the bureaucracy and political unrest in the countryside.90 All of this 
came to a head in the Hong Kyŏngnae Rebellion and inspired a rethinking of what 
Chosŏn Korea’s institutions for national defense should look like. 
 
II. Rethinking National Defense 
 Much like the effects of the Imjin War, poor handling of rebellions and peasant 
unrest in the nineteenth century inspired new and sometimes radical ideas for reforming 
national defense. The latter half of this chapter examines three works that sought to 
answer how changing the provincial military system would help reduce internal unrest 
and repel external invasions. The three works, Chŏng Yagyong’s (pen name Tasan, 
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1762–1836) On the People’s Bastion (Minboŭi, 1812), the anonymous Dialogue between 
the Woodcutter and Fisherman (Ŏch’o mundap, n.d.), and Sin Hŏn’s (1810–1884)91 
Collected Arguments on the People’s Bastion (Minbo chipsŏl, 1866) all build on Chinese 
precedents and advocated sometimes dramatic reorganizations of provincial society, at 
least in war time. The greatest difference among the three was their respective 
assessments of internal versus external threats. The perception of whether internal or 
external factors presented the greater danger to the regime shifted toward the latter over 
the course of fifty plus years from 1812 to 1866. The impetus for this change was a 
growing knowledge of Western encroachment into East Asia, especially in China, and 
later Japan, and the increasing frequency of attempts to draw Chosŏn Korea into greater 
engagement with Western powers. But again, despite a recognition of the deficiencies of 
the prevailing system, and a growing chorus of thinkers advocating for radical change, 
instituting effective reforms proved near impossible. 
 
The People’s Bastion 
Tasan Chŏng Yagyong was as secure a yangban as one could arguably find in 
late Chosŏn Korea. Born in Kyŏnggi Province south of Seoul in 1762,92 Tasan could 
trace his ancestry and tradition of civil examination passage and government service to 
before the foundation of the Chosŏn dynasty. His father, Chŏng Chaewŏn (1730–1792), 
was a civil examination passer who served in several positions in Yŏngjo’s government, 
                                                             
91 Born Sin Kwanho, Sin changed his name in 1868. SJW 2724:69a [1868/3/29 26th entry]. 
92 Unless otherwise noted, details of Tasan’s life are drawn from Mark Setton’s book Chŏng 
Yagyong: Korea’s Challenge to Orthodox Neo-Confucianism (Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 1997), 53–66. 
39 
 
 
but the death of the Prince Sado in that year and Chŏng’s sympathy for the Faction of 
Expediency (sip’a), one half of the internal division among the Patriarchs that had 
advocated against Sado’s execution, led to Chŏng’s withdrawal from government 
service.93  
As a young man, Tasan was known for his precocious intellect and creativity, by 
the age of ten, he had already produced a volume of poetry. His erudition continued to 
impress his teachers and associates throughout his life, including Chŏngjo, only a few 
years his senior. Tasan first came to Chŏngjo’s attention in 1784 when the he singled out 
Tasan’s objectivity in a response to a question the king posed to students at the State 
Confucian Academy (Sŏnggyun’gwan). Chŏngjo and Tasan developed a close 
relationship over the next few years, and Tasan’s future in the bureaucracy appeared 
secure. Tasan’s intellect and curiosity, however, led him to explorations of heterodox 
Western Learning (Sŏhak), or Catholicism, that caused him some trouble. Chŏngjo and 
his court grew increasingly concerned about the threat of Catholicism, brought to Korea 
through the yearly embassies to the Qing court, and resorted to increasingly draconian 
measures to stop its spread. Chŏngjo went so far as to ban the importation of all books 
from the Qing in 1792.94 Limited crackdowns and persecutions occurred during 
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Chŏngjo’s reign as well and ensnared some of Tasan’s close associates and family 
members. Tasan himself was accused of harboring Catholic sympathies and was forced 
out of government for a time. His relationship with Chŏngjo allowed him to remain in 
government service, though, and he continued to participate in some of the king’s major 
public works including designing a floating bridge over the Han River and schematics for 
the construction of Hwasŏng.  
Tasan’s fortunes turned for the worse after the untimely death of Chŏngjo in 
1800. As the regent and dowager, Queen Chŏngsun, who was staunchly anti-Catholic, 
instituted a large and bloody persecution of Catholics in 1801 after Hwang Sayŏng 
(1775–1801), who was related to one of Tasan’s brothers by marriage, attempted to send 
a letter requesting Western aid in ending the government’s suppression of Catholicism.95 
Tasan’s close connections to several of the participants resulted in his exile to Chŏlla 
Province, where he would spend the next seventeen years, despite attempts to end his 
punishment including by the dowager herself.96 Tasan’s exile afforded him freedom from 
secular affairs, and he was able to devote himself to research and teaching, composing 
some of his most well-known works such as A Book on Mindful Governance of the 
People (Mongmin simsŏ, 1821). 
It was during his exile in the far south that Tasan wrote his short treatise on 
national defense, On the People’s Bastion. He wrote it after the chaos of the Hong 
Kyŏngnae Rebellion in P’yŏngan and what he viewed as the incompetent response of the 
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Chosŏn military. His work explored methods for choosing a location, construction, 
organization, protection, mutual aid, scouting the enemy, rewards and punishments, and 
special considerations for fortresses on islands and on temple grounds. It also included 
illustrations of some of the defensive works and a short question and answer section to 
address concerns some may have had about its effectiveness and function. The work 
consists of mostly long quotations from older Chinese treatises on military technology 
such as Mao Yuanyi’s Treatise on Military Preparedness and Yun Qing’s (1513–n.d.) 
Fortress Conventions (Baoyue, n.d.) with commentary from Tasan or examples from the 
Korean experience. The Chinese precedents, however, could not be adopted wholesale 
into Chosŏn Korea, rather Tasan adapted these late Ming texts to Korean concepts of 
social organization and defensive postures. 
The people’s bastion was not simply a fortress, though much space in his On the 
People’s Bastion was given over to the construction of walls and defensive fortifications. 
Not only was it Tasan’s solution for the degradation of the provincial military and the 
Sogo Armies, at its heart, was a community organization that would forge bonds among 
the people and by extension make them more amenable to central control. Through a 
network of bastions, Chosŏn subjects in the provinces could be assured of their security. 
These subjects would become the ideal farmer-soldier who tended the fields in times of 
peace but was prepared to defend the land in times of war. A community defense force 
would negate the need for a standing army, which he, and many literati at the time, 
viewed as a drain on resources and corruption of the natural order.97 This farmer-soldier 
would be tied to his community through the bastion where everyone would serve in some 
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capacity, the rich would offer their wealth, and respected members of the community 
would assume leadership, doling out punishment and reward in coordination with the 
magistrates and other central bureaucrats sent to the provinces, and the lower classes 
would offer their labor. 
Ostensibly, On the People’s Bastion advocated for the people’s bastion to fend 
off incursions from a hostile nation, primarily Japan. Tasan based his reasoning on his 
fear that the Japanese bakufu was unable to maintain control over the independent daimyō 
and that the southwest domains of Chōshū and Satsuma would use the bakufu’s weakness 
to indulge in their natural proclivities toward violence and adventurism overseas. 
Unfortunately, Tasan’s ideas about Japan were anachronistic and pulled much from Mao 
Yuanyi’s assessments of both the Japanese and the Wakō, who, by Mao’s time, were a 
multi-ethnic collection of East Asian traders, smugglers, and bandits.98 Moreover, as 
Ch’oe Chinuk points out, Tasan used hearsay and others’ personal recollections about the 
weakness of the bakufu and its inability to keep the more militaristic domains from 
adventurism rather than direct knowledge of internal Japanese politics.99 Even so, Tasan 
did not consider a full-scale invasion from a hostile power to be a real possibility. Instead, 
he thought that even the mere rumor of an invasion would spread through the countryside 
like fire, causing chaos.100 His experience with how rumors of Hong Kyŏngnae’s 
rebellion so far north caused people to flee in Chŏlla province convinced him that the 
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people were not prepared to defend themselves.101 Further, Tasan’s illustration that a 
rumor was sufficient to throw people into chaos reflects his assessment that successful 
regional defense was as much about social control as military preparedness. Therefore, in 
his work, he advocated for greater oversight of the population and social engineering 
through cooperation with local magistrates in implementing the people’s bastion more 
than educating the people in military tactics or drill. 
 
The Fortress 
Tasan envisioned the people’s bastions covering the country like armor in 
overlapping scales of iron.102 In creating defensive fortifications throughout the peninsula 
to repel attacks, it would be important to analyze and defend weak points and strategic 
areas along roads and rivers. Yet, instead of a geographic analysis of Korean terrain and 
key defensive areas, Tasan recommended all local officials seek out ideal spots in the 
mountains to establish the bastions. His suggestion was in spite of the failure of Korea’s 
mountain fortresses to stop the enemy during the Chŏngmyo and Pyŏngja Wars.103 The 
lack of attention to strategic defensive positions reinforces the view that the social aspects 
of his plan were paramount. Without fortresses at strategic points along roads, in valleys 
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or mountain passes, sending out regional forces to repel an invading army would be 
impractical, and ultimately doomed to failure. It is difficult to imagine that Tasan’s 
method of national defense would be effective at repelling an invading army. It would, 
however, protect the people. 
In selecting land for construction of a fortress, Tasan stressed the importance of 
the shape of the mountain, the presence of trees, fresh water and natural barriers to attack. 
Few of the considerations he suggests for magistrates deal with situating the bastion to 
protect the territory of the community. His discussion of enemy attacks assumed that an 
invading force would focus on the people and taking individual fortresses. His approach 
to war and defense was clearly drawn from the Imjin War and classic Chinese military 
texts like Sunzi’s Art of War that prioritized defense over offensive engagement.104 His 
reasons for not advocating a broader range of terrain for bastions were technological, 
noting that Chinese fortresses were sometimes built on the plains, but that they were 
constructed with tempered bricks that could withstand greater attacks. Tasan claimed that 
Korea lacked the technology or ability to temper their bricks. He also worried that 
fortresses on flat land could be attacked with siege engines and covered wagons, 
technologies that common farmers would have trouble defending against, so it was best 
to maintain mountain fortresses.105  
Tasan believed that all Chosŏn subjects in all areas should be gathered together 
into people’s bastions. Even the island towns and Buddhist temples were to have 
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fortresses. His vision of national defense is consistent with defense from total war, an 
enemy raid, or more crucially popular rebellion. If the entire peninsula were engulfed in 
war or rebellion, the bastions would operate to make subduing the population costly. If an 
enemy were a small raiding party, the bastion would protect the people, livestock and 
food stores and the enemy, too small to lay siege, would give up. Its effects on deterring a 
more limited conflict would be small, much like the Pyŏngja War. But in the event of a 
local rebellion, the bastions would serve to deny not just provisions to the rebels but also 
manpower. If the people were required to retreat into small isolated communities in the 
mountains at the command of the magistrate, popular rebellions would fail due to a lack 
of network cohesion.  
Overall, Tasan was not concerned with the people waging war for national 
defense from the bastions. Instead protection was the main goal of the bastions. His 
philosophical guide for national defense was “first protect, then wage war” (sŏnsu hujŏn), 
a maxim that is suggested by Sunzi in his Art of War: “Therefore, he who is skilled in 
battle establishes himself in an undefeatable position, and does not let slip the inevitable 
defeat of his enemy.”106 Tasan, however, did not complete Sunzi’s maxim by examining 
how the people should wage war, rather he trusted that a populace that had invested the 
time and effort in creating the bastion would naturally fight the enemy.107 Indeed, On the 
People’s Bastion lacks any recommendations for drill or training in military skills, but 
                                                             
106 Sunzi, The Art of War, 90. 
107 The furthest Tasan goes in discussing an attack on the enemy is when he discusses mutual aid, 
that when a bastion is attacked, those nearby should render aid after determining it is not a ruse. 
Chŏng Yagyong and Sin Kwanho, 219–220. 
46 
 
 
Tasan did go into greater detail describing his recommendations on how the people 
should be grouped together and tasks delegated. 
 
Social Engineering 
In the bastion, it was important that no one be under-utilized, but the units, the 
smallest comprising five persons called an o as in the Sogo units, should not contain both 
the “noble” (kwijok) and the lowborn (ch’ŏnjok). If they did, “their differences would 
become evident, the elites are made for comfort and the lowborn are inclined to hardship. 
Their strength would be uneven.”108 He also left his definition of elite undefined though it 
would appear to be commoners who had some status or wealth. Tasan probably included 
local yangban in his definition, but he likely overestimated the extent to which they 
would participate. The lowborn were slaves and those in despised trades like butchery. 
Tasan noted three grades of people, the elite, the lowborn, and the middle group 
(chungdŭng), or the average person.109 All three status groups, would be organized into 
separate companies of five, and each one would be given duties within the bastion, 
including defense, hauling water, making fires, keeping watch, etc. He advocated 
organizing the entire population including weak troops (yakkun), children older than eight 
se and younger than fifteen se, which was the age when they could be mobilized for 
                                                             
108 Chŏng Yagyong and Sin Kwanho, 215. 
109 Chŏng Yagyong and Sin Kwanho, 215. Despite the distinction here, the rest of the text usually 
refers only to elite and lowborn. Tasan’s middle group is likely not the chungin, a status group of 
technocrats and specialists, like translators, who made up a distinctive stratum in Chosŏn society, 
but rather commoners of some status who were not considered local yangban or other elites. For 
more on the chungin as a social class see: Eugene Y. Park, “Old Status Trappings in a New 
World: The “Middle People” (Chungin) and Genealogies in Modern Korea,” Journal of Family 
History, 38, no. 2 (2013): 166–187. 
47 
 
 
corvée, and the old troops (nogun), those over fifty-six se who were no longer eligible to 
be conscripted. 
The rich would be asked to support the bastion, especially for rations. The rich 
would be allowed to maintain some of their private wealth and food, but that food could 
only be used for incidental meals since breakfast and dinner should be eaten together for 
solidarity. If the rich had a better meal it would cause resentment. All three types of 
rations, military, relief, and private, were to be collected and distributed by the bastion 
general (poch’ong). The rich were not allowed to take their rations out of the fortress to 
sell them and should be encouraged to share them with the bastion, for “if within the 
bastion they are shared with the poorer folk, it will be repaid with obedient effort.”110 But 
rations would be collected only in ten day increments to prevent abuse of the system if 
the enemy had left the area. 
The organization of the people’s bastion did express a certain egalitarian ethos 
about society and the responsibilities of the people for national defense, but it still 
reinforced class distinctions, especially through living quarters. Tasan recommended four 
rooms be built within the walls of the bastion so that men and women and the elite and 
commoners could sleep separately. Elite women were to be cloistered from the men 
except for young men who wished to see their mothers. The lowborn could mingle freely 
except at night. Four rooms were the absolute minimum to maintain separation of the 
sexes and classes. If the bastion were larger, it could accommodate more rooms, and 
should have an office for the bastion commander (pojang) and bastion general. The 
                                                             
110 Chŏng Yagyong and Sin Kwanho, 217. 
48 
 
 
priority was maintaining strict social distinction over creating administrative space that 
would aid in commanding the bastion and prosecuting war.111 
 
Life under Siege 
In Tasan’s philosophy, the bastions should be self-sufficient. He went so far as to 
urge the people, even at times of war, to farm the land while not actively under siege. A 
proper bastion would erect watchtowers and institute the use of flags to communicate 
enemy troop movements so that those in the fields could retreat to the fortress when 
necessary. This was good for the people not only to protect their lives, but also “it is 
certainly not the people’s desire to wait for troops to take it [their harvest].”112 Tasan 
suggested that the bastions should communicate with one another in peacetime and 
hammer out agreements about mutual defense. Those fortresses that failed to come to the 
aid of another under attack would also be punished. This way, the people’s bastions 
would be “a thousand ri [Ch. li] steel chain [around the peninsula].”113 
Tasan did impart some suggestions on the prosecution of war. It was important 
that the commanders of the bastions understood where the enemy was and that the enemy 
may “make noise in the east while striking west” through an attack on another bastion as 
a diversion or to get neighboring groups to rally to their aid.114 His attitude presupposed a 
certain amount of military acumen and ability on the part of the commoners, too. His 
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chapters on reconnoitering and knowing the enemy required the people to have skills in 
scouting and counting troop strength, and more than likely some practical battle 
experience, little of which a Chosŏn subject of the time would have had. Also, his section 
on understanding the methods of the enemy, the Japanese, consists mostly of long quotes 
from Mao Yuanyi’s work, which was not describing the Japanese per se, but was about 
the Wakō along China’s southern coast. Mao’s descriptions of technology and tactics was 
outdated by the nineteenth century and was concerned with repelling piracy and raiding, 
not an invasion. Tasan’s understanding of how the Japanese or another nation would 
wage a war in his contemporary era suffered as a result.115  
Tasan’s philosophy was “First protect, then wage war.” But, his fear that the 
people would use their new-found ability to wage war to instead contest the power of the 
state tempered his concern for stocking adequate war-making materials. He suggested 
that the bastions be limited in their offensive weapons to bows and swords. He reasoned 
that the costs for firearms both in training and stockpiling gunpowder outweighed their 
defensive capability.116 This is a valid argument, especially in the cash-strapped reality of 
early nineteenth-century Chosŏn,117 but he further did not advocate much for training the 
bastion communities. Tasan preferred the classical Confucian model of a provincial army 
composed of farmer/soldiers that would relieve the state of the corruption of the military 
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farm colony and Chosŏn subjects of the burden of corvée, which in Tasan’s argument had 
bred resentment and fueled the recent unrest in the peninsula.118  
Tasan wrote very little on the training of subjects in soldiering or handling 
weapons, an approach that reflected a common prejudice of the time. Yi Tŏngmu (1741–
1793) and Pak Chega (1750–1805) two contemporaries who advocated Reformed 
Confucianism (Sirhak) like Tasan, expressed in their work, the Illustrated Compendium 
of the Martial Arts (Muye tobo t’ongji), that the daily life of a farmer or commoner was 
replete with opportunities for developing the skills of a warrior, from harvesting crops to 
hunting.119 Those skills, however, were strength and ability in wielding weapons. Many 
scholars argue that the true work of effective armies is soldiering, that is training in 
coordination, drilling, and obeying commands to work within a unit.120 In On the 
People’s Bastion, soldiering was either a peripheral skill or Tasan assumed that such 
cohesion would naturally develop from life in the bastion and the sense of determination 
such protection would give to its members. His belief that when a crisis arose such 
tangential work as harvesting and hunting could be applied to defensive or offensive war-
making on a grand scale was misplaced, but little in Chosŏn’s history of war would 
dissuade a literatus of the time from making this assumption. Korea had a long tradition 
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of “righteous armies” (ŭibyŏng), a militia that local leaders would assemble in times of 
crisis, and the righteous armies were known to fight with some effect.121 Finally, Tasan’s 
bias showed in the selections he used from his source material; the practical application 
chapters of Mao Yuanyi’s Treatise on Military Preparedness, Yun Qing’s Fortress 
Conventions, and Qi Jixiang’s New Work of Effective Techniques, were elided in favor of 
those authors’ philosophical arguments or discussions of technologies.122  
The beginning of the nineteenth century saw increasing stresses on the fabric of 
Chosŏn society. Increasing famines, a restive population, and an elite fearful of both 
heterodoxy and internal revolt combined to breed resentment and fear in the provinces. 
Tasan’s experiences in his exile drove home to him the importance of renewing a social 
compact, developing stronger bonds between all levels of society. News of the Western 
powers’ increasing military and political encroachment in Asia as the century progressed 
caused more literati to reexamine Chosŏn Korea’s defense. Still, the threat of the West 
was not that it would conquer Chosŏn territory, rather it was that the presence of the West 
and Western threats would destabilize a population already under strain. Rectifying moral 
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hazard and strengthening social cohesion continued to be the focus for the next author 
who took up Tasan’s work. 
 
A Second Argument for a People’s Bastion 
 The Dialogue between the Woodcutter and Fisherman (Ŏch’o mundap) is a 
defense of the people’s bastion written sometime in the nineteenth century. Its authorship 
is unknown. Some suspect it was written by Tasan himself.123 The Dialogue is modeled 
on a well-known exegesis of natural philosophy, the Discussion between the Woodcutter 
and Fisherman (Yuqiao wendui) attributed to Shao Yong (1011–1077), a Chinese 
literatus during the Song dynasty (960–1279). Shao was a philosopher closely aligned 
with the school of thought that came to be known as Neo-Confucianism, so Chosŏn elite 
in the nineteenth century were familiar with Shao’s works though more so in the literary 
world than the military one.124 Shao’s Discussion inspired a number of paintings by 
Chosŏn literati, the most famous by Hong Tŭkku (1653–1703?). Rather than any 
philosophical affinity with the Chinese work, which was not concerned with more 
pedestrian aspects of the world such as national defense, the author of the Korean work 
wished to signal a connection to a broader literary world and the elites by couching his 
defense of the people’s bastion in the form of a famous Chinese work connected to the 
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development of Neo-Confucianism. Beyond the introduction which has some form of 
dialogue, the main body of the work is structured as the woodcutter’s response to quotes 
from Yun Qing, Mao Yuanyi, and Tasan rather than a dialogue with the fisherman. Tasan 
did write a critique of Shao Yong’s philosophy on the I Ching, or Book of Changes, and 
the structure of the Dialogue is based on a number of the topics in Tasan’s On the 
People’s Bastion, but there is no more definitive evidence of authorship than that.125 As 
my analysis will show, the social structure of the bastion is different enough that Tasan is 
not a likely candidate. 
The time of publication is also in dispute, with some suggesting a date as late as 
the 1870s. However, based on the information in the introduction and its mention of the 
West only in the context of Christianity, I would venture that it was composed before the 
French incursion of 1866, and probably even closer to the beginning of the century.126 Its 
focus on the social aspects of the people’s bastion and on its potential to rectify societal 
ills and unrest also suggest a early to mid-nineteenth century date. 
 The author’s cautionary warnings about the threat to the ruling dynasty inherent in 
Chosŏn’s social decay is vividly illustrated in the introduction’s portrayal of the fall of 
Chinese dynasties. The historical timeline the Dialogue presented focused on the threat to 
successive Chinese dynasties from internal dissolution and a moral backsliding which 
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opened the door for successful external invasions. Tasan was more implicit in his concern 
for rectifying internal relationships between the elite and commoner, or the central 
authorities and provincial communities, and suppression of local rebellious sentiment, but 
the author of the Dialogue is quite explicit. The Dialogue section titled “Admonishments 
and Exhortations with Commitments” reads like a manifesto with bulleted points such as: 
“The bonds of filiality to parents, respect to one’s older brothers, loyalty to the sovereign, 
and respect for elders are the first duty and mutual admonishments [on the subject] are 
permitted;” “Within, all are the same group without distinction between elite and lowborn, 
high or low;” and “Do not live with an impoverished and stingy mentality, it causes us to 
satiate ourselves as others go hungry. Do not live with a lazy mentality, it causes us to 
shirk while others work harder.”127 Also, the author is suspect of Christianity: “That 
violation of Western teaching [Christianity], wrapped in secrecy and hidden leaders, there 
are those who have crossed the ocean to call our enemies to rise up. Now, though their 
nose has been bloodied and they retreated, we cannot know their evil machinations.”128 
 Bastion construction and the usefulness of wall materials, moats, parapets, 
crenellations and the like generally follow the methods laid out in Tasan’s work as well 
as Mao Yun’s Treatise on Military Preparedness and Yun Qing’s Fortress Conventions. 
The Dialogue, however, suggests that walls be made of mud instead of Tasan’s 
preference of stone and mud, which may have made construction easier and faster, but 
compromises their strength of defense. Also, in place of the four large rooms Tasan 
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recommends, the people would construct their own small rooms as necessary out of 
thatch.129 Such methods suggest that this author imagined the structures, and even the 
fortress itself, as more temporary, to be maintained during an invasion. This perception 
would necessarily alter the social nature of the people’s bastion, weakening the strength 
of cohesion that Tasan’s more encompassing bastion would engender.  
 The Dialogue devotes a considerable amount of time to regulations that were 
designed to alleviate discrepancies between the rich and poor. The author recognized 
more transactional aspects of the bastions including that if a family dies without a next of 
kin, the property could be sold by the bastion general for the benefit of the military. The 
rich could be asked to support more of the bastions functioning as well. And the division 
of labor was not as strict between class as Tasan’s work.130 These stipulations encouraged 
a more egalitarian social contract among the residents in the bastion. This model, which 
was so at odds with contemporary Chosŏn society, may explain why the author chose to 
remain anonymous and the failure of this work to affect any policies in the government. 
 A desire to return to older principles drawn from classical Chinese models 
permeates Chosŏn reformers’ discussions. To be taken seriously, any change had to be 
found somewhere in the Chinese canon, preferably from the Zhou, Han, Tang or Song 
dynasties, even the introduction of the Sogo Army could not solely rely on Qi’s work 
from the late Ming, but the evidence of a similarly named, but not organized, institution 
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from the Tang had to be marshalled to institute the change.131 The Dialogue laments the 
loss of the connection between farmer and soldier represented by a professional soldier in 
the central army, and urges a return to the well-field system of taxation and social 
organization. The ideal member of the people’s bastion was a farmer who could fight 
when called upon, as a farmer’s connection to the land would discourage fleeing and 
encourage a more zealous defense of the bastion.132 But, in a deviation from Tasan’s 
argument, the Dialogue also recommended supplying the bastion with cannons, and that 
people be trained to use them. The author noted, too, that guns were a useful technology 
for defense but did not advocate for stocking them in the armory.133 
 Another departure from Tasan’s work is in the section on scouting. In Tasan’s 
work, this section consisted of a long quote from Mao’s work on the Wakō and their 
raiding techniques, followed by a short statement from Tasan that many Chosŏn subjects 
betrayed their country and collaborated with the Japanese. To prevent this in the future, 
Tasan recommended rewarding greatly those who bring knowledge of the enemy. The 
Dialogue was not so fixated with the Japanese but did recount the defeats of Yi Il (1538–
1601) and Sin Rip (1546–1592) during the Imjin War as failures in scouting and knowing 
the enemy which led to being surprised.134 There are no rewards for bringing knowledge 
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of the enemy, the author assumed that devotion to the land and the one’s neighbors would 
inspire proper action. 
 The author of the Dialogue was also more concerned with the character and 
attitude of those in the people’s bastion than Tasan was. Not only did the author spend 
less time on fortifications, a number of sections, with titles like Bravery (changdam), 
Conserving Energy (chŏnggi), Staying in Place (chŏnggak), Focusing the Eyes 
(chŏnmok), Quieting Noise (chŏngsŏng), Resolving the Will (kyŏnji), and Exposing 
Wickedness (ch’ŏkkan), devote space to preparing the people for life in the bastion. Each 
of these topics used quotations from the seven military classics, primarily the Art of War, 
to expound on the necessity of proper action in the bastion.135  
 Finally, the author still felt that the people’s bastion was not equal to the 
government soldiers as their rewards for heroic deeds like killing enemies were only half 
as good. His justification was that the government soldiers’ devotion was publicly 
oriented while the people’s bastion was privately oriented.136 The bastion leader also 
would not receive awards for military exploits which was more properly the realm of the 
bastion commander. The bastion was also subordinate to the government office when it 
came to severe punishments such as exile or death. The author was not too concerned 
about discipline, believing that rewards were enough incentive for valorous behavior, and 
regular order could be kept with the laws as they existed, that is to say the people’s 
bastion would not be under martial law.137 
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 The Dialogue focused more intently on the social aspects of the people’s bastion 
and argued that shoring up the moral rectitude of the people would prevent the fate that 
had befallen all the Chinese dynasties: overthrow of the rulers because of internal 
dissolution. An invasion by a Western military power still remained a nebulous bugbear 
to instill a need for greater attention to the decay that the author felt had infected Chosŏn 
society. That would soon change. 
 
A New Argument for New Ears 
The calculus for national defense changed dramatically by the 1860s with the 
concrete presence of Western militaries. The necessity for technological change was 
greater than the threat of social dissolution, and the proponents of the people’s bastion 
decreased the arguments for the bastion as a tool of social engineering and integrating the 
countryside more firmly with the central authorities while highlighting its importance as a 
border defense strategy. The beginnings of this change can be traced Chosŏn officials’ 
increasing interactions with Western powers and the Chinese defeats in the two Opium 
Wars. The Koreans had learned of Chinese defeats in the Opium Wars relatively soon 
after the conclusion of each, but the court was not overly concerned with the news. 
However, people like Kim Segyun, Pak Kyusu, and others, particularly those who had 
served as diplomatic envoys, expressed more alarm.138 The defense commands along the 
coast saw Western ships close to shore more frequently, and in the 1840s Korea faced a 
delicate diplomatic negotiation when an English ship landed in Korea and requested 
permission to survey the Korean coastline. They were ultimately successful in keeping 
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the English off their coasts without upsetting the Westerners too much.139 But, the event 
gave the Chosŏn court a foreshadowing of the difficulties ahead. One of the key figures 
in advocating for greater government commitments to national defense was Sin Hŏn. 
Sin Hŏn was born Sin Kwanho to a military elite family which was Patriarch in 
partisan loyalty. His father was a moderately successful bureaucrat who served as a 
garrison commander in Taegu, Kyŏngsang Province and as the magistrate of P’yŏngsan, 
Hwanghae Province during his career but few high-rank positions in the capital. His 
grandfather served as the magistrate of both Ch’angsŏng and Kanggye, key counties on 
the northern border in P’yŏngan Province. In his youth, Sin received tutelage from Tasan 
and another influential Reformed Confucianism scholar, Kim Chŏnghŭi (1786–1856).140 
Ch’oe Chinuk, however, argues that Tasan’s influence on Sin’s development was not as 
deep as that of Kim whose advocacy for Northern Learning, which was a subcategory of 
Reformed Confucianism that studied the Qing and their developments, and verification 
based on facts (silsa kusi) affected Sin’s scholarship and reform ideas profoundly. Ch’oe 
notes that Sin’s treatise, Collected Arguments on the People’s Bastion, is the only work 
that reveals Tasan’s direct influence.141 
Sin’s life and career shared some striking similarities with Tasan’s. Sin was 
noticed by the court at a young age, when, in 1827, he was appointed to a Special 
Military Post (Pyŏlgunjik) in the guard of the young regent, Prince Hyomyŏng, who was 
Sunjo’s heir apparent. Hyomyŏng was only eighteen at the time, but he was eager to 
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leave his mark on the bureaucracy, following many of Chŏngjo’s policies of seeking men 
of talent. He also promoted military men more frequently and to higher posts.142 Sin’s 
elevated position brought him in contact with several reform minded bureaucrats and 
scholars such as Pak Kyusu and Kim Segyun. Over the next couple years, Hyomyŏng 
struggled to reassert royal authority at the expense of the bureaucracy in part by 
promoting younger, military men to higher positions within the bureaucracy who would 
then owe their position and allegiance to him. In 1830, however, the prince died suddenly, 
and the reform minded clique he had been building was dispersed with many officials 
posted to magistracies in the provinces.143 This group of reformers, including Sin, 
continued to communicate with each other and memorialize the throne on the topic of 
social and political reform, but they would not receive a sympathetic ear until the 
ascension of Kojong, and the de facto rule of his father, the Taewŏn’gun.  
The ascension of Kojong in 1864 marked the beginning of a program to return 
authority to the monarchy at the expense of the bureaucracy. The reform agenda was 
overseen and zealously pursued by the Taewŏn’gun and included dramatic changes in 
government ministries, tax collection, monetary policy, and public works.144 The rule of 
the Taewŏn’gun was also marked by strong anti-Western sentiment that ostensibly called 
for reforms in the military and governing the population in the provinces.145 Both 
domestic and international currents had finally converged to offer a window of 
opportunity to implement the people’s bastion. 
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 The new international reality of Western military intervention in East Asia 
finally reached the Korean peninsula in the form of French incursion in 1866. In 
retaliation for the murder of a French priest, French marines surprised a fort on the island 
of Kanghwa and ravaged the countryside for a few weeks, burning much of the royal 
palace and pillaging the supplemental repository for royal documents and writing (oe 
Kyujanggak). The Chosŏn central army was mobilized and ambushed the marines on 
their way to attack a Buddhist monastery, Chŏndŭng-sa, on the southern end of the island 
and successfully forced the French to retreat.146 While the Taewŏn’gun considered the 
operation against the French successful, the extended time it took to mobilize the central 
army and prepare for war and the inability of local forces to contest French control 
worried many, including Sin, who redoubled their push for reforms. Sin’s memorials to 
the throne and the proposals in his work on the people’s bastion did influence the 
Taewŏn’gun’s military reforms.147 But, the impetus for renewal would be met with 
financial and societal pressures that could not be easily overcome. 
The people’s bastion as presented in Collected Arguments on the People’s 
Bastion was a slight revision of Tasan’s work, consisting mostly of quotations of whole 
sections of On the People’s Bastion. However, Sin’s work was not thinly veiled social 
engineering justified through a nebulous foreign threat. The threat was real, and defense 
was paramount. He explicitly stated at the outset that “People’s bastions were the method 
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the famous generals of old used to protect the border.”148 And his analysis of Chosŏn 
failures in repelling the French attack consume much of his introduction. Sin’s work 
notably does not include Tasan’s quotations from the Mao Yuanyi’s Treatise on Military 
Preparedness about the character and threat of the Japanese, rather he was much more 
forceful in describing the tenuous position Korea faced in regard to a changed 
international order. The threats of foreign armies, and even shipwrecked sailors, 
reinforced for Sin the need to prepare a strong defense. “Then, we should be filled with 
areas to defend against enemies, and when that is a reality we shall have a good defense. 
The essentials of a good defense lie in the safety of the people.”149 
Sin envisioned the people’s bastions as a method of social control and a 
reorganization of society with an awareness of the importance of protection and military 
preparedness. His vision, though, was slight on details of implementation. For instance, 
he suggested that all towns be organized into companies of five like Tasan’s work, and 
then arranging those in ever larger compacts under the control of a bastion leader, but he 
gave little guidance on the organization or discipline of these groups, an unfortunate 
oversight that may have hampered its implementation. And, in a change from Tasan’s 
organization, these groups on their face would not segregate by class, except that archery 
units should be made up of the youth of the rich families since rich youth would have had 
the most training and opportunity to practice archery, a more difficult skill to master than 
musketry. Their wealth may have been a factor, too, as Sin recommended that the 
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families furnish silver for their own arrows.150 The egalitarian suggestion of the people’s 
bastion only suggested in Tasan’s work had a fuller articulation in Sin’s. The dramatic 
changes to social stratification and the potential to disrupt networks of local functionary 
authority may have held some appeal to the Taewŏn’gun. Still, Chosŏn Korea was not an 
egalitarian society and the old order resisted many of the Taewŏn’gun’s reforms; the 
people’s bastion, with its mingling of noble and common, would not receive a warm 
reception.151 
Despite recognizing the need to reform the provincial defensive units, Sin 
provided little guidance as to how to integrate these units as a capable defensive force. 
Tasan at least gave consideration to this in his chapter on rewards and punishments. For 
Tasan, the local officials were tasked with maintaining standards of conduct that 
comported with their own peacetime duties, this discipline would ensure that the people 
supported each other in an effort to gain praise or avoid punishment. Whereas, the extent 
of Sin’s assessment was that the bastion leader should be someone who commanded the 
loyalty and obedience of the people. His status imparted his authority to discipline, but 
the standards of discipline were vague.152  
 Sin’s proposal for the people’s bastion was partially implemented by Kojong’s 
court in 1867. His chapter on social organization, despite its limitations and sparseness of 
detail was used to organize the population in the countryside.153 It was, however, 
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inadequate to overcome social stratification and could not receive the funding necessary 
due to several other projects in which the court was engaged, prominent being the 
restoration of Kyŏngbok palace.154 
 
Conclusion 
 By the nineteenth century, the Chosŏn provincial military was in disarray. It was a 
military institution in name only. Its reform was not an easy task. The people’s bastion 
was a proposal that appealed to a group of reform minded officials, though the majority 
of them were politically ostracized from positions of power. These officials, mostly 
Southerners and those Patriarchs who were aligned with the Faction of Expediency, were 
concerned with national defense and organization of the countryside more than the capital 
and its prerogatives. Through the first half of the nineteenth century, the people’s bastion 
had its proponents, but the egalitarian nature of its social engineering, appealing probably 
more to those out of power, doomed its chances for full-scale implementation. 
All three authors expressed concern for the nation, but their conceptions of 
pressing threats were different. Tasan viewed the people as the greatest threat whether 
through corruption or rebellion. He raised the specter of the Japanese to serve as an 
example of how unstable and fearful the populace was, rather than as a prescient warning 
of Japanese intentions. As the century progressed, concern over external enemies grew as 
the author of the Dialogue between the Woodcutter and the Fisherman shows in his 
warning on Christianity and the discussion of the fall of Chinese dynasties. That author, 
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however, still considered those threats as catalysts of internal instability that needed to be 
corrected so that the population could more effectively confront foreign encroachment. It 
was not until Sin’s work on the people’s bastion in the wake of the French incursion that 
the focus turned to preparing defensive fortifications for the express purpose of repelling 
attack.  
None of these works addressed the central core of developing a strong defensive 
capability, namely group training and cohesion. They did attempt to address systemic 
issues with the Sogo Armies and the military support cloth tax, which were hopelessly 
corrupted by provincial officials and the rich and elite families’ desire to avoid military 
service. The Sogo Armies, developed in the aftermath of the first invasion during the 
Imjin War, was envisioned as a local militia comprised of all subjects and provisioned by 
the central government. The system began to break down as social stratification caused 
many of the upper classes to avoid service with the lower classes and commoners. This 
deterioration in the capabilities of the Sogo units was also accompanied by a further loss 
of revenue with Yŏngjo’s implementation of the equal service reform which essentially 
halved the amount of taxes collected for the military.155 Tasan argued that the Sogo units 
were too costly to maintain and a burden on the populace, not to mention that they were a 
military unit in name only, more often than not used as manual labor to reconstruct castle 
walls and help with farming or harvesting. Military training had also suffered in the 
                                                             
155 Palais, Confucian Statecraft, 566–568. In fact while on paper, it was a halving of the tax, it 
ultimately did not bring in the expected revenue nor were the people satisfied with the relief as 
complaints of magistrates abusing their tax collection authority continued to be brought 
frequently. Palais argues that while the government did not produce revenue needed, the people 
were still paying as much if not more taxes by the nineteenth century. 
66 
 
 
intervening years, either due to cost constraints or the long peace, locals were simply 
ignorant when it came to the more demanding aspects of drill and preparation. 
The remedy consistent in all the works on the people’s bastion, even Sin’s, was 
social engineering. The implicit message was that change would need to start in social 
relations, a tenuous proposition at best. It is perhaps no surprise that the two known 
authors, Tasan and Sin, hail from traditionally outsider groups though both enjoyed some 
measure of access to higher levels of the government. Their positions allowed them 
distance to criticize Chosŏn elitism, but they still had enough invested in the system to 
deplore rebellion. The author of the Dialogue had a more strident social message which 
may explain his anonymity. The unfortunate reality was that none of these propositions 
could overcome vested interests of the ruling elite. It was not until the ascension of 
Kojong and de facto regency of the Taewŏn’gun that there was enough interest in 
contesting the power of the bureaucracy in favor of a strong monarchy that any of the 
proposals for the people’s bastion were implemented. 
67 
 
 
Chapter 2: The Value of Virtue 
Late Chosŏn Magistrates on the Northern Border, 1623–1894 
 
“Up at the border, it is different than the interior, people’s minds easily become 
disordered and crooked.” –Yi Sŏnghyo, sent as secret inspector (amhaeng ŏsa) to the 
P’yŏngan border, 1739156 
 
In late Chosŏn period rhetoric, Korea’s northern border was an area of pernicious 
wickedness. The nature of the borderlands, along with the potential for foreign invasion, 
posed a threat to the people who lived there and the men sent to administer the region. 
Ideally, this meant that those who served on the border should be of outstanding character 
and uncommon mettle. But the reality of a post so far from the capital in a region 
generally shunned for its lack of culture and rusticity, meant it was hard to find men of the 
caliber such service demanded. Faced with the conflict between rhetoric and reality, 
Chosŏn kings and their ministers argued over who could serve on the border and what 
performance disqualified a magistrate or necessitated their dismissal. The declining threat 
of invasion from any of its neighbors also caused Chosŏn leaders to reevaluate what a 
“border land” (pyŏnji) was and which counties merited greater resources to protect against 
potential breaches of Chosŏn territory. This conception of the border meant that not every 
county that lay along what might be considered the edge of territorial sovereignty, the 
coasts or the northern border along the Yalu and Tumen Rivers, was deemed a border 
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land.157 
Examining appointments listed in the Daily Records of the Royal Secretariat 
(Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi; hereafter Records) and cross-referencing these with registers of 
officials (sŏnsaengan) found in gazetteers creates a more detailed picture not only of late 
Chosŏn officials who served at the border, but also those who refused or were rejected 
and the reasons for both. The data arising from this examination shows that Chosŏn 
ministers and kings sought to appoint magistrates to the border with experience and 
specialization in border affairs. Yet the difficulty of managing the border and the varied 
tasks required, including military duties of patrol and often civil duties of diplomacy, 
meant that the pool of qualified individuals was smaller than that for other areas of the 
bureaucracy. Therefore, officials sought to appoint experienced officials to the 
magistracies of Ch’angsŏng and Kanggye in P’yŏngan province, and Hoeryŏng in 
Hamgyŏng province so that no magistrate would be too far from one that had experience 
on the border. 
This chapter provides a detailed analysis of the Chosŏn kings’ appointments of 
officials to the northern border, not only the magistrates who assumed office, but also 
those who for whatever reason did not serve. Through the analysis, this chapter argues 
that those magistracies, Hoeryŏng, Ch’angsŏng, and Kanggye, lay at the nexus of security 
at the border and status within the bureaucracy and were the ones most difficult to staff. 
These were key magistracies for Korea’s defense of the northern border in the late 
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Chosŏn period. 
 
I. The Border Counties 
In 1682, Pak Sŏngsŏk (1650–1709), who passed the military examination in 1676, 
became magistrate of Ch’angsŏng. His appointment was not without its detractors, mostly 
due to his relatively young age of thirty-three se (Ch. sui), close to the average age at 
which a late Chosŏn aristocrat passed the civil or military examination.158 The Army 
Commander (Pyŏngma chŏltosa) of P’yŏngan province, Yi Sehwa (1630–1701), noted 
that the river was narrow at that area with great potential for harm to the kingdom, 
especially at Ch’angsŏng, and that the king could not afford to appoint anyone but high-
ranking military men as magistrates.159 The controversial solution was to promote Pak 
despite his youth to a rank sufficient to assume management of the defense command. His 
performance on the border was above average as he completed his tenure, a feat less than 
a third of Ch’angsŏng magistrates in the seventeenth and eighteenth century accomplished.  
According to research by Ku Wanhoe, by the middle of the eighteenth century, 
there were 331 magistracies (designated as hyŏn, kun, tohobu, taedohobu, mok, or pu in 
order of ascending rank) listed in the Gazetteers for All Areas (Yŏji tosŏ). A military 
                                                             
158 The passers of a military examination that recruited mostly members of the aristocracy were 
around thirty se, as were the civil examination passers in general. Military examination passers 
who wished to compete for a higher office had to take an examination that required more literacy, 
particularly in the Seven Military Classics, than those examinations that tested martial skill. 
According to Edward W. Wagner, the average age for passers of the civil examination was “about 
thirty years give or take a year or two,” quoted in Carlos Kenneth Quinones, “The Prerequisites 
for Power in Late Yi Korea: 1864–1894” (Ph.D. Diss., Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., 
1975), 59. Eugene Park’s work on military men of aristocratic backgrounds suggested a similar 
age. See Between Dreams and Reality, 214 n.93. 
159 SJW 292:40a [1682/8/3, 31st entry]. 
70 
 
 
degree holder could be appointed to 136, or just over forty percent of the magistracies.160 
Of those, fifty-six were exclusive to the military, sixty-two were alternating civil and 
military posts, and eighteen were open to civil, military, and protection appointees. The 
majority of posts available to military men were in P’yŏngan, Hamgyŏng, Chŏlla, and 
Kyŏngsang provinces. This preference reflected an attitude much like Yi Sehwa’s that 
protecting the border was military work, though what counties constituted the “border” 
changed over the late Chosŏn period.161 
I focused on the riverine border of Chosŏn Korea formed by the Yalu River 
flowing south and west from Mount Paektu and the Tumen River flowing east and north 
because it was the area of most frequent interaction between Chosŏn subjects and 
foreigners. Official contacts occurred quite regularly with semi-annual envoy missions 
to and from the Qing travelling through Ŭiju. Throughout the late Chosŏn period there 
were open markets held yearly at Chunggang near Ŭiju and in Hoeryŏng and on 
alternating years in Kyŏngwŏn. At these markets, merchants from Chosŏn had the rare 
opportunity to trade with those of other countries, primarily the Qing, but by the 
nineteenth century Russian merchants plied their trade as well.162 While the potential of 
invasion or war was low until the latter half of the nineteenth century, the northern 
border was still the site of the greatest imagined threat to Chosŏn leaders. The border 
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counties represented a distinct challenge to magistrates appointed there, not only to 
prepare defenses in the case of war or invasion but also to effectively manage relations 
with—or to restrict the contact between—Chosŏn Korea and its northern neighbors 
(map 1). 
 
 
Map 2.1. Magistracies on the northern border. 
Note: The administrative and geographic contours of the region changed somewhat 
throughout the late Chosŏn period, most significantly before 1724. Musan was moved 
several times and elevated to a defense command (tohobu) in 1684. Samsu and Ch’osan 
(Isan until 1774) were originally counties (kun) until 1710 and 1724 respectively. In 
1824, Huju defense garrison (ch’ŏmsa-jin) was elevated to a defense command and 
absorbed half of the “four abandoned counties” (p’yesa-gun), bringing the land under 
Hamgyŏng province’s provincial administration. In 1869, the defense garrison of 
Sangt’o was incorporated as a defense command and renamed Chasŏng.  
 
Of the posts analyzed here, only two—Ŭiju in P’yŏngan and Chongsŏng in 
Hamgyŏng—were exclusively civil posts, seven—Sakchu, Ch’angsŏng, Pyŏktong, and 
Wiwŏn in P’yŏngan and Musan, Samsu, and Hoeryŏng in Hamgyŏng—were exclusively 
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military, and six—Ch’osan and Kanggye in P’yŏngan and Kapsan, Onsŏng, Kyŏngwŏn, 
and Kyŏnghŭng in Hamgyŏng—were alternating civil and military posts. Huju was not 
yet a defense command when the Gazetteers for All Areas was printed in 1746, but it was 
a military post after it was elevated. Pyŏktong was originally supposed to be an 
alternating post as it was a border land, but it quickly became exclusively military for 
reasons unclear. In addition, toward the end of the late Chosŏn period, there was a 
tendency to appoint military examination graduates more frequently than civil to the 
border posts. For instance, Chongsŏng in Hamgyŏng became an alternating post in the 
early nineteenth century, Kapsan was almost exclusively military near the end of King 
Yŏngjo’s reign (1724–1776), and Kanggye became a mostly military post in King 
Kojong’s reign. 
The border consisted of three types of administrative districts referred to 
generally as magistracies or counties. They were the county (kun), defense command 
(tohobu), and special city (pu); the titles and rank for magistrates of these administrative 
units were a Kunsu at Jr. 4 rank, a tohobusa, frequently abbreviated to Pusa, at Jr. 3 rank, 
and a Puyun at Jr. 2 rank, respectively. As James B. Palais noted in his work on late 
Chosŏn administration, Confucian Statecraft and Korean Institutions, several of the 
magistracy types derived from Chinese precedents as far back as the Tang dynasty (618–
907), but their equivalence to Chinese administrative units was only in name. For instance, 
defense commands (Ch. Duhufu, Grand Protectorate) in Korea were not necessarily 
situated in areas that were of critical strategic value, nor did they always contain garrisons 
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or large numbers of central government troops.163 Because bureaucratic change could not 
keep pace with demographic shifts throughout the peninsula, by the end of the 
seventeenth century, the designation of defense command or county was not necessarily 
related to a magistracy’s size, population, or geographic location. For many magistracies, 
the most important factor in its designation as a county or defense command was the rank 
of the magistrate. According to Yu Hyŏngwŏn (pen name Pan’gye, 1622–1673), during 
much of the Chosŏn era, there was a bias against service in the provinces on the part of 
bureaucrats, and so elevating the magistracies to a higher rank would encourage central 
bureaucrats to take these far-flung positions. The court also elevated the ranks of sub-area 
commander or small naval garrison commander (Manho) to Jr. 4 and army second deputy 
commander or large naval garrison commander (Ch’ŏmjŏlchesa) to Jr. 3 for the same 
reason, but since these provincial military positions were considered lesser in 
responsibility but equal in rank to the magistrate, problems arose with authority and 
command between these officials.164 
The defense commands of Sakchu and Ch’osan along the Yalu River well 
illustrate the apparently arbitrary nature of these designations. Sakchu controlled a narrow 
strip of the river between Ŭiju and Ch’angsŏng, and for much of the seventeenth century 
its appointment patterns and discussions of its strategic importance made it clear that 
officials considered Sakchu key to Chosŏn’s defense along the Yalu.165 Yet by middle of 
the eighteenth century, its appointment patterns more closely resembled the counties of 
                                                             
163 James B. Palais, Confucian Statecraft and Korean Institutions: Yu Hyŏngwŏn and the Late 
Chosŏn Dynasty (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1996), 676.   
164 Palais, Confucian Statecraft, 681, 683.  
165 Pae Usŏng, Chosŏn hugi kukt’ogwan kwa ch’ŏnhagwan ŭi pyŏnhwa (Seoul: Ilchisa, 1998), 96. 
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Pyŏktong and Wiwŏn with younger, less-qualified magistrates.166 By 1800, Sakchu was, 
for all intents and purposes, a county, but it remained a defense command with a 
magistrate at Jr. 3 rank. Ch’osan, named Isan until 1774, was a county (kun) nearly 
double the size of Ch’angsŏng. Its appointments from the seventeenth century, however, 
more closely resembled the defense commands of Sakchu and Kanggye than those of 
Wiwŏn and Pyŏktong. Unlike Sakchu, it did undergo a change in designation. It was 
elevated to defense command in 1710 after the court began, around 1700, to appoint civil 
officials to the post more frequently.  
Not only had the magistracies at the northern border drifted from their original 
purposes as administrative units, their roles in the defense of the country from invasion 
changed as well, at times significantly. Originally, the Great Code of State Administration 
(Kyŏngguk taejŏn; hereafter Great Code), compiled in the mid-fifteenth century, listed 
sixty-one border (yŏnbyŏn) counties. The majority, thirty-two, were coastal counties in 
the three southern provinces with thirteen in Chŏlla, twelve in Kyŏngsang, and seven in 
Ch’ungch’ŏng. Kyŏnggi, Kangwŏn and Hwanghae provinces had one, two, and six 
respectively. The northern provinces combined had just under a third, or twenty, 
including Kyŏngwŏn, Kyŏngsŏng, Hoeryŏng, Chongsŏng, Onsŏng, Kyŏnghŭng, Puryŏng, 
Kapsan, Samsu, Tanch’ŏn, Kilsŏng (Kilchu), and Myŏngch’ŏn in Hamgyŏng; and Ŭiju, 
Kanggye, Ch’angsŏng, Sakchu, Yongch’ŏn, Isan (Ch’osan), Pyŏktong, and Wiwŏn in 
                                                             
166 The story of the encounter between Yi Manyu, an illiterate magistrate and the Secret Inspector 
Yi Sŏnghyo, whose quote opens this paper, provides a dramatic illustration of a Sakchu 
magistrate with few qualifications. See SJW 897:40–42a [1739/9/9, 12th entry]. 
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P’yŏngan.167 All of the border counties in P’yŏngan were located along the Yalu River, 
while in Hamgyŏng, the counties were located at the extent of Chosŏn authority. Most of 
the six northern defense commands of Hamgyŏng in map 1 were not located on the 
Tumen River until the sixteenth century, rather abutting areas under de facto control of 
Jurchen tribes for much of the beginning of the Chosŏn period.168 Tanch’ŏn, Kilsŏng and 
Myŏngch’ŏn were located on the northeastern coast of Hamgyŏng. The Great Code 
included the designation of border counties in the subsection for granting offices (chesu) 
stipulating that the Ministries of War and Personnel had to agree on the appointment of a 
magistrate.169 
In the Great Code’s list of border counties, Suan in Hwanghae stands out as the 
only interior border magistracy, that is, Suan was not near the coast nor along the 
northern terrestrial border. First Royal Secretary (Tosŭngji) Han Myŏnghoe’s (1415–
1487) report on slaves and criminal servitude in P’yŏngan province in 1456, during the 
reign of King Sejo (r. 1455–1468) and within a few years of the promulgation of the 
Great Code, may explain its inclusion on the list of border lands. In his report, Han notes 
that Suan was a key defensive post that possessed a garrison and checkpoint (kwan), but 
lacked enough soldiers for defense.170 Suan sits just below a key strategic narrowing of 
                                                             
167 Ku Wanhoe, “Sŏnsaengan ŭl t’onghae pon Chosŏn,” 193; Kyŏngguk taejŏn 1:66b, “Ijŏn: 
Chesu.” References to Chosŏn law codes are from Chosŏn wangjo pŏpchŏnjip, 4 vols. [A 
collection of Chosŏn law codes] (Seoul: Minjok munhwa, 1982).  
168 For a fuller treatment of the northward expansion of the Hamgyŏng border, see Kang Sŏkhwa, 
Chosŏn hugi Hamgyŏng-do, 31–41. For Chosŏn policies toward the Jurchen in the early Chosŏn 
period and their residence on the peninsula, see Kenneth R. Robinson, “From Raiders to Traders: 
Border Security and Border Control in Early Chosŏn, 1392–1450,” Korean Studies 16 (1992), 
97–102. 
169 Kyŏngguk taejŏn 1:66b, “Ijŏn: Chesu.” 
170 Sejo sillok 5 [1456/11/16]. 
76 
 
 
the peninsula between the defense command of Tŏgwŏn, near what is now Wŏnsan, and 
Pyŏngyang. Invasions from both the northwest and northeast would be likely to cross this 
narrow neck to take advantage of the flatter terrain on the western side of the peninsula 
and the Straight Road (chingno) running from Ŭiju to Seoul. This road passed through the 
Special County (mok) of Hwangju, a coastal border land just west of Suan. In the fifteenth 
century, as Kenneth Robinson has documented, the Chosŏn court was concerned about 
Jurchen tribes that still dwelt in the northeast part of the peninsula and were not fully 
incorporated into Chosŏn’s diplomatic orbit.171 In the event of an invasion of these tribes, 
Suan would be key to preventing a Jurchen force from gaining access to the roads to the 
capital. According to Robinson, however, the Jurchen tribute missions were guided 
through Kangwŏn province, not Hwanghae, so Jurchen leaders would be more familiar 
with passes in Kangwŏn, which makes the lack of similar interior border land 
designations for magistracies like Ch’ŏrwŏn, Anhyŏp or P’yŏnggang puzzling.172  
The anomaly of Suan presaged a changing definition of border land that would 
gain more prominence in the seventeenth and eighteenth century: a border land defended 
the capital, not necessarily the territory of Chosŏn. This is an inversion of the 
phenomenon Kenneth Robinson analyzed for the fifteenth century noting that there were 
two conceptions of the Chosŏn realm, the territorial and jurisdictional. Where the Chosŏn 
king imagined his realm extended to the Tumen River in Hamgyŏng province (territorial), 
                                                             
171 Kenneth R. Robinson, “Organizing Japanese and Jurchens in Tribute Systems in Early Chosŏn 
Korea,” Journal of East Asian Studies 13, no. 2 (2013), 347.  
172 Kenneth Robinson, “Organizing Japanese and Jurchens,” 354–356. 
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the reality was that his authority could not encompass all that territory (jurisdictional).173 
By the eighteenth century, the jurisdiction of Chosŏn authority reached the river, but the 
most important territorial area to protect had narrowed to the capital. The new law codes 
reflected this perception. 
In contrast to the Great Code’s predominantly coastal border counties, the 
Amended Great Code (Sok taejŏn), promulgated in 1746, reveals a drastically reduced 
and refocused list of twenty-eight counties. The Amended Great Code also distinguishes 
between border land and coastal (yŏnhae) counties. Hamgyŏng had six counties: 
Kyŏnghŭng, Kyŏngwŏn, Onsŏng, Puryŏng, Kapsan, and Kilchu, and P’yŏngan, seven: 
Kanggye, Chŏngju, Sŏnch’ŏn, Yŏngbyŏn, Ch’osan, Unsan, and Pyŏktong. Together 
Hamgyŏng and P’yŏngan thus had nearly half the border counties, while Chŏlla and 
Hwanghae were reduced to five and four respectively; Kyŏngsang province had only one, 
Kimhae; and Kangwŏn and Kyŏnggi had none.174 The border counties in Hamgyŏng and 
P’yŏngan provinces made up nearly half of the total in the Amended Great Code, a clear 
reflection of Chosŏn officials’ focus on the terrestrial border with the Qing as the greatest 
source of threat. This list of borderland counties also illuminates some change in what a 
border was in late Chosŏn officials’ imaginations: a point of exchange and threat but not 
necessarily any place where Chosŏn authority ends. For instance, like Suan, Unsan and 
Yŏngbyŏn were among P’yŏngan’s border counties, but these counties are not near any 
border. Rather, they lay on one of the three major roads in P’yŏngan that led to the capital 
                                                             
173 Kenneth R. Robinson, “Residence and Foreign Relations in the Peninsular Northeast During 
the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries,” in The Northern Region of Korea: History, Identity & 
Culture, ed. Sun Joo Kim (Seattle: Center for Korea Studies, University of Washington, 2010), 
20–21. 
174 Sok taejŏn 1:20a, “Ijŏn: Oegwanjik.” 
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through Anju.175 It was the threat that these interior counties posed by dint of their 
strategic importance in the event of an invasion that elevated them to consideration as 
border lands. Unlike in the Great Code, the Amended Great Code listed the counties with 
general information about appointments outside the capital with the requirement for 
agreement between the Boards of War and Personnel dropped in favor of alternating civil 
and military appointments. 
The conversion of border counties was not without controversy. In 1759, 
Minister of War (Pyŏnjo p’ansŏ) Yi Ch’angsu (1710–n.d.) criticized the distinction of 
external (oebyŏn), middle (chungbyŏn), and internal (naebyŏn) border counties 
suggesting that it did not fairly distribute stipend benefits to military men serving at the 
northern border and recommended a return to the original definition and reduction in 
benefits for internal border counties. Yŏngjo agreed in part. Military men, however, 
continued to argue for and against border land designations for northern counties that did 
not lie along the terrestrial border.176 
The bureaucratic definition of the border lands did not fully supplant the 
conception of the border being at the Yalu and Tumen Rivers generally. The Qing 
affirmed that the rivers would form the border between the two countries after Chosŏn’s 
King Injo capitulated to the Qing armies in the invasion of 1637. The border was even 
                                                             
175 Ko Sŭnghŭi, “Chosŏn hugi P’yŏngan-do chiyŏk toro pangŏ ch’egye ŭi chŏngbi” Han’guk 
munhwa 34 (December 2004), 207. Called the Inland Ridge Road (Naeryuk yŏngno), it began in 
Ch’angsŏng and led through Unsan and Yŏngbyŏn to Anju. 
176 Pae Usŏng, Chosŏn hugi kukt’ogwan, 221–222. Pae’s citation for Yi Ch’angsu’s report in the 
SJW is a day off, and the proper date is 11/11, SJW 1175:35 [1759/11/11]. 
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more clearly delineated during a joint field survey in 1712.177 Posts such as Garrison 
Commanders, Sub-area Commanders, and other military positions along the northern 
border in areas like Musan and Pyŏktong, two counties not listed as border lands, were 
grouped together with other border commanders (pyŏnjang) during leave-taking 
ceremonies (hajik). But by the end of the eighteenth century, the bureaucratic definition 
of the border indicated a gradation of importance for counties outlined in the 
administrative codes. Some counties were on the terrestrial border, but not border 
counties, while others were borders while being located far from the coast or the Yalu or 
Tumen Rivers.  
While the border remained a line at the edge of Chosŏn sovereignty that posed an 
existential threat to the residents therein, the bureaucratic revision of the definition of a 
border land allowed the Chosŏn government to focus resources on key counties that 
posed the most strategic threat in an invasion. The designation of a border land also raised 
the status of a magistracy, and by extension the magistrate, and offered an opportunity for 
a larger stipend. The encouragement was necessary for provincial service. The following 
sections examine those magistrates who were appointed to the border and the key border 
lands of Ch’angsŏng, Kanggye, and Hoeryŏng. 
 
II. Official Appointments at the Border 
Two types of sources offer a wealth of information on the officials appointed to 
                                                             
177 For a discussion of the creation of this border line and the Chosŏn conceptualization, see Kang 
Sŏkhwa, Chosŏn hugi Hamgyŏng-do, 48–58; and Seonmin Kim, “Ginseng and Border 
Trespassing between Qing China and Chosŏn Korea,” Late Imperial China 28, no. 1 (2007), 50–
52. Kim approaches the subject mostly from the Qing perspective, but notes the Chosŏn court’s 
desire for ambiguity in its demarcation. 
80 
 
 
posts in the provinces: the registers of officials generally found in local gazetteers, and the 
notices of appointment in the Records. The registers are invaluable for understanding the 
continuity of border service, but this strength is also their main limitation. The picture that 
emerges from an examination of the registers is one of generally continuous, uncontested 
governance. For instance, the Kanggye register includes the first and last months of every 
official’s tenure from 1623 to 1905, and it rarely has a gap between these officials. In 
examining the appointments in the Records, however, one finds that nearly a third (82 out 
of 269) of the appointees to the position had their appointment rescinded before attending 
a leave-taking ceremony.178  
The Records offer a more detailed view of what happened in the process of 
appointing officials. If the transition were ordinary, that is, an official was not removed 
for dereliction, excused for personal reasons, or died in office, the Ministry of Personnel 
(Ijo) or Ministry of War (Pyŏngjo) would nominate up to three candidates, usually in the 
sixth or twelfth month of the year by the lunar calendar. The timing of regular 
appointments followed the biannual performance evaluations (p’op’yŏm). The king would 
then select from the names put forward by the Board. If the king was not satisfied with the 
recommendations, he could send the list back for new recommendations, or, more rarely, 
                                                             
178 To say “rescinded” is not entirely accurate, as often the position was entered into the official’s 
record of appointments (iryŏk) if the appointee requested relief due to illness or an aged parent. 
Thus arguably, the appointee “held” the post, no matter how briefly. Even for contested 
appointments, it is not always clear in the Records whether the appointment is entered into the 
officials’ records of appointments. For instance, Hŏ Chŏng, a military official in Yŏngjo’s early 
years, was appointed to at least five border posts but only took up two. In reciting his career of 
appointments to the king, Hŏ lists two of the posts where he did not serve but not the third. SJW 
729:125a [1731/8/28, 34th entry]. The process of appointments is explored more deeply in the 
following section. 
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suggest his own appointment.179 Challenges to appointments were not standardized, nor 
were the responses to such challenges. Not uncommonly a post would have two 
appointees listed within a few weeks or months, but the reasons a king rescinded the 
original appointment would not always be forthcoming. To discover the full extent of 
appointments made and rescinded required searches based on the name of the county and 
the position in question, and frequently, additional searches on the names of officials. 
Lengthy registers for most of the magistracies exist, the exceptions being Sakchu, 
Ch’angsŏng, Pyŏktong, Ch’osan, and Wiwŏn. Still, these registers only recorded officials 
before 1860 for counties in Hamgyŏng and 1855 for Ŭiju. The Kanggye register is 
impressively complete and contains fairly detailed information for post-Imjin War (1592–
1598) appointees.180 The registers show the magistrates who took up the position by 
participating in a leave-taking ceremony. They do not, however, record those officials 
who had the position entered into their official record (iryŏk) but did not leave the capital.  
From these sources, I recorded a total of 2,706 individual magistrates appointed 
3,279 times. Four hundred seventy-eight magistrates were appointed to multiple posts, 
while the number who served in more than one post was 302, approximately eleven 
percent of the total. On their face, these numbers suggest that specialization in border 
                                                             
179 More often than not, a king’s referral for appointment would be as a reward for an official’s 
service to the king or the government. While the king may not have personally advocated for their 
appointment, such positions were granted outside regular processes of the Ministries of War and 
Personnel. For example, an illiterate military commander Yi Manyu, received several 
appointments early in Yŏngjo’s reign because of his support for the king in the Yi Injwa 
Rebellion of 1728, despite ministerial resistance. Sunjoo Kim also notes that Ch’oe Sinyŏp was 
appointed magistrate of Ch’osan as a result of service during the Hong Kyŏngnae Rebellion of 
1812. Sunjoo Kim, Marginality and Subversion in Korea: The Hongkyŏngnae Rebellion of 1812 
(Seattle: University of Washington, 2007), 144. 
180 Registers can be found in CSSU. These include the Kanggye-bu ŭpchi, vol. 54: 1–251; Kim 
Ŭngsu, Yongmanji, vol. 51; and Yun Chŏngsŏn, Kwanbukchi, vols. 40–41. 
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posts and service was not a key consideration in appointing magistrates. However, the 
number of border posts that were held by magistrates who were appointed to the border 
more than once was about thirty percent (table 2.1).  
 
Provincial Breakdown P’yŏngan Hamgyŏng 
Total postings 1,517 1,762 
Total postings where official served 1,216 1,350 
Rate of rescinding 20% 23% 
Average time in office (only served) 1.51 yrs 1.56 yrs 
Appointments to multiple posts 485 575 
Appointments served by multi-post officials 381 399 
Percent of reappointment posts 31% 30% 
Totals   
Number of appointments 3,279 
Number of individuals 2,706 
Individuals appointed to multiple magistracies 480 (18%) 
Individuals who served in multiple 
magistracies 
303 (11%) 
Table 2.1. Late Chosŏn magistrates, 1623–1894. 
I have not put together a picture of the border magistrates by year, but with these 
numbers and the reappointment rate for individual counties, at any given time at least 
three magistrates along the border likely had served there before. Even more likely, the 
magistrates of Kanggye or Ch’angsŏng in P’yŏngan and Hoeryŏng in Hamgyŏng were 
serving their second post. Not only were these magistracies located at strategic points on 
the border, having a magistrate serving a second post in those three counties would mean 
that no other magistrate was too far from someone who had experience with service on 
the border.  
According to the king and his ministers, service on the border was qualitatively 
different than in other counties and cities. On the border, not only were people and their 
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customs rougher and less civilized, but there was also always the possibility that the 
magistrate would encounter foreigners who had crossed the border illegally or would need 
to collect Chosŏn subjects who had crossed into Qing territory. Concern over the 
importance of border posts and ensuring that the magistrates who were appointed there 
were of the proper quality appears consistently throughout the Records. The necessity of 
capable and experienced military appointees is frequently referenced such as in Yi 
Sehwa’s argument above. What exactly defined an experienced magistrate was vague, but 
regional expertise was a key component. The time between appointment and departure for 
the post afforded ministers ample time to bring their concerns to the king.181 
Within a few days after a candidate was selected, if he was in the capital, he came 
before the king to express his gratitude (saŭn). If he was serving in the provinces, he had 
thirty to forty days to express gratitude. Sometime later he attended a ceremony to receive 
his orders and take leave of the king. The amount of time between these two ceremonies 
varied greatly throughout the dynasty. It may have been a function of how far the post 
was from the capital and the difficulty of travel, bureaucratic scheduling, or the personal 
requirements of the officials. At times when an official was dismissed for egregious 
conduct, his replacement’s leave-taking ceremony could occur within a day or two, other 
times it could take two months. The Great Code states that officials should receive their 
orders investing them with the post (sin’go) within fifty days of selection. The Amended 
                                                             
181 For example, Yŏngjo’s appointment of Yi Hyŏngwŏn (1705–n.d.) as magistrate of Pyŏktong 
occasioned debate from his ministers about the appropriateness of Yi’s appointment since only a 
few years before he was sent into exile in Nagan in Chŏlla province because of serious crimes 
committed as magistrate of Sukch’ŏn, a county on the western coast of P’yŏngan province. Some 
called for removing him from office and expunging him from the record of officials (sakkŏ 
sap’an), but the king did not take their recommendation. SJW 954:122b–123a [1743/2/22, 19th 
entry]. 
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Great Code further states that those magistrates who were arrested in a border county 
should be replaced within fifteen days, and ten if the arrest occurred near a regular 
exchange of magistrates.182 Based on my research, the selections certainly happened 
within that time frame, but the officials’ leave taking ceremonies were not often within 
that window. On average ministers had about ten to twenty days to bring their concerns to 
the king. 
The appointee himself could also request not to serve at the post. The most 
common reasons for requesting a transfer or relief from duty were sickness or having an 
elderly parent. According to the records, a magistrate requesting relief on the grounds of 
illness was to be inspected and their inability certified in some way, similarly for an 
illness of close family members.183 I saw few requests denied in my research, but perhaps 
some used it as an excuse to avoid service. The appointments to Pyŏktong in the tenth 
month of 1892 are a case in point: eight appointees requested not to serve because of 
illness before King Kojong was able to find someone to take the position.184 The hardship 
of the northern border postings probably played some role, but also political 
considerations cannot be ruled out. For instance, Yŏngjo had particular difficulty 
appointing magistrates to Ch’angsŏng, Kanggye, Kyŏnghŭng, Samsu, Kyŏngwŏn, and 
Chongsŏng just before and after the Yi Injwa rebellion in 1728. 
                                                             
182 Kyŏngguk taejŏn 1:66b, “Ijo: Sin’go;” and Sok taejŏn 1:19a, “Ijo: Oegwanjik.” 
183 The Amended Great Code does specify that currently serving officials requesting relief due to 
illness in the family should have their inability to serve certified by the governor of the province, 
but requirements for those not yet in receipt of orders are not as clear. Sok taejŏn 1:35a, “Ijo: 
Kŭpka.” 
184 There may have been a particularly debilitating flu at the time as this was at the end of 
November by the Western calendar, but none of the other magistracies at the border had a similar 
issue at the time. 
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When officials were conducting an orderly transition of magistrates, groups such 
as border commanders participated in the leave-taking ceremony together. This allowed 
Chosŏn kings the opportunity to address the group as a whole and reinforce what the king 
saw as the most important responsibilities of a border commander. Kings Yŏngjo and 
Chŏngjo frequently took advantage of these opportunities to ask questions of appointed 
officials and exhort them to better manage the border. 
 
III. Tenure and Removal 
In 1728, while reporting on Yi Ch’ŏnjun’s (1670–n.d.) fitness to become 
magistrate of Ch’angsŏng, Second Inspector (Chibŭi) Kim Sihyŏng (1681–1750) 
remarked that Ch’angsŏng and other counties along the river were vital garrisons of the 
western border and should not be staffed with just anyone. Yi, at fifty-nine, was old and 
feeble, not to mention a drunk. Kim admonished that the king should not just appoint him 
because he was a military official. Kim’s criticism successfully sank Yi’s appointment, 
and the king would appoint two more officials before finally settling on a veteran of the 
Yi Injwa rebellion, Pak Tongch’u (1670–n.d.), who was also fifty-nine years old at the 
time. Pak was once a resident of Ŭiju, and may have had a parent over 70, allowing him 
to request a post closer to home. He served two plus years, but the king had him arrested 
for failing to secure the border in the case of the smuggler (chamsang) Han Pongch’un.185 
When looking at how effective a governing structure might be, the tenure of 
officials would appear to be a natural measure. Longer tenures would mean that the 
                                                             
185 Kim’s comments appear in SJW 657:41 [1728/3/5, 20th entry]; Pak’s appointment, or leave-
taking as his appointment was not recorded, appears in SJW 660:214a [1728/4/29, 2nd entry]. He 
was indicted by the governor of P’yŏngan for his crimes. SJW 705:118a [1730/4/25, 29th entry]. 
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magistrate had more time to develop connections among the local elite and to better 
understand the socio-political climate. Theoretically this would lead to more effective 
leaders. Early Chosŏn ministers, however, were wary of just such a situation. In their 
estimation, long tenures would encourage magistrates to develop power centers outside 
the capital that could threaten the stability of the dynasty, so they limited the tenure of 
officials to 1800 days for those who were accompanied by their families and 900 for those 
who were not (mugyega).186 It should be noted that for officials who were transferred, the 
tenure clock did not restart, so some officials are noted to have completed tenure after 
only a few months in a new position.187 In other words, time spent in a position did not 
determine tenure, rather it was time spent outside the capital. 
The magistrates also needed to be evaluated in some way so that ineffective or 
abusive magistrates could be quickly and efficiently marked and removed. The system 
for this was the biannual performance evaluations. Every sixth and twelfth month, each 
provincial governor (kwanch’alsa) was to evaluate all the magistrates on their 
performance of the “seven key tasks of the magistrate” (suryŏng ch’ilsa). For a post 
where the magistrates were accompanied by family, that could mean up to eleven 
examinations. A low grade (ha) would result in immediate removal, passing grades 
were middle (chung) and high (sang), but receiving only two middle grades could also 
                                                             
186 Yi Chonhŭi, Chosŏn sidae chibang haengjŏng chedo yŏn’gu (Seoul: Ilchisa, 1990), 143. Yi 
Chonhŭi assessed the reasons for short tenures as part of the Chosŏn desire to centralize power. 
Regarding tenure length, see Kyŏngguk taejŏn 1:44b, “Ijŏn: Oegwanjik.” The tenure remained the 
same throughout the Chosŏn period. See Taejŏn hoet’ong 1:39a, “Ijŏn: Oegwanjik.”  
187 SJW 1991:114a [1811/12/25, 23rd entry]. Though serving only twelve months as magistrate of 
Wiwŏn, officials informed the king that he had reached “the limit for military service at the 
border.” The reason given was that he had already spent twenty-six months in his previous post at 
Sakchu, and so he had finished three years. I have not found the regulation for this specific limit, 
but the official may have been referencing the fact that border posts were unaccompanied. 
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result in immediate removal.188  
Yi Chonhŭi evaluated the seven tasks of the magistrate—expanding agriculture 
and sericulture (nongsang sŏng); increasing households and population (hogu chŭng); 
elevating schools and learning (hakkyo hŭng); managing military taxes (kunjŏng su); 
evenly enforcing corvée (puyŏk kyun); reducing appeals and litigation (sasong kan), and 
suppressing wickedness and deceit (kanhwal sik)—and he argued that the criteria used 
for evaluation of a magistrates performance were not based on the ability of the 
magistrate to perform the duties, rather they were based on the virtue of those 
performing them.189 To Kim Songjun, the works on magisterial duties, Reflections on 
Mindful Governance of the People (Muminxin jian, 1404) by Zhu Fengji, Governing 
Essentials for Local Officials (Imgwan ch’ŏngyo, 1738) by An Chŏngbok (pen name 
Sunam, 1712–1791), and A Book on Mindful Governance of the People (Mongmin 
simsŏ, 1821) by Chŏng Yagyong (pen name Tasan, 1762–1836), take as the starting 
point not the effective execution of duties, but the cultivation of proper thought 
(ch’ŏngbaek sasang) in governing officials.190 Taken together these evaluations suggest 
a premium was placed on the performance of virtue on the part of the magistrate rather 
than their effective ability. Within this scheme, when a magistrate was guilty of 
                                                             
188 Yi Chonhŭi, Chosŏn sidae chibang haengjŏng, 153–155. Yi quotes the Kyŏngguk taejŏn, but 
again the structure of the biannual examinations changed little throughout the dynasty. See 
Taejŏn hoet’ong 1:62b–63a, “Ijŏn: P’op’yŏm.”  
189 Yi Chonhŭi, Chosŏn sidae chibang haengjŏng: 162–164, the grading system included whether 
the magistrate performed his duties with honesty (yŏm), diligence (kŭn), and circumspection (kŭn), 
not just the outcome. 
190 Kim Sŏngjun. “Chosŏn suryŏng ch’ilsa wa Muminxin jian,” Minjok munhwa yŏn’gu 21, 1998, 
16. NB: I translate sim as referencing the governance as opposed to the text as, in Zhu’s 
introduction, he makes clear he is discussing the proper thought with which a governing official 
should begin. Tasan’s work, while not referencing it explicitly, builds on Zhu’s. 
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egregious crimes, the most common punishment was exile. Exile would afford the 
official the time to rectify their failure in virtue through study; many scholarly works 
were written by exiled officials, Chŏng Yagyong’s being arguably the most famous. 
The result of the constant evaluations was frequent removal from office before 
a magistrate’s set term. The failure of a magistrate on the performance of these tasks 
was common, and often only resulted in a temporary setback in an official’s career. 
Unfortunately, the Records did not consistently record the reasons for a magistrate’s 
removal which prevents a more robust analysis of how and why officials were removed 
from the border. The Kanggye Defense Command Gazetteer, however, included the 
reasons for removal for over eighty percent of magistrates from the reign of Injo 
through Kojong’s reign (table 2.2).  
 
Reign 
 Reason191 
Full 
Term 
Arrest Dereliction Removal Transfer Other Unk 
Injo   3 1 1  1 11 
Hyojong  1  1 2   3 
Hyŏnjong  3 1 1  1 2 1 
Sukchong  6 5 6 5 2 2 9 
Kyŏngjong      2  2 
Yŏngjo  10 8 12 4 6 5 1 
Chŏngjo  7  3 1 2 2 3 
                                                             
191 The terms used to describe reasons for departure varied over time in the gazetteer, but the 
common terms for each category were: fulfilling a term (kwach’e or sach’e), arrest (nap’a) or 
dereliction (kyep’a). I tabulated arrest and dereliction separately from a regular removal from 
office based on the biannual performance reviews (p’yŏmp’a), because the egregiousness of the 
conduct required immediate action. Transfers (ibae or sŭngbae) included promotions. Other 
reasons included death, leave of absence, avoidance of concurrent service with close family 
(sangp’i) and such. 
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Sunjo  8  1 4 1 2 1 
Hŏnjong  1 1 3 2 2 1 1 
Ch’ŏlchong  2   1 5 3  
Kojong  2   2 10 1  
Totals 40 18 28 22 31 19 32 
Table 2.2. Reasons for removal of Kanggye magistrates.  
Data from the Kanggye Defense Command Gazetteer. 
 
Of the 190 officials who served as magistrate of Kanggye, just over a third left 
office because of their performance, meaning arrest, dereliction, or removal. A number 
that is about equal to those who had completed their terms or were transferred without 
incident. Here I use the term dereliction to denote when the king discovered poor 
performance of a magistrate through extra-ordinary channels. Primarily that was the 
secret inspector but could also be reports from governors or complaints from other 
magistrates.  
What stands out in this table is that the rates for removal and completion or 
transfer remain quite similar from King Chŏngjo through King Hŏnjong’s reign (1834–
1849), and only in King Ch’ŏlchong’s reign (1849–1863) do we see a dramatic drop in 
removals. By Kojong’s reign it appears that either the biannual evaluations had lost 
their importance, or transferring problematic officials was the norm. Kojong’s reign 
also saw some shifts in the age and background of officials appointed to the key posts 
of Kanggye and Ŭiju. These shifts suggest a weakening of bureaucratic authority and 
disruption of tenure that could have had an impact on the Chosŏn government’s 
response to deepening crises in the late nineteenth century. An analysis of age and 
background of officials is the subject of the next section. 
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The conclusions in this section would be reinforced with a fuller picture of the 
reasons for magistrate removal in more of the counties along the border. As yet, my 
research has not yielded enough data for statistical analysis. Still, the trends outlined in 
the Kanggye Defense Command Gazetteer appear generally consistent with the data I 
have gathered on the other P’yŏngan border counties.  
 
IV. Age and Experience 
Throughout his reign, Chŏngjo was concerned with corruption at the border. His 
discussions during leave-taking ceremonies with magistrates appointed to the border often 
included exhortations to correct past abuses from magistrates and relieve the people of the 
burdens of unjust governance. He even noted that “right now, for the border counties in 
P’yŏngan, managing them is more important than the capital.”192 Much of this is 
rhetorical and the trope of the rapacious magistrate is rife in Chosŏn documents. Even so, 
Chŏngjo consistently brought up the importance of effective border management. Chosŏn 
kings and ministers did value effective magistrates, and their patterns of appointment to 
the border regions reflect that concern. 
While not a proxy for ability, age and experience often do reflect a certain 
facility within any bureaucracy. The benefit of people with greater experience in the 
workings of a bureaucracy or the tasks and situations a magistrate may encounter is 
evident to anyone who has encountered that long-serving administrative employee who 
can somehow get anything through the system quickly and with few complications. 
Rather than analyzing the benefits or drawbacks of bureaucratic systems, this chapter 
                                                             
192 SJW 1679:78a [1790/6/16, 31st entry]. 
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argues that bureaucracies tend to value those who work within the system and reward 
such compliance. Politics aside, longer serving officials should by default have more 
authority and ease of operation within the system. The average age of appointees to the 
northern border posts in P’yŏngan reveal differences in respective importance (figure 
2.1). 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Average age of border magistrates at appointment. 
Number above columns is average deviation. Data from the “Comprehensive Biographical 
Database of Historical Korean Individuals”  http://people.aks.ac.kr and SJW. 
 
 The average age of appointees to the seven P’yŏngan border counties remained 
relatively stable for most of the late Chosŏn. With the two counties of Pyŏktong and 
Wiwŏn generally receiving younger appointees, as would be expected since they were 
junior fourth rank as opposed to defense commands that were junior third. The data on 
Pyŏktong during the seventeenth century seem exceptional, however age data was 
available for less than a third of the appointees in that time period while age data for the 
other counties in the same time period was above forty percent. This information is 
hardly surprising, but the fact that Sakchu, ostensibly a defense command, had age 
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ranges that more closely resembled the counties suggests that it was not considered as 
prestigious a post.  
The average age statistic is somewhat misleading in that it flattens the great 
variety of ages. The average deviation of the magistrates ages above each column 
shows how variable the ages could be.193 A couple numbers stand out: the relatively 
lower age variability in Ŭiju from the seventeenth to the eighteenth century suggests a 
more standard career placement for civil officials and perhaps part of a career path. The 
same lower variability for Kanggye, which tightened from King Sunjo’s reign (1800–
1834) through King Ch’ŏlchong’s reign to a low of 4.8 years, along with such a high 
average age suggests that it might have been a capstone, especially for military officials. 
The rest of the magistracies have great variability when it comes to age at appointment. 
The variety in ages is not particularly surprising given that a magistracy might be the 
highest many military men in the late Chosŏn could realistically hope to attain,194 and 
many of the officials were appointed to at least four or five magistracies in their careers. 
That these officials were willing to take these posts at even advanced age suggests that 
whether a post was a defense command or a county either was equally appealing. It also 
suggests that service at the border was not particularly likely to lead to promotion. If it 
were, lower age deviation is to be expected as more officials would be appointed to the 
                                                             
193 I use average deviation as opposed to standard deviation because standard deviation, by using 
squares, overemphasizes outliers, especially in small datasets. 
194 Eugene Park found the highest court rank that military men could realistically expect to attain 
was the junior second, as military division commanders (taejang, yŏngjang). See Between 
Dreams and Reality, 79. While tenures for provincial offices in the upper senior third rank or 
higher (tangsang, “upper hall”) were generally shorter, 700 days for Ŭiju for example, the 
number of positions were much fewer than the 136 magistracies and other postings available to 
military men mostly Jr. 3 and below. 
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border earlier in their careers to test their qualifications. 
For many of the appointees, in addition to their age, their year of passage of the 
civil or military examination allowed an analysis of the position of appointments 
relative to time in the bureaucracy (figure 2.2). 
  
 
Figure 2.2. Average number of years between magistrate’s examination and appointment for 
P’yŏngan border counties. 
Data from “Comprehensive Biographical Database of Historical Korean Individuals” and SJW. 
 
Though data before 1720 is not as complete, the chart suggests that the Chosŏn 
government considered experience within the bureaucracy more important for those 
serving on the border both before and especially after the eighteenth century. Some of 
this is undoubtedly due to Yŏngjo’s efforts to contest the power of the bureaucracy, 
factionalism, and regional discrimination through the policy of impartiality 
(t’angp’yŏng) and Chŏngjo’s continuation of the same.195 Even so, beyond these basic 
contours, the data for Kanggye, Ch’angsŏng, and Ŭiju are exceptions. Kanggye and 
Ch’angsŏng continued to receive experienced bureaucrats at rates higher than the other 
                                                             
195 O Such’ang, Chosŏn hugi P’yŏngan-do sahoe palchŏn yŏn’gu (Seoul: Ilchogak, 2002), 108–
110. 
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magistracies throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. For Ŭiju, the relatively 
short time in the bureaucracy can be partially explained by the fact that the civil 
examination took candidates longer to pass, and so the appointee more than likely had 
spent some time in the bureaucracy already.196 Yet despite overall increases in 
experienced bureaucrats being appointed to the border, Ŭiju magistrates’ time in the 
bureaucracy prior to appointment hardly changed. The short time from examination 
passage to appointment, together with a relatively young age for the highest-ranking 
post (Jr. 2) on the border, point to the fact that Ŭiju was not a terminal post, but one that 
led to more positions in the capital. This is especially true in the nineteenth century 
when appointments to the post were monopolized by the Border Defense Command 
(Pibyŏnsa). The highest deliberative body in the Chosŏn government at the time, for the 
first half of the nineteenth century the Border Defense Command effectively controlled 
the government and circumscribed the king’s authority. The command was dominated 
by in-laws of the king during the first half of the nineteenth century, and the position of 
Ŭiju magistrate appeared in the data to go to candidates more politically connected to 
these families.  
The ages of the magistrates and their time in the bureaucracy increased until 
Kojong’s reign, where both Kanggye and Ŭiju changed noticeably. Average age 
decreased to about 46 for both Ŭiju and Kanggye while average time in the bureaucracy 
also dropped six years for both. In Kojong’s reign, Kanggye became a more clearly 
                                                             
196 For most military appointees, especially later in the Chosŏn period, their first appointment 
would often be a protection appointment as a Royal Messenger (Sŏnjŏn’gwan) generally a year or 
two before they passed the military examination. See Park, Between Dreams and Reality, 82. 
Civil branch officials were similar but may have spent longer in protection appointments. 
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military post with the balance being ten military men to four civil. This may signal a 
decline in Kanggye’s status or perception as a border land county as Huju and Chasŏng, 
two magistracies created in the nineteenth century that absorbed the northern half of 
Kanggye, were located in the sensitive border area of the four abandoned counties once 
under its command.197 The change in character for both Ŭiju and Kanggye could also 
reflect an increasing sense of threat arising from coastal encounters with Western navies, 
especially after incursions from the French in 1866 and the Americans in 1871, and 
deployment of experienced magistrates to central and coastal counties. By further 
breaking down average age and time in the bureaucracy by decade for all the sixteen 
counties mentioned, a more detailed image emerges (figure 2.3). 
 
Figure 2.3 Average age and time in bureaucracy by decade for all P’yŏngan border counties. 
Data from SJW. 
                                                             
197 The so-called four abandoned counties constituted an area of frequent border crossing and 
illegal ginseng harvesting. See Pae Usŏng, Chosŏn hugi kukt’ogwan, 224–225; and Seonmin Kim, 
Ginseng and Borderland, 73–74. 
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This chart more clearly shows the effect of Yŏngjo and Chŏngjo’s struggles 
with the bureaucracy. The declines over the course of Yŏngjo’s reign and the lower 
than average ages for both Chŏngjo and Kojong reflect these strong monarchs’ attempts 
to disrupt the power of the bureaucracy by appointing outsiders and those who might 
give allegiance to the king above the ministers. The dissociation between time in 
bureaucracy and age in the last half of the nineteenth century here reflects a breakdown 
in the examination process. The timing is significant here because the corruption of the 
political system, and by extension the bureaucracy, is often suggested as a consequence 
of the era of royal in-law politics.198 If we take the finding here in conjunction with the 
previous section’s evidence that Kojong’s reign also saw disruption in removing 
problematic officials, it would suggest that the breakdown of Chosŏn bureaucracy 
occurred much later in the nineteenth century than previously asserted. This conclusion 
leads me to posit that attempts at reforming the bureaucracy during Kojong’s reign were 
quite damaging to the institution and its ability to manage the myriad problems of the 
late-nineteenth century like increasing Western encroachment, local resistance and 
rebellion, and the collection of taxes. 
To return to the broader questions of appointments to the border, examining the 
rate of rescinded appointments reveals another curious connection between Ch’angsŏng, 
                                                             
198 O Such’ang, “Onŭl nal ŭi yŏksahak, Chŏngjo yŏn’gan t’angp’yŏng chŏngch’i mit 19-segi sedo 
chŏngch’i ŭi samgak taehwa,” 204–206. O sees the era of in-law politics as a part of the overall 
long-term decline throughout the late Chosŏn era, and thus not necessarily an isolated 
phenomenon. Nevertheless, several scholars drew similar conclusions about the fate of Chosŏn’s 
political system, while noting the particularity of the early nineteenth century, see: Han’guk 
yŏksa yon’guhoe, Chosŏn chŏngch’isa: 1800–1863. 
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Kanggye, and Hoeryŏng. Below is a chart (figure 2.4) that shows the percent of 
appointments where the magistrate did not serve for P’yŏngan counties and Hoeryŏng. 
Generally, Hamgyŏng’s border counties saw higher rejection rates, but even there 
Hoeryŏng stood out.  
 
Figure 2.4. Rate of appointees not serving post for P’yŏngan province and Hoeryŏng. 
Data from SJW. 
 
Civil branch appointments avoiding service may possibly be inflating the rates 
in Ch’osan and Kanggye. Ku Wanhoe described this persistent issue, and Yi Wŏn’gyun 
confirmed such a situation for Tongnae magistrates in Kyŏngsang province, but in the 
data, there was not an appreciable deviation of rescinded appointments by branch 
among the officials whose branch I could determine.199 There was no appreciable age 
difference for those rejected either. It appears that performance or personal reasons 
were the main issues ministers considered when arguing against an appointment. 
Hoeryŏng is a special case, and would benefit from a much more detailed treatment, but 
                                                             
199 Ku Wanhoe, “Sŏnsaengan,” 211. Yi Wŏn’gyun “suryŏngjik kyoch’e silt’ae,” 73. 
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the necessary statistical data in not available. From anecdotal data in selecting 
magistrates to Hoeryŏng, specialization was a key consideration. 
 
V. Multiple Border Postings and the Benefits of Specialization 
Han Pŏmsŏk’s career represents how regional specialization of border 
magistrates could affect their appointments. He was born in 1672 and passed the military 
examination in 1695. His first provincial posting of note was in 1700 as sub-area 
commander in Chongp’o in the north of Kanggye, one of the forts marking the southern 
border of the four abandoned counties. Soon after this he became a junior sixth-rank 
magistrate of a lesser county, Hadong, in the far south of Kyŏngsang. He returned to 
P’yŏngan as the junior fourth-rank magistrate of Kwaksan in 1712. Following this he 
spent the next eight years in southern posts along the coast of Chŏlla and on Chejudo. 
After serving as military division commander in Naju, he was appointed senior third-rank 
magistrate of Yŏnghŭng in Hamgyŏng in 1722 and then four more posts in that province. 
He was apparently a very capable manager and rarely left a county without its residents 
feting him and expressing their sadness at his departure.200 It was, however, his 
appointment to Hoeryŏng in 1728 that reveals the concern for specialization. 
Despite having served as a sub-area commander near the border and as magistrate 
in the coastal counties of Kwaksan, Changhŭng, and the city of Cheju, ministers were 
skeptical of Han’s ability to handle a defense command on the northern border. They 
                                                             
200 Yi Sanghun, “Chosŏn sidae chibang kwanje wa mongmin’gwan Han Pŏmsŏk,” Nammyŏnghak 
yŏn’gu 44 (2014), 179. In quotations from a collection of his writings compiled by a descendant, 
Han Ŭngbok, the residents of Yŏnghŭng were filled with sad memories at his farewell feast, and 
the residents of Hoeryŏng claimed he “was like a mother nursing her beloved child.”  
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prevailed upon Yŏngjo to appoint a more experienced military commander, Yi Suryang 
(1673–1735). Still, before Yi could take the post, the consensus around him fell apart, and 
Han’s appointment was left to stand.201 The definition of what constituted specialization 
in military affairs at the northern border in this context was frustratingly unclear. It was 
specific enough that a man such as Han could spend a distinguished career handling what 
we might consider border counties in the south with capability and yet be held up in an 
appointment to another.202 Here again we have the special case of Hoeryŏng and the fact 
that the location is far and away the most difficult county to staff on the northern border. 
The magistracy often required a military official who had previously served on the 
northern border as a magistrate. 
 Specialization was a key consideration not only for Hoeryŏng, but also for 
Ch’angsŏng and Kanggye. A few other counties at the border had some significant 
difference in the number of post-initial appointments. That is to say that for some counties 
experience on the border could be a positive or negative factor in deciding who should be 
appointed to the post. For instance, Sakchu was a positively correlated post with 
magistrates’ initial border post. This means that while Sakchu was the initial border post 
for some thirty-seven magistrates, it was a post-initial appointment only sixteen times. In 
the following table (table 2.3) are some of the outliers in this deviation between initial and 
                                                             
201 Yi Suryang was indeed more experienced, but it is a question of how much. One year younger 
than Han, he was appointed and served in Wiwŏn in 1718, and was appointed but did not serve in 
Kyŏnghŭng in 1717 and Kanggye in 1722. He also served in Changhŭng and as Naval adjutant in 
Chŏlla province. His rise appears conspicuously fast. 
202 My suspicion is the question of his ability to manage the open market played a role in 
contesting his appointment, but it is not specifically referenced. Yi Sanghun remarks that Han had 
a fight with the magistrate of Myŏngch’ŏn over scales in the open market during his tenure, but 
that is after the fact. Yi Sanghun, “Chosŏn sidae chibang kwanje,” 179. 
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post-initial appointments. 
 
Magistracy Initial Post-Initial Difference 
Onsŏng 45  21   24 
Sakchu 37  16   21 
Musan 26  11   15 
Ŭiju 14  34  -20 
Ch’angsŏng 33  65  -32 
Kanggye 39  90  -51 
Hoeryŏng 15 148 -133 
Table 2.3. Difference in Experienced Appointments for Select Counties. 
 
Ch’angsŏng, Kanggye, and Hoeryŏng stand out in that they are significantly more 
likely to be a magistrate’s second post on the border. A further finding was that despite 
Kanggye’s magistrates’ generally greater age, the most common subsequent post for 
reappointed Kanggye magistrates was Hoeryŏng, and forty-six (about ten percent) of the 
multiple border post officials were appointed to both Kanggye and Hoeryŏng. In the 
nineteenth century, appointees to both Kanggye and Hoeryŏng achieved relatively high 
positions for military men in the Chosŏn bureaucracy. These were men like Hŏ Kye 
(1788–1866), Sin Chongik (born Chongnak, 1797–n.d.), and Yi Yongsang (1806–n.d.) 
who all achieved posts as Army Commander of P’yŏngan (Jr. 2), and Chŏng Haŭng 
(1800–1871) who was appointed Second Magistrate (Chwayun, Jr. 2) of Seoul , a position 
Yi Yongsang also held. Interestingly, no Kanggye magistrates were reappointed to 
Hoeryŏng, or vice versa, after Kojong’s ascension. Even so, for Hoeryŏng, from King 
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Kyŏngjong’s reign (1720–1724) over fifty percent of magistrates were reappointees, and 
from 1800, the number was sixty-eight percent. O Such’ang has argued that regional 
specialization was a feature of the bureaucracy that gained prominence during Yŏngjo’s 
reign and continued under Chŏngjo.203 This specialization continued into the nineteenth 
century and had a significant influence on the appointment patterns at the border, 
especially in the key magistracies of Ch’angsŏng, Kanggye, and Hoeryŏng. 
 
VI. Career Paths and the Value of Virtue 
In the middle of the nineteenth century during a leave-taking ceremony for 
border commanders, the young Ch’ŏlchong complained that his admonishments to 
succor the people were continuing to go unheeded, particularly at the border.204 Yet, 
despite this lament, it appears that magistrates with past malfeasance and poor 
performance continued to receive appointments. The question we must ask is: was this a 
feature of the system or a bug? The legal perspective of Chosŏn kings and ministers and 
the great value placed in the examination system as a proxy for virtuous talent ensured a 
kind of tenure for degree holders that was not easy to disrupt. 
The process of biannual evaluation and the high standards of performance 
meant most officials would encounter headwinds in their bureaucratic career. On top of 
this, the costs of failure became more severe through the late Chosŏn era, as evidenced 
in the dramatic increase in the number of punishment statutes between the Great Code 
                                                             
203 O Such’ang, Chosŏn hugi P’yŏngan-do sahoe, 108–112. 
204 SJW Ch’ŏlchong 6/7/7 (1855). Ch’ŏlchong’s issues with magistrates might have run deeper 
than simply the inertia of the system. After all, he was living as an ordinary farmer in Kanghwa 
Island until ascending the throne at age 19, but the concern for attentive magistrates is common 
throughout the late Chosŏn era. 
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of State Administration and the Amended Great Code.205 Even so, it appears that many 
of the Chosŏn kings and their ministers believed in the reformative power of 
punishment, rather than simply as a punitive or preventative measure. While a 
magistrate could receive severe punishments for his failures, after they completed their 
punishment they were generally free to accept new positions. The harsher punishment 
by far was elimination of their official record (sakkŏ sap’an), but this was a drastic 
measure that was often resisted by the king or downgraded by the State Tribunal 
(Ŭigŭmbu).206  
The story or Yi Manyu (fl. 1728–1748), former magistrate of Sakchu, a defense 
command nestled just east of Ŭiju, well captures the problems of tenure and removal. In 
the summer of 1739 Yŏngjo had dispatched Yi Sŏnghyo (1697–1740) as a secret 
inspector to P’yŏngan province’s northern border. He was to investigate the conditions 
in the counties along the Yalu River and report back to the king. Being a secret 
investigator in the northern region presented some problems for Yi: in particular, it was 
so lightly populated that he could not enter most towns and town offices because his 
presence would be immediately suspect. Instead, he relied on hearsay and the testimony 
of residents to collect evidence. Despite these limitations, his searches yielded some 
surprising information: the magistrate of Sakchu had been embezzling rice taxes, 
funneling them to a Ŭiju trader, and cavorting with female entertainers in the trader’s 
pleasure house.  
The magistrate’s active contravention of one of his seven duties, suppressing 
                                                             
205 Yi Wŏn’gyun, “Chosŏn sidae ŭi suryŏngjik,” 72. 
206 This assumption is based on anecdotal evidence and may not be statistically borne out. 
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wickedness and deceit (kanhwal sik), was galling enough, but not the worst of Yi’s 
experience. Not long after discovering the wrongdoing, the magistrate, Yi Manyu, 
confronted Sŏnghyo in the county office. Yi Manyu had laid his sword across his lap as 
a threat, accusing Sŏnghyo of being a false secret inspector, forging his tablet of 
authority (map’ae),207 and looking to oust Manyu from his position. In Sŏnghyo’s 
dramatic retelling, he defied Manyu’s threat with bravado, shouting that Manyu was no 
true servant of Chosŏn as he lacked sufficient reverence for his country. With a 
theatrical flourish, Sŏnghyo produced his tablet, threw it at Manyu’s feet and told the 
magistrate “do you see that tablet, my authority comes from that.” Whereupon Manyu 
fled the office.208 
Upon hearing Sŏnghyo’s tale, Yŏngjo was distraught, lamenting, “We know Yi 
Manyu is uncouth, but this level of criminality, we had no way to assess that 
beforehand. Until now this was something no one could have known.”209 Of the many 
transgressions that the secret inspector accused Manyu of committing, the ones which 
occasioned the most discussion were not his embezzlement or illicit activities, but those 
of his character. Yŏngjo was reluctant to admit that Yi Manyu’s ignorance may have 
played a role in his crimes, but Yi Sŏnghyo argued that “the affair with Yi Manyu, all 
of it stems from his lack of education, ignorance is the consequence.”210 Nevertheless, 
that Manyu doubted the authority of an official the king personally invested greatly 
                                                             
207 Originally, a tablet embossed with the image of a horse allowing the possessor to requisition 
station horses, it eventually became the emblem of the secret inspector. 
208 SJW 897:41a [1739/9/9 12th entry].  
209 SJW 897:40b [1739/9/9]. Literally “illiteracy,” but in discussions about him and stories of his 
conduct, this inability is but one manifestation of his moral deficit.  
210 SJW 897:41b [1739/9/9]. 
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disturbed the king, and he sent out an order for Yi Manyu’s arrest and questioning. For 
many of the king’s officials, Yi Manyu’s lack of education revealed a deeper lack of 
virtue, a moral failing which was the wellspring of all his subsequent profanities. His 
deficiencies were all the more dangerous on the border as Yi Sŏnghyo’s quote at the top 
of the chapter illustrates. The border was a threat even to the best of magistrates. Yi 
Manyu’s career was somewhat unorthodox, but all the more revealing because 
ministers’ complaints about his unorthodox treatment reveal the expectations of what 
made a proper official and who was qualified to hold the position of magistrate. 
Yi Manyu had been rewarded as a merit subject by the king with a title, the 
Hanwŏn-gun, for supporting the king during the Yi Injwa rebellion in 1728 and served 
as a magistrate for a few counties including Yangsŏng (Hyŏn’gam, Jr. 6) in Kyŏnggi 
province and Nagan (Kunsu, Jr. 4) in south Chŏlla province. He was, however, removed 
from both positions for malfeasance. His education, or lack thereof, featured 
prominently in discussions about his abilities and led to the rescinder of his 
appointment as magistrate (Jr. 4) to Pyŏktong in 1731.211 Yi was removed from Nagan 
in 1735, but nevertheless maintained royal favor. In 1737, he was appointed magistrate 
(Jr. 3) to Sakchu and served a full two years before he requested to be relieved because 
his mother was over eighty years old.212 
                                                             
211 For his receipt of title: SJW 667:44a [1728/7/19 48th entry]. His departures for Yangsŏng and 
Nagan are in SJW 671:67a [1728/9/25 3rd entry] and SJW 753:7a [1732/12/17 3rd entry]. His 
lack of education is discussed in SJW 724:74a–97a [1731/6/5 31st entry]. In SJW 840:12a 
[1737/1/2 28th entry] the king defends Yi’s ability in managing provinces despite being illiterate. 
212 Yi may have been the victim of partisan rancor as the Fourth Royal Secretary (Chwabu sŭngji) 
Yu Ŏm (1692–1752) flatly rejected the king’s characterization of Yi as a good manager, SJW 
840:12a [1737/1/2 28th entry], while the Minister of War (Pyŏngjo P’ansŏ) Kim Ch’wiro (1682–
1740) praised him as “not only uncommonly robust, but also devoted to the country before 
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After his disgrace at the hands of Yi Sŏnghyo, the secret inspector, Yi Manyu 
must have maintained some connections to the court as he was appointed magistrate 
(Pusa, Jr. 3) of Onsŏng in Hamgyŏng province, again along the northern border, in 
1743, and Kusŏng (Pusa, Jr. 3) in P’yŏngan in 1744, but he refused both on account of 
his mother’s age. A few months later, in discussing Kim Chungman’s (1676–n.d.) 
appointment as magistrate of Tanch’ŏn in Hamgyŏng province and the problems of 
appointing military men who lack education to such posts, the king brought up Yi’s 
ignorance asking whether it was harmful. Third State Councilor (Uŭijŏng) Cho 
Hyŏnmyŏng (1690–1752) responded that Yi had recently begun studying the youth 
curriculum Important Methods of Eliminating Ignorance (Kyŏngmong yogyŏl). Such 
efforts on Yi’s part probably aided his appointments as magistrate (Pusa, Jr. 3) of 
Sukch’ŏn in P’yŏngan and Kilchu (Moksa, Sr. 3) in Hamgyŏng and as the right naval 
commander (Sr. 3) of Kyŏngsang over the next five years.213 
 What is notable about Yi’s career path is the regional tilt to many of his posts. 
Of the eight posts outside the capital to which he was appointed, five were in P’yŏngan 
or Hamgyŏng, the other two magistrate postings were related to his residence and 
family. His arrest warrant in 1739 was sent to Tamyang in south Chŏlla where Yi was 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
himself,” SJW 840:43b [1737/1/7 18th entry]. Yi’s request to leave his post is SJW 888:21a 
[1739/3/18 17th entry]. This entry mentions that his mother was at the time residing in Nagan 
nearly 2,000 ri (~600 miles) from Sakchu and that regulations allow for an official to request 
appointment within 300 ri (~90 miles) of a parent over the age of seventy. Yi’s sudden request of 
a transfer near the end of his appointment may have lent credence to the secret inspector’s 
accusations. 
213 For Yi’s appointments to Onsŏng: SJW 956:99a, 113b–114a [1743/4/22 16th entry, 4/25 14th 
entry]; Kusŏng: SJW 970:82a [1744/3/13 11th entry]; Sukch’ŏn: SJW 977:69a [1744/9/12 2nd 
entry]; Kilchu: SJW 1025:128b [1748/1/24 18th entry]; and Kyŏngsang Naval Commander: SJW 
1036:128b [1748/11/24 27th entry]. Yŏngjo discusses his recent education in SJW 973: 122 
[1744/6/23 40th entry]. 
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said to be residing with his family, about fifty kilometers from Nagan, where he had 
served as magistrate only four years earlier. And in 1744 during a discussion with the 
king, Cho Hyŏnmyŏng stated that Yi was residing in Myŏnch’ŏn along the border 
between Kyŏnggi and Ch’ungch’ŏng provinces, about fifty kilometers from Yangsŏng. 
Yi Sŏnghyo’s report also singled out No Kyejŏng (1695–1755) as being an 
exceptional magistrate for Wiwŏn. Nonetheless, No’s career would be fraught with 
similar difficulties as Yi Manyu, though his path began in a more traditional way. He 
was born in 1695 and passed his military examination in 1725. In the record of his 
examination performance, his residence was listed as Sŏnsan in the middle of 
Kyŏngsang province.214 Over the course of his career he served in a number of posts in 
the northern provinces including the P’yŏngan counties of Pakch’ŏn (1735, Jr. 4), 
Wiwŏn (1737, Jr. 4), Sŏnch’ŏn (1740, Jr. 3), and Ch’angsŏng (1743, Jr. 3). In 1742 he 
received censure for mishandling funds for military farms (tunjŏn) and his appointment 
to Ch’angsŏng in 1743 was rejected after officials had found that he had forged part of 
his genealogy, but such transgressions do not seem to have derailed his career. In 1746 
he was appointed magistrate of Isan (Ch’osan, Jr. 3) where he was praised for rallying 
over 900 people for training in scouting and defense against invasion, yet found himself 
removed for failure to succor the people during a poor harvest the following year.215 He 
was banished for a year and a half in Sunch’ang for this and other crimes discovered 
                                                             
214 For these biographical sketches, unless otherwise noted, I began with the “Han’guk yŏktae 
inmul chonghap chŏngbo sisŭt’em” [A comprehensive biographical database of historical Korean 
individuals] compiled and maintained by the Academy of Korean Studies at 
http://people.aks.ac.kr and cross-referenced the information with the SJW.  
215 Praise of his deeds: Yŏngjo sillok 65:3b [1747/1/15], and removal SJW 1018:124a [1747/7/19 
12th entry]. 
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after his arrest.216  
Like Yi Manyu, his regional postings outside of the north may have had a 
connection to his family. After he received the praise of secret inspector Yi Sŏnghyo in 
1739, No was promoted to military division commander (yŏngjang, Sr. 3) in Sangju, 
just to the west of Sŏnsan. And a year after his release from exile in 1750, he was able 
to reenter the bureaucracy to finish his service as left army commander (Chwa 
Pyŏngma chŏltosa, Sr. 3), also in Kyŏngsang. All told, he spent nearly ten years in 
posts in the north, close to the border, a balance that outweighed his time in the south. 
Im Sich’ŏk’s (1694–1764) experience mirrored that of No. Born in Ŭiju, Im 
passed the military examination in 1719. He was in Ŭiju at the outbreak of the Yi Injwa 
rebellion and upon receiving his orders spent three sleepless days travelling to Suwŏn to 
participate in the suppression campaign.217 After the rebellion, in 1731 he was 
appointed army second deputy commander of Kalp’aji (also Kaŭlp’aji), a fort on the 
Yalu River on the western border of Samsu. After this northern post, most of his 
subsequent career was spent in the southern provinces or central Korea. In 1736, 
Yŏngjo appointed him junior sixth-rank magistrate of the lesser county of Kijang on the 
southeast coast of Kyŏngsang province, in 1741 he became magistrate of Koyang 
(Kunsu, Jr. 4) and later, in 1745, military division commander of Sunch’ŏn in south 
Chŏlla province. Near the end of his career in 1753, however, Im was appointed 
magistrate of Pyŏktong. The reason for this post is not clear, though considering his age, 
                                                             
216 See SJW 1022:97b–98a [1747/10/14 24th entry] for discussion of additional crimes. His 
sentencing is not recorded, but his release from exile notes that he was in Sunch’ang: SJW 
1040:196a [1749/2/30 19th entry]. 
217 Kim Ch’anghyŏn, “Im Sich’ŏk,” 
http://encykorea.aks.ac.kr/Contents/Index?contents_id=E0047515 (accessed 3/30/2018).  
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59, it is likely that he had a parent over seventy allowing him to serve close to home. He 
served in this post well, earning praise from some ministers, and was promoted to naval 
commander (Sugun chŏltosa, Sr. 3) of Ch’ungch’ŏng province in 1755.218 Despite not 
receiving any major censure or demotions, his career looks remarkably similar to many 
other military magistrates in the late Chosŏn. 
Im Paekkwan (1778–n.d.) passed the augmented examination in 1803 and 
received his first border posting in 1807 as sub-area commander of Oetkoe along the 
four abandoned counties border in Kanggye. He then served as county magistrate (Jr. 4) 
in Kaech’ŏn from 1810, where he was accused of not mobilizing with his troops during 
the Hong Kyŏngnae Rebellion but avoided punishment at the time. A few years later in 
1817 he was again sent to the north as magistrate (Jr. 3) of Kapsan along the border and 
served about five months before being recalled in part because officials were upset that 
someone who had failed in his duty to confront the rebels had received one of the 
“grand counties of the north” (pukchi ungbu).219 Another six years passed before he was 
again given a border assignment, this time in Sakchu, where he completed his tenure 
without incident. This marked the end of his northern posts. All his subsequent 
provincial posts were high ranking ones in Kyŏnggi or Chŏlla provinces including: left 
and right naval commander (Sr. 3) and army commander (Jr. 2) of Chŏlla, military aide 
(Chunggun, Jr. 2) in Suwŏn and defense commander (Pangŏsa, Jr. 2) of Yŏngjong. 
Yun Myŏnggŏm’s experience is even more telling. Born in 1779, he passed the 
                                                             
218 Im Sich’ŏk’s career postings: Kalp’aji SJW 719:109b [1731/3/18 19th entry]; Kijang SJW 
834:22b [1736/9/21 22nd entry]; Koyang SJW 931:61b [1741/5/14 8th entry]; Sunch’ŏn SJW 
994:112a [1745/11/24 18th entry]; Pyŏktong SJW 1093:161a [1753/4/28 16th entry]; promotion 
to naval commander SJW 119:75a [1755/5/14 13th entry]. 
219 SJW 2094:45b [1818/4/11 21st entry]. 
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military examination in 1805. In 1814 he was appointed magistrate of Tanch’ŏn on the 
east coast of Hamgyŏng province but was arrested for misuse of public grain and sent 
into exile in Yŏngam in Chŏlla province. Shortly after his release, he was appointed 
military division commander in Chinju, Kyŏngsang province. A few years later in 1822, 
he was again in Hamgyŏng province as army second deputy commander of Sŏngjin but 
lasted only a few months. After returning to the capital, Yun was appointed magistrate 
in Sakchu. Only at this post one year, he was removed on the recommendation of a 
secret inspector, Kim Ro (1783–n.d.). His punishment this time was even more severe, 
including caning, being stripped of his offices, exile, and a five-year ban on taking 
examinations. The State Tribunal recommended a reduction in his sentence, and it 
appears he only served a three-year exile. After this, he was appointed to Chongsŏng in 
1829 but did not serve due to illness, Kapsan in 1835, T’ongjin on the mainland across 
from Kanghwa island in 1839, and Kilchu (Sr. 3) in Hamgyŏng in 1841. At this point, 
of his seven provincial office appointments, five were in the northern provinces, three 
within a few hundred ri of each other. He then served as left naval commander (Sr. 3) in 
Kyŏngsang, but he was once again arrested after a secret inspector report on his crimes 
in T’ongjin and exiled to Munhwa in Hwanghae province. Finally, he served as right 
naval commander (Sr. 3) and army commander (Jr. 2) of Chŏlla province where he was 
once more censured after a secret inspector report. His career seems not to have been 
significantly derailed by any of his punishments.  
A statistical analysis of the magistrates’ individual career paths awaits more 
data, but the picture thus far is one of general regional specialization with some 
consideration of an official’s family and residence. Considering many of the military 
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officials’ residences were in or near Seoul, especially later in the dynasty, the need for 
such regional division to avoid nepotism should have declined, but nonetheless it 
appears to have persisted.220 In addition, most officials were appointed to a capital 
position for a few months before receiving another provincial post. This may have 
served as insurance against the development of regional networks that could contest 
central authority. After being removed from office, a magistrate was often punished 
with a demotion in rank or undesirable posts, but that did not appear to affect his 
opportunity to advance to higher positions in the future. Some of these magistrates 
certainly had connections to the court or bureaucracy on which they could rely, but the 
consistency of these cases suggests not only the well-connected experienced such 
mercy. Misplaced as the idealism of self-correction and the virtue of education was, it 
did express an admirable interpretation of limited meritocracy. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter pursued two distinct, but related themes. The first was that the 
border represented a threat to Chosŏn Korea that needed to be handled by border 
magistrates with experience in the region which was expressed as preference for 
experienced border magistrates in key defense commands. The second was that what 
defined a magistrate’s ability was not the results of their time in office per se, but the 
virtue they displayed in the performance of their duties. This virtue was often defined 
by proxy, most notably in the official’s pursuit of education. The process of passing the 
                                                             
220 Evidence for residence is drawn from the “Han’guk yŏktae inmul,” http://people.aks.ac.kr, 
which notes the residence of examination passers where recorded, which may not have been their 
residence at appointment but does suggest a familial network in the region.  
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military or civil examination imbued an official with a default level of virtue. This 
virtue provided tenure that allowed defective magistrates the opportunity for 
redemption. 
A system of review that operated more objectively might have produced the type 
of official with demonstrable experience in the tasks specific to border counties for which 
Chosŏn kings and ministers consistently expressed a preference. But they did not always 
agree, and the times of struggle between strong monarchs and a retrenched bureaucracy 
resulted in generally lower tenures and greater rates of rescinded appointments to border 
posts. While tenures were never long by design, shorter tenures more than likely led to 
poor performance. But, the system in place acted adequately, if reactively, to remove 
defective magistrates and maintained the regime and its stability, despite challenges, until 
the latter half of the nineteenth century. The ability of Chosŏn magistrates to return to 
positions of authority despite manifest failures probably was not a bug in the system, but 
rather a feature. The power of virtue to alter behavior in the face of rather strong negative 
incentives for magistrates to abuse their positions was miniscule in reality, but grand in 
Chosŏn officials’ imagination. Still, the idealism of the system, and the consistent reliance 
on the trope of the rapacious magistrate, should not overshadow the fact that there were 
many magistrates who served at the border with ability and dedication. Many of these 
officials were military men who returned to the border region several times in their career, 
developing a specialization in border affairs. The breakdown of this system in the late 
nineteenth century may have contributed to a deficit of experience in border management 
that exacerbated Korea’s response to deepening international crises. But that conclusion 
awaits more a detailed examination of the careers of the magistrates who served at the 
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northern border.  
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Chapter 3: The Threat of Illegals  
Borders and Security in Nineteenth-century Chosŏn 
 
On a late spring day of 1846 during King Hŏnjong’s reign, Yi Hŭiryŏm, 
commander of the Sangt’o garrison, noticed a smudge of smoke on the horizon coming 
from what looked to be the riverside. Yi had been at his post a little less than a year, and 
the area his garrison was responsible for managing, the four abandoned counties 
(p’yesagun), was large, but he knew there were no legal Korean settlements that close to 
the river.221 He decided to investigate, and what he discovered was troubling indeed. 
Where the smoke had risen, and all up and down the river, spread out over more than 
sixty miles of the border between his land and Qing territory, were over forty small 
groups of illegal settlers. They had built rough homes and begun to farm, carving out 
homesteads in this hardscrabble land. They had cleared forest and settled on floodplains 
all along the river in what was supposed to be a buffer, a space where Qing and Chosŏn 
subjects could not settle lest they be tempted to engage in deeds more nefarious than 
animal husbandry. The mountains here were rich in old growth forest and were known as 
one of the best areas to seek wild ginseng, both products could sustain an entrepreneurial 
soul or two with contacts at the border offices along the willow palisade. There were even 
rumors of precious minerals in the hills. The scale of the crisis inspired a swift response 
                                                             
221 Yi Hŭiryŏm’s appointment to Sangt’o: SJW 2440.55a [1845/6/25 43rd entry] The description 
of “seeing smoke” and finding settlers is in Kim Ch’inam, Kim Kyŏngmun, and Yi Ch’am 
comps., T’ongmun-gwan chi, 1881, vol. 5 11.43a.  
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to Chosŏn requests for aid, and by the end of the summer several hundred Qing troops 
arrived at the border to remove its subjects. 
This chapter will argue that these events reveal the Chosŏn government was 
pursuing border control policies in an incremental, but consistent way. Their approach to 
border security was one of cautious observation and limited engagement. The Qing 
soldiers, along with Korean minders, spent over two months crisscrossing the Yalu River 
in an effort to uproot illegal settlements and stamp out smuggling. Occurring against the 
backdrop of increasing foreign encroachment, and Korea’s desire for a measure of 
insulation from foreign contact at its borders, this operation presents an opportunity to 
examine Chosŏn border security in practice.222 The Korean government was not 
inattentive to the requirements of border security; rather, its policies required a partner on 
the other side of the border whose desires were aligned with the Chosŏn government. 
Absent that, the incremental and observational nature of Korean border policies would 
always be too little, too late. 
Accordingly, this chapter examines the nature of the border and border patrol 
during the late Chosŏn era. It primarily focuses on the sections of the Collection of 
Diplomatic Documents (Tongmun hwigo) dealing with illegal crossing (pŏmwŏl) and 
borders (kanggye) and the Records of Capital Offices (Kaksa tŭngnok). The first part 
                                                             
222 For a view of Korea’s proactive stance toward such encroachment see: Takemichi Hara, 
“Korea, China, and Western Barbarians: Diplomacy in Early Nineteenth-Century Korea,” 
Modern Asian Studies 32, no. 2 (1998), particularly 407–414 which examines foreign sailors 
arriving on Korean soil and the Chosŏn officials’ responding with rather sophisticated diplomatic 
ambiguity. 
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describes the border in the Qing-Chosŏn era and the second consists of a case study of the 
border sweep operation. 
 
I. Drawing Borders 
The border between Chosŏn and Qing has benefitted from the natural boundaries 
created by the Yalu and Tumen Rivers. The Yalu is steeply banked and not easily 
navigated in its middle and upper reaches. The difficulty of the terrain lent itself to a 
natural demarcation of the political border of the successive Koryŏ and Chosŏn 
dynasties.223 In the early Chosŏn era, although the government drew its line of 
sovereignty at these rivers, the residents along the border, particularly in the far 
northeastern areas along the Tumen River, clearly were not subjects of the Chosŏn king. 
There were Jurchen tribes in the area south of the river, in the area that would become 
Hoeryŏng, who entered into a tributary relationship with the Chosŏn court, but neither 
side considered them the king’s subjects.224  
As Chosŏn kings incorporated the northeast under greater central control, the 
Chosŏn bureaucracy could better project its authority and control its borders. As 
discussed in chapter two, the culmination of this process was that the Chosŏn jurisdiction 
                                                             
223 Shannon McCune, “Physical Basis for Korean Boundaries,” Far Eastern Quarterly 5, no. 3 
(May 1946), 273–274; Kenneth R. Robinson, “Residence and Foreign Relations in the Peninsular 
Northeast during the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries,” in The Northern Region of Korea: 
History, Identity and Culture, ed. Sun Joo Kim (Seattle: Center for Korea Studies, University of 
Washington, 2010), 19–20. Robinson focuses on an earlier time period, but he points out that 
from early Chosŏn they termed the area above the two rivers “kangoe” or outside the rivers and 
referred to this land as belonging to the superior country, sangguk.  
224 Kenneth Robinson, “Organizing Japanese and Jurchens in Tribute Systems in Early Chosŏn 
Korea,” Journal of East Asian Studies 13, no. 2 (2013), 347. 
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more accurately conformed to the perception of Chosŏn territory at the beginning of the 
dynasty. By the end of the seventeenth century and continuing through the nineteenth, 
Chosŏn kings and the subjects residing near the border recognized that there was 
something significant and othering about the lines of the two rivers. Not simply lines on 
maps stored in the capital, the borders now more clearly delineated Chosŏn authority and 
had serious, often dire, consequences for the people who were caught on the wrong side 
of them.  
One complicating factor in defining the border was Mount Paektu. As the 
northern region underwent significant social, political and demographic growth, the 
importance of Mount Paektu and the surrounding region for mining ore and other 
resources, arable land, and as the mythical source of both the Manchu and Korean people 
increased. This increasing importance in Qing cosmography and Chosŏn economic 
development, and later in the nineteenth century, Chosŏn’s own cosmological origins, 
caused mapmakers and historians to lay claim to the entire mountain on both sides of the 
border clouding our ability to view the border in the context of the eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries.225 
The convenience of distinct geographical markers that have long defined the 
extent of Korean territory in imagination if not in actuality belies the complexity of 
Chinese, and particularly the Qing, endeavors to define its borders. Peter Perdue, 
following the French historian Michel Foucher, suggests that mapmaking is the final step 
                                                             
225 Shannon McCune, “Physical Basis for Korean Boundaries,” 277–279; Andre Schmid, 
“Looking North Toward Manchuria,” South Atlantic Quarterly 99, no. 1 (2000), 219–240. 
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in delimiting a border, preceded by war and negotiation.226 Seonmin Kim also views the 
act of demarcation as a distinct act that transforms borderlands into more modern 
boundaries.227 This is a very Westphalian perspective that privileges the argument that 
constant war in Europe resulted in a Darwinian European ascendancy that allowed it to 
export its concepts of nations and borders throughout the world from the seventeenth 
century onward. Other scholars like Leo Shin, Mark Elliott, and Benjamin Elman 
challenge this perspective. They see mapmaking and erecting physical demarcations as 
the first steps the Ming and Qing emperors would take in their approach to territorial 
negotiations with their neighbors.228 When we examine the process of border making in 
China’s northeast region, particularly along its historical border with Chosŏn Korea, we 
see patterns more similar to the latter scholars’ arguments.229 Writing on early Chosŏn 
political formation, Kenneth Robinson notes the prominent use of negotiation, diplomacy 
and maps before the employment of force in Chosŏn border relations.230 The Qing 
                                                             
226 Peter C. Perdue, “Boundaries, Maps, and Movement: Chinese, Russian, and Mongolian 
Empires in Early Modern Central Eurasia,” International History Review 20, no. 2 (1998), 264. 
227 Seonmin Kim, Ginseng and Borderland: Territorial Boundaries and Political Relations 
between Qing China and Chosŏn Korea, 1636–1912 (Oakland: University of California Press, 
2017), 12–15. 
228 Shin and Elman see: Diana Lary, ed., The Chinese State at the Borders, ed. Diana Lary 
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2007); and Mark C. Elliott, “The Limits of 
Tartary: Manchuria in Imperial and National Geographies,” Journal of Asian Studies 59, no. 3 
(2000), 603–646. 
229 Elliott, “The Limits of Tartary,” 603; and Andre Schmid, “Tributary Relations and the Qing-
Chosŏn Frontier on Mount Paektu,” in The Chinese State at the Borders, 126–127. Schmid’s 
chapter examines the occasion of the Kangxi Emperor’s attempt to define the Chosŏn-Qing 
border at the headwaters of the Yalu and Tumen Rivers. 
230 Kenneth R. Robinson, “Centering the King of Chosŏn: Aspects of Korean Maritime 
Diplomacy, 1392–1592,” Journal of Asian Studies 59, no. 1 (Feb. 2000), esp. 111–112; and 
Kenneth R. Robinson, “Chosŏn Korea in the Ryūkoku “Kangnido”: Dating the Oldest Extant 
Korean Map of the World (15th Century),” Imago Mundi 59, no. 2 (2007), 182. 
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attempt to survey and define the source of the Yalu and Tumen Rivers in the early 
eighteenth century is another example.231 
The need for empires and states to conceptualize and project their authority relates 
directly to their requirements in revenue and resources. Incorporating people at the edges 
of a bounded entity—be it kingdom or empire—requires a negotiation of the costs in 
protection with the benefits of loyal subjects. It is not an easy formula to decipher and not 
all states are successful, but eventually, equilibrium between the projection of authority 
and the resistance of peoples on the edge of the periphery arises.232 Arguably, the 
calculations for determining whether force, negotiation or mapmaking are the best 
approach to border making depend heavily on the entity on the other side of the intended 
line. To take the Qing as an example, emperors employed dramatically different 
approaches in separate regions of their empire and in different eras. Along their 
southwest border, where the empire faced populations of multiple ethnicities and a terrain 
that made escape from soldiers and tax collectors easier, they used a mixture of force and 
cooptation.233 On their western periphery, the Qing faced a more cohesive political state, 
                                                             
231 Kang Sŏkhwa, Chosŏn hugi Hamgyŏng-do wa pukpang yŏngt’o ŭisik (Seoul: Kyŏngsewŏn, 
2000), and Seonmin Kim, Ginseng and Borderland, 61–73. 
232 James C. Scott, The Art of Not being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast 
Asia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009). Scott’s peripheral zones are constantly 
readjusting and absorbing fleeing populations, these shatter zones, as he calls them, represent an 
equilibrium of sorts. See 7–8; Peter C. Perdue, China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of 
Central Eurasia (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005), chap. 15; 
Bradley C. Davis, “Black Flag Rumors and the Black River Basin: Powerbrokers and the State in 
the Tonkin-China Borderlands,” Journal of Vietnamese Studies 6, no. 2 (2011), 16–41. Davis is 
focused on the late Qing era and French Indochina, but he illustrates well the consequences of 
overexertion on the part of the state. 
233 Laura Hostetler, “Qing Connections to the Early Modern World: Ethnography and 
Cartography in Eighteenth-Century China,” Modern Asian Studies 34, no. 3 (2000), 641–651; 
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the Zunghar empire, on the flatter terrain of the steppes with less diverse geography, as 
they sought to expand their empire beyond areas that had been within the traditional 
Sinologic sphere of influence. For this project, military force dominated Qing strategy.234 
In the Northeast and Manchuria, the Qing faced two long-established entities with 
centrally-organized political structures, the Russian empire and Chosŏn Korea. 
Correspondingly, the Qing approach relied heavily on negotiation, whether over trade, 
jurisdictions, or defining borders.235 The Qing efforts to create a multi-ethnic empire also 
affected its diplomatic and military missions to the borders, for instance the officials 
dispatched to Chosŏn territory tended to be Manchus in keeping with traditional relations 
the Qing had with Mongolian tribes and other northern groups.236 The prominence of 
Manchu officials in Chosŏn diplomatic missions could only reinforce the broadly held 
perception on the part of Chosŏn intellectuals that the Qing were usurpers of the font of 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
John E. Herman, “The Cant of Conquest: Tusi Offices and China’s Political Incorporation of the 
Southwest Frontier,” in Empire at the Margins: Culture, Ethnicity, and Frontier in Early Modern 
China, ed. Pamela Kyle Crossley, Helen F. Siu, and Donald S. Sutton (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2006), 157; Davis, “Black Flag Rumors and the Black River Basin: 
Powerbrokers and the State in the Tonkin-China Borderlands,” 18–21. Davis analyzes the history 
of the southwest border with an eye toward the levels of anarchy that stirred a response from the 
Qing. 
234 James A. Millward, Beyond the Pass: Economy, Ethnicity, and Empire in Qing Central Asia, 
1759–1864 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1998). Millward notes the uneasy 
relationship between the Zunghars and the Manchus fluctuated between trade and war depending 
on the stability of the Zunghar political system, see 27–36; See also Perdue, China Marches 
West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia. 
235 Peter C. Perdue, “Boundaries and Trade in the Early Modern World: Negotiations at 
Nerchinsk and Beijing,” Eighteenth-Century Studies 43, no. 3, (2010), 341–356; Victor Zatsepine, 
“The Amur: As River, as Border,” in The Chinese State at the Borders, 151–161; Seonmin Kim, 
Ginseng and Borderland, 56–70. 
236 Pamela Kyle Crossley, “Making Mongols,” in Empire at the Margins, esp. 78; for an analysis 
of the ethnicity of officials sent on Qing diplomatic missions to Chosŏn see Ku Pŏmjin, “Ch’ŏng 
ŭi Chosŏn sahaeng insŏn,” 2–13. 
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civilization, and it fell to the Chosŏn dynasty to maintain the culture they shared with the 
Ming as the small font of civilization (sojunghwa).  Further, the Qing empire’s “one 
country, one frontier” policy also deeply affected how emperors pursued trade relations 
with the empire’s neighbors leading to concerted efforts to closely manage borders and 
restrict the legal flow of goods to a few regulated trading posts for each area.237 
The physical geography of the Korean peninsula aided Chosŏn efforts to define its 
own borders. Even during the Koryŏ dynasty, the two rivers and Mount Paektu were 
distinctive landmarks that separated Korea from the land beyond.238 The rugged terrain of 
the Yalu River in its middle and upper reaches and around Mount Paektu discouraged 
crossing the border.239 The Chosŏn government also forbid settlement around Mount 
Paektu and in the far north of P’yŏngan province. Though Chosŏn kings rarely resorted to 
force of arms, in the beginning of the dynasty it conducted military campaigns in its 
northeast and attempted to co-opt Jurchen leaders there and just over the Tumen River in 
Manchuria. This is analogous to the Qing experience in southwest China. But, in facing 
the Japanese and the Ming, Chosŏn kings attempted to use more diplomatic strategies.240  
                                                             
237 Matthew Mosca, “The Qing State and its Awareness of Eurasian Interconnections, 1789–
1806,” Eighteenth-Century Studies 47, no. 2 (2014), 104–105. Trade between Qing and Chosŏn 
along the northern border will be explored more fully in the next chapter. 
238 Pae Usŏng, Chosŏn hugi kukt’ogwan kwa ch’ŏnhagwan ŭi pyŏnhwa (Seoul: Ilchisa, 1998), 
48–49. 
239 An early seventeenth century Jesuit map even represented Korea as an island, which may be a 
rather dramatic expression of the difficulties encountered in crossing the two rivers, Jodocus 
Hondius, “China,” 1cm=19 German miles, “Asian Maps Collection,” 
http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p15799coll71/id/224/rec/6, (accessed 
January 25, 2019).  
240 Robinson, “Centering the King of Chosŏn,” 109–110. 
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The Chŏngmyo and Pyŏngja wars of 1626 and 1636–1637, occurring after 
Chosŏn rejection of Manchu overtures for recognition and support in its campaign against 
the Ming, represented a disastrous diversion from the Chosŏn government’s usual 
diplomacy. The decision to reject the Manchu (Jurchen at the time) demands followed a 
coup carried out by supporters of King Injo (r. 1623–1649) who believed King 
Kwanghae-gun’s (r. 1608–1623) argument for negotiated peace with the Qing (Later Jin 
at the time) was an affront to the Ming who had supported Chosŏn against Japan only 
thirty years earlier.241 The pitiful performance of the Chosŏn military in these two wars 
elicited the military changes described in chapter one, and a reassertion of a preference 
for diplomatic negotiation over military adventurism. Further, the military reorganization 
was not adequate for the Chosŏn government to assert any control or vie for land beyond 
the two rivers, though there were those who agitated for an invasion of Qing territory. For 
the Manchus, the invasions of Chosŏn were not about territorial expansion, but rather 
asserting their authority over the Chosŏn government and forcing the king to recognize 
Qing suzerainty. The Qing declared that it would recognize historical precedent in 
settling their mutual border at the Yalu and Tumen Rivers very shortly after defeating the 
Ming, but the two countries did not formally settle the location of the border through 
surveys until much later.242  
                                                             
241 For a more detailed discussion of Chosŏn debates on the use of force in defense of Ming 
interests and the coup that eventually deposed the Kwanghae-gun, see Seung B. Kye, “In the 
Shadow of the Father: Court Opposition and the Reign of King Kwanghae in Early Seventeenth-
Century Chosŏn Korea” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Washington, 2006). 
242 On invading the Qing see Park, Between Dreams and Reality, 57–58; On Qing motivations in 
invading Korea see Hŏ T’aegu “Pyŏngja horan ŭi chŏngch’i kunsa sajŏk yŏn’gu,” 67–69; 
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The history of Mount Paektu was also a concern for both Chosŏn and Qing rulers. 
Its designation as the border mountain on maps from the early Chosŏn dynasty, and its 
long association with the origins of Korea, suggested an immutable boundary reaching 
into antiquity.243 Qing mythology held that it was the foundation of the Manchu people 
and, the areas to the north were designated a homeland for their bannermen.244 In the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth century, the mountain as part of Chosŏn territory gained 
more prominence in Chosŏn literati writing and arguments for settling the area around the 
mountain and returning it to Chosŏn control also increased.245 Chosŏn kings were aware 
of the history of the kingdom of Koguryŏ as presented in the The History of the Three 
Kingdoms (Samguk sagi) and Memorabilia of the Three Kingdoms (Samguk yusa) and the 
claims to land once under the sway of their predecessors in the north, yet they did not 
raise such claims on the land with Qing officials until the nineteenth century.246 As the 
Western notions of territory and nationalism gained more prominence, Chosŏn officials 
began to more seriously entertain the idea of pressing for Korean claims on territory 
beyond the two rivers.247 In the latter half of the nineteenth century, nationalist historians 
like Sin Ch’aeho argued that Mount Paektu, as the location where the mythical founder of 
the Korean race, Tan’gun, was born, and the territory north of it, having once been under 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Seonmin Kim’s second chapter in Ginseng and Borderland covers the settlement of the Yalu 
river line, and the Tumen on pages 145–150. 
243 Shannon McCune, “Physical Basis for Korean Boundaries,” 273. 
244 Elliott, “The Limits of Tartary,” 607–608. 
245 Kang Sŏkhwa, Chosŏn hugi Hamgyŏng-do, 247. 
246 Seonmin Kim, Ginseng and Borderland, 27–31, and Kang Sŏkhwa, Chosŏn hugi Hamgyŏng-
do, 269. 
247 Henry H. Em, The Great Enterprise: Sovereignty and Historiography in Modern Korea 
(Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2013). 
123 
 
 
the control of the Koguryŏ kingdom, were integral to the Korean state.248 The growing 
population, and agricultural, commercial, and social development of the northern 
provinces prompted more people to cross the border in search of new opportunities and 
even Chosŏn officials began to argue for historical rights to areas across the border.249 
The increasing interest in the northern border region also coincided with greater 
violations of the border itself which made the importance of border control greater but 
did not, in and of itself, mean the border was more recognizable than in earlier eras. 
 
II. Border Violations 
Neither side took illegally crossing the Sino-Korean border lightly, though the 
Chosŏn punishments tended to be more severe.250 Upon apprehension, a perpetrator was 
often taken to the sites of exchange, generally Ŭiju on the Yalu River for Chosŏn subjects 
and Fenghuang Fortress in Liaodong for Qing subjects. The obligation to feed and clothe 
the criminal was assumed by the hosts, but the authorities in the criminal’s country of 
origin generally meted out punishments when the criminal was handed over. Chosŏn 
punishment for border crossing, no matter the reason, was death, but occasionally 
mitigating circumstances were considered. Qing punishments were nominally execution, 
                                                             
248 Schmid, “Looking North Toward Manchuria,” 219–220. Schmid references Sin Ch’aeho in the 
beginning of his article, but the rest generally focuses on another nationalist historian, Chang 
Chiyŏn, who had similar ideas; also, Henry H. Em, “Nationalism, Post-Nationalism, and Shin 
Ch’ae-ho.” Korea Journal 39, no. 2 (1999), 292. 
249 Seonmin Kim, Ginseng and Borderland, 148–149. 
250 George McAfee McCune, “Korean Relations with China and Japan, 1800–1864” (Ph.D 
dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1941), 78–80. The dissertation is somewhat dated, 
but thoroughly researched, and provides cogent analyzes of border crossing and other complaints 
in the Veritable Records, the Records of the Border Defense Council and the Collection of 
Diplomatic Documents over the timeframe. 
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but often the sentences were commuted.251 Chosŏn border officials on watch at the time 
of the transgression were often punished with banishment and demotion as well. The 
separate spheres of punishment and need to first return prisoners might be seen as 
evidence of a lack of border awareness, as it suggests that the finding of an illegal 
transgression was entirely up to the originating country. The diplomatic exchanges, 
however, record keen interest on either side over the resolution of punishments. Often, 
the Qing emperor expressed his sense that Chosŏn punishments were too harsh or 
suggested clemency.252 Also, when reports of the inquests or resolutions were slow in 
coming, the reasons for delay were sought.253 Returning those who crossed illegally was 
an issue of sovereignty. The relationship between ruler and subject was of paramount 
importance in East Asian political statecraft, and it was the right of the sovereign to 
punish his own subjects. 
Maritime border crossings provided an exception to the exclusive right to punish 
being reserved for the originating country. In the beginning of the eighteenth century, 
Chosŏn officials were especially vocal in protesting illegal fishing in the coastal waters of 
Hwanghae province. The Collection of Diplomatic Documents records events in 1701, 
1703, 1710, 1712 (twice), and 1714. The Qing grew tired of receiving Korean complaints 
or wished to seriously discourage such transgressions as it allowed Chosŏn officials to 
                                                             
251 Kuksa p’yŏch’an wiwŏnhoe ed., Tongmun hwigo 4 vols. (Seoul: Kuksa p’yŏch’an wiwŏnhoe, 
1978), (hereafter TH), 4:11–24. Pages are those of the physical volume, not the documents’ 
internal pagination. 
252 For example: TH 2:150–172; 3:64–98. 
253 For example: TH 4:343–350, additionally if the criminals escaped back over the border, the 
opposite party sent requests that they be detained: TH 2:139–143, 150–172. 
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punish fishermen who landed on Chosŏn soil, if it could be proved they were illegally 
fishing.254 Even with Qing permission, Chosŏn rarely availed itself of the privilege.255 
Another salient aspect of the border crossings is the nature of the transgression 
that drew the greatest response, escalating the event to the level that warranted recording 
in the Collection of Diplomatic Documents. The nature of this level of transgression 
appears to be different for the Qing and Chosŏn courts. The reasons for complaints 
spanned illegal ginseng gathering, fishing, poaching, and other resource-oriented 
activities (Figure 3.1). The illicit ginseng trade caused a great amount of consternation on 
both sides of the border, though as we can see, it was of greater concern on the Qing 
side.256 On the other side, Chosŏn concern over illegal fishing resulted in such complaints 
equaling those of the other three groups combined. Not shown in the chart below 
however is the frequency of Qing complaints being tied to murder and other violence 
against its subjects. Fourteen of the violations on the part of Chosŏn subjects, near half 
the total, included some form of violence or abuse of Qing subjects, whereas 
encroachments of Qing subjects rarely do. A number of the cases were actually 
                                                             
254George McCune, “Korean Relations with China and Japan,” 71 n. 4. This was not apparently 
very effective or Chosŏn erred on the side of caution as they included a report with the return of 
an illegal fisherman (not punished in Chosŏn) in 1722 that border crossings were still happening 
with frequency and the Qing ought to enforce their own laws. (TH 2:44) 
255 An occasion when Chosŏn executed a Qing subject occurred in 1834 when a priest who had 
resided in Korea was executed for spreading heterodoxy, as George McCune notes (80–81) the 
reason given was the priest wore Korean clothing and spoke Korean. Chosŏn sensitivity to the 
spread of Christianity may have had more to do with their decision to execute him though. It was 
also an event not considered an illegal border crossing by the definition of the Collection of 
Diplomatic Documents as it was not included under that heading.  
256 See also: Seonmin Kim, “Ginseng and Border Trespassing between Qing China and Chosǒn 
Korea,” Late Imperial China 28, no. 1 (2007), 33–61; and George McCune, “Korean Relations 
with China and Japan,” chap. 4 
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smuggling rings including subjects on both sides. The emphasis that Qing and Chosŏn 
reports place on either personal violence or territorial integrity suggests that both sides 
held separate conceptions of sovereignty or, at the least, what kind of threat illegal 
crossings posed. Applying the overlapping sovereignties that Kenneth Robinson has 
argued for in Chosŏn imagination,257 we can view this as the Chosŏn government’s 
greater concern for territorial sovereignty. The land and resources were of greater 
concern to Chosŏn kings possibly because their kingdom had a paucity in comparison to 
the riches of the Qing. Chosŏn complaints are also geared toward the livelihood of its 
subjects, not the activities of its subjects.  
 
Figure 3.1. Reasons for illegal border crossing, 1694-1854 for events reported in the Collection of 
Diplomatic Documents. 
 
                                                             
257 Robinson, “Residence and Foreign Relations in the Peninsular Northeast,” 20. 
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It  is also illuminating to examine the frequency of border crossings over time (Figure 
3.2). Note that after 1750, the total overall occurrences of border crossings decreased due 
mostly to a reduction in the number of Qing subjects crossing over. 
 
 
Figure 3.2. Number of border crossings as reported in the Collection of Diplomatic Documents. 
 
 
The eighteenth century was the highpoint of border crossing events reported in the 
Collection of Diplomatic Documents. Data for Chŏngjo’s reign, however, does not exist 
in the collection, so it is not obvious whether the decline seen after 1750 continued during 
his reign. Examining the Veritable Records of the Chosŏn Dynasty, Daily Records of the 
Royal Secretariat, and the Records of the Border Defense Council for the occurrence of 
the term “illegal crossing” (pŏmwŏl) and discussions of borders gives a useful 
comparison. The relative frequencies of the occurrence of the term illegal crossing in all 
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three sources was as low as subsequent rulers, suggesting that the pattern during 
Chŏngjo’s twenty-five-year reign would conform to the general trend of diminishing 
events (figure 3.3 and 3.4). Intriguingly, discussion of borders remained high through 
Chŏngjo’s reign, despite the drop in illegal crossing. This reinforces the observation from 
chapter two that Chŏngjo considered maintaining a strong border important business. As 
to the decline in border crossings a couple contingencies may explain this trend. 
 
Figure 3.3. Relative frequency of terms in the Veritable Records of the Chosŏn Dynasty and SJW. 
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Figure 3.4. Relative frequency of the term “illegal crossing” in the Records of the Border Defense 
Command. 
 
First, some authors suggest that the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries 
saw increasingly severe Malthusian crises along with uprisings and outright rebellions 
occurring in Chosŏn Korea, particularly in the northern provinces.258  The desperation 
any such crisis would inspire on the part of Chosŏn subjects might explain the continued 
crossings, while conversely, a preoccupation with domestic issues related to these crises 
may suggest a lack of attention to the border on the part of Chosŏn officials. In this 
scenario, it is not that border crossings changed all that dramatically, but rather 
circumstances did. This explanation is inadequate in part because the trend pre-dates the 
most severe crises—occurring mostly in the nineteenth century—and though border 
                                                             
258 Tony Michell, “Fact and Hypothesis in Yi Dynasty Economic History: The Demographic 
Dimension,” Korean Studies Forum 6, Winter–Spring (1979–1980), 65–93. 
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crossings declined in Chŏngjo’s reign, the frequency of discussions of the border was 
greater than other kings from the late seventeenth century to the end of the dynasty. The 
latter half of the eighteenth century, encompassing the reigns of Yŏngjo and Chŏngjo, 
also marks the high point of royal authority in late Chosŏn Korea. Jahyun Kim Haboush 
particularly notes King Yŏngjo attention to all aspects of rule as the model Confucian 
ruler.259 
Second, if social and political collapse did not cause laxity on the part of Chosŏn 
kings, maybe something occurred on the Qing side or there were parallel developments. 
James Reardon-Anderson analyzed Chinese settlement activity in Manchuria and 
describes changing Qing policies throughout this period. Originally, the Qing policy was 
to restrict migration, using Manchuria as a reserve for its bannermen and forcibly 
relocating criminals to the region to labor in military colonies. This policy gradually 
changed as more and more Han Chinese defied the prohibitions and settle in the region. 
Extrapolating demographic data backward from the twentieth century, he also comes to 
the conclusion that the population of Liaodong roughly doubled from 1780 to 1820.260 
This increase in population, and concomitant productivity, acted as a draw for Chosŏn 
subjects while reducing incentives for Qing subjects to cross the other way. In an 
argument with a more political focus, Seonmin Kim points to this space along the Yalu 
                                                             
259 Haboush, The Confucian Kingship in Korea, chap. 2.; Sun Joo Kim, Voice from the North: 
Resurrecting Regional Identity through the Life and Work of Yi Sihang (1672–1736) (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2013). Kim looks at the projects King Chŏngjo took an interest in for 
the purpose of augmenting his authority and suggest he had a greater interest in the northern 
regions of Korea than previous kings. 
260 James Reardon-Anderson, Reluctant Pioneers: China’s Expansion Northward, 1644–1937 
(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2005), 69–70, 97–101. 
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and Tumen Rivers as a “borderland” where territorial claims are vague and contested 
leading to a vacuum of state authority in the area for much of the seventeenth and early 
eighteenth centuries.261 In the latter half of the nineteenth century, Qing authorities’ 
attention to the area began to increase and coincided with the greater presence of Russia 
along the Amur River. The Qing increased their military presence in the region in 
response to Russian activities.262 Therefore, population pressures and a greater 
administrative presence forced the Qing and Chosŏn to more clearly define the boundary 
between them and the region became a “bordered land.”263  
The reality lies somewhere in between these two scenarios. The records of the 
Collection of Diplomatic Documents show that in the beginning of the eighteenth century, 
there are a greater number of crossings committed by what appear to be relatively 
organized groups, one might say “gangs,” of Chosŏn subjects. However, by the 
nineteenth century, the illegal border crossers appear in the exchanges as poor, 
bedraggled and disorganized. For example, two of the Chosŏn crossings in the nineteenth 
century were itinerants who accidentally crossed the Yalu in winter and were 
subsequently executed.264 There were no itinerants mentioned in the eighteenth-century 
crossings. George McCune also noted the increase of border patrols on both sides of the 
Chosŏn/Qing border in the interest of stopping Chosŏn incursions and problems of an 
                                                             
261 Seonmin Kim, Ginseng and Borderland, 14–15 
262 Seonmin Kim, Ginseng and Borderland, 87–88; See also: Perdue, “Boundaries and Trade in 
the Early Modern World,” esp. 352. Perdue suggests that the Nerchinsk Treaty of 1689 relieved 
Qing anxiety about the region and allowed them to focus on military threats in the West. While 
the results are different, the thrust of the argument: that the Qing were keenly aware of stability in 
the region and pressed for more clearly defined borders remains.  
263 Seonmin Kim, Ginseng and Borderland, 129–140. 
264 TH 4:276–278, 289–291. 
132 
 
 
increasing Chinese population including illegal villages south of the Yalu.265 These 
events do suggest a crisis in Chosŏn, but the previously mentioned mid-eighteenth 
century trend toward reduced crossings and the fact that the patrols described by McCune 
resulted in large-scale arrests and cooperation between Chosŏn and Qing authorities 
argue for established practices of border control. While these practices were put under 
strain in the eighteenth century, the evidence points to an awareness of borders and their 
significance to the people residing along them. 
Chosŏn ministers maintained consistent interest in the integrity of its borders. In 
examining diplomatic collections like the Collection of Diplomatic Documents, and local 
office collections such as the Records of Capital Offices, the borders were not unkempt, 
fluid places that defied legibility on the part of the state. Still, since Chosŏn commanders 
could not physically patrol the border with the diligence required to insure their integrity, 
rather the Chosŏn court contacted Qing authorities over border violations and abuses on 
the part of Qing subjects.266 A frequent trope of early eighteenth-century protests was that 
since Chosŏn was small and lacked the necessary resources to prevent border abuses, it 
was incumbent upon the larger state to enforce its own regulations from its side of the 
border.267 
  What follows is a case study on a mid-nineteenth century event where a large 
number of Qing subjects were found carving out homesteads in Chosŏn territory. It well 
                                                             
265 George McCune, “Korean Relations with China and Japan,” 72–76. 
266 Whether or not these communiqués were important enough to be included in the Collection of 
Diplomatic Documents, there were frequent memorials and complaints about border crossings 
and illegal Chinese activities on the part of Chosŏn subjects recorded in the Veritable Records. 
See: George McCune, “Korean Relations with China and Japan,” chap. 3. 
267 TH 4:38–39.  
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encapsulates the issues of territoriality and sovereignty that were becoming more acute 
between the Qing empire and Chosŏn kingdom in the nineteenth century. The study 
begins with an examination of the region in question, a hardscrabble area on the edges of 
Chosŏn territory, the four abandoned counties. 
 
III. The Four Abandoned Counties and Kanggye 
An examination of the geography, history, and demographics of the defense 
command of Kanggye in the far northern region of P’yŏngan province reveals an area of 
growth in an otherwise stagnant peninsular population with some similarities to frontier 
regions like the American West. Understanding the demographic change, agricultural 
productivity, and strategic importance of the northern region of Kanggye, called the four 
abandoned counties, through the beginning of the nineteenth century helps to explain the 
Chosŏn court’s renewed interest in the region. It also exposes a process of change and 
adjustment that presented difficulties for Chosŏn officials in the area in attempting to 
carry out the duties of managing the population and maintaining border security. 
The four abandoned counties region had been derelict for almost three centuries 
by the time Sangt’o garrison was moved to keep watch over the area. The region was a 
roughly diamond shaped area in the far north of P’yŏngan province that was once a 
bulwark against Jurchen encroachment supported by four large outposts: Chasŏng, Uye, 
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Yŏyŏn, and Much’ang.268 In the late fifteenth century, the Chosŏn government retreated 
from these outposts and established a line of defensive forts along the Majŏn ridge that 
extended southeast from the Yalu across to Kanggye’s eastern border with Hamgyŏng 
province. The outposts beyond this ridge were abandoned, and the area closed to 
settlement. It was called the four abandoned counties in reference to this dereliction.269  
After the Pyŏngja War, treaty obligations with the Qing prevented Korea from 
rebuilding any of its fortifications. Even so, Kanggye’s defensive fortifications were a 
priority for Chosŏn kings as the defense command was the terminus of the Kanggye 
Direct Route (Kanggye chingno) that passed through Anju on the Ch’ŏngch’ŏn River and 
from there straight into P’yŏngyang. This led to a retrenchment along the Majŏn ridge 
allowing the four abandoned counties to shield the Chosŏn government’s quiet increase 
of its mountain forts along the ridge from Qing official’s prying eyes. Successive Chosŏn 
kings reinforced the ridges with walls to protect the valleys between and slow an 
invading force,270 and a series of garrisons and forts were tasked with defending this line; 
west to east the posts were Manp’o, on the Yalu, Oetkoe, Sangt’o, Chongp’o, Ch’up’a, 
and Mamahae, which lay only a few miles to the east of Kanggye.271 The line of forts 
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270 Ko Sŭnghŭi, “Chosŏn hugi P’yŏngan-do chiyŏk toro pangŏ ch’egye ŭi chŏngbi,” 218. 
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from Kanggye. See also: “Kwansŏ chido” [Map of the western passes], n.d. (18th c.), koch’uk 
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also served to check illegal migration to the four abandoned counties albeit with 
increasing ineffectiveness. But, by the early nineteenth century, the government in Seoul 
had opened up all the land north of Kanggye’s Majŏn ridge, not including a mile-wide 
buffer along the Yalu River, for reclamation, and people had been steadily migrating to 
the area.272 The local Korean population was still small, at most a few thousand. This 
land was after all not very conducive to farming, mountains erupted from the ground in 
steep climbs and the rivers, including the Yalu, ran through courses that could be 
mistaken for canyons. There were precious few plains and most of those were located 
along the Yalu itself, upon which settlement was still taboo. Still, some intrepid souls 
risked harsh conditions for a chance at something better, not to mention those who 
wished to avoid prying eyes or probing questions. In the coming century, this land and 
the area just north of the river would see large numbers of Koreans and Chinese 
intermingling in just the manner most feared by both the Qing and Chosŏn authorities.273 
The incorporation of the four abandoned counties with Kanggye in various maps 
and privately published gazetteers in the eighteenth and nineteenth century make clear 
that it was under the administration of Kanggye, but it does not appear that Kanggye 
magistrates were involved in securing the four abandoned counties border while it was 
closed to settlement.274 Kanggye’s importance as the terminus of the Kanggye Direct 
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Route, one of three vital thoroughfares in P’yŏngan designated by the Border Defense 
Command as essential to national defense, and its historical ties to the region do suggest 
at least a nominal authority for its regulation.275 Nonetheless, the area saw very little 
bureaucratic or military interference during the seventeenth and eighteenth century as 
Chosŏn kings established no garrison or higher level administrative entity there until the 
Sangt’o garrison was moved north in 1810.276 After this, the four abandoned counties 
briefly served as a refuge for Hong Kyŏngnae’s army and even, Hong claimed, 
sympathetic Manchu soldiers during his insurrection,277 but it enjoyed little direct 
attention from the king and his ministers for much of the next thirty years. As there are 
few voices which can tell us what pull there might have been for Koreans to risk 
settlement beyond the protection of the garrisons, we can only speculate that the 
opportunities for land, logging, or making money selling ginseng to the tribute brokers 
must have been powerful enough.  
In the nineteenth century, with the increasing realization that illegal migration to 
the region was not adequately halted, the court decided to entertain arguments for 
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277 Sun Joo Kim, Marginality and Subversion in Korea: The Hong Kyŏngnae Rebellion of 1812, 
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opening the entire four abandoned counties area to reclamation. Ultimately, an increase in 
ginseng taxes was one of the key enticements: Sŏ Misu, the magistrate of Kanggye in 
1800, argued that the defense command was better able to administer the region, 
including the tax revenue, than the neighboring Huju garrison of Hamgyŏng province. 
Though he did consider allowing Huju a 5 kŭn share of wild ginseng tax.278 His 
arguments eventually carried the day, and Sangt’o garrison was moved north above the 
confluence of the Yalu and Chasŏng Rivers almost 35 miles upriver of Manp’o garrison, 
the next closest. Even though it was under Kanggye’s administrative control, it is 
probable that most of the Koreans who settled in the four abandoned counties area arrived 
from Huju because of its more dramatic increases in population from 1800—it was 
promoted to the status of defense command (tohobu) in 1823.279  
Despite the harshness of the terrain and restrictions on internal migration, the 
population of the entire northern region of P’yŏngan and the neighboring Hamgyŏng 
counties had been increasing throughout the end of the eighteenth century and into the 
nineteenth.280 In his analysis of Hamgyŏng province, Kang Sŏkhwa, comparing 
information from the Gazetteer for All Areas (Yŏji tosŏ), which drew on the census of 
1759, and the Geographic Treatise of the Great East (Taedong chiji) published in 1863 
(though its population numbers drew from the 1828 census), shows that the regions of 
Hamgyŏng along the Yalu River saw the largest increases in population over that time. 
Of particular note is the Huju garrison on the eastern border of the four abandoned 
counties which saw a more than twofold increase. Granted these numbers were small, 
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consisting of a jump for the Huju population from 3,215 in 1759 to 6,510 in 1828 and 
Chosŏn era censuses cannot be relied upon for exact numbers, but anecdotal evidence and 
famine records suggest an increasing pressure on the region to open land for 
reclamation.281 Further, despite the large area of land, the upper reaches of the Yalu are 
mountainous and not well suited to agriculture which limited its potential for subsistence 
farming and consequently its maximum sustainable population, thus amplifying the 
effects of even small changes in population. The paucity of arable land in the foothills of 
Mount Paektu undoubtedly exerted more push pressures in Huju than what was available 
further south in Kanggye. An analysis of population growth in Kanggye will give us 
some perspective on the results of such migration and what pull factors the region may 
have held. 
In examining population growth in Kanggye, three data points offer a snapshot of 
the transition from closed counties to expanded settlement: the figures from the 
Geographic Treatise of the Great East, whose numbers reflect the 1828 census as noted 
above, as well as two private gazetteers, the Illustrated Gazetteer of Seven Counties 
(Ch’ilgun togyŏng) published in the early nineteenth century and the Kanggye Defense 
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Command Gazetteer (Kanggye-bu ŭpchi) published in 1839.282 The Illustrated Gazetteer 
of Seven Counties reported Kanggye’s population at 8,721 households with 45,864 
people, 25,400 men and 20,408 women (no explanation for the inaccurate total), for an 
average household of 5.25. The Geographic Treatise of Korea lists a total population for 
Kanggye of 12,575 households and 50,748 persons resulting in a household size of 4.04 
with 28,022 men to 22,726 women. In between these two publications, however, there 
was a rebellion and several natural disasters when “the country lost nearly 17 percent of 
its recorded population,”283 which puts Kanggye’s increase, despite cataclysmic changes 
in Korean demographics, into greater relief. 
 The 1839 gazetteer records 15,743 households with 57,888 persons for Kanggye, 
while it also provided numbers for the garrisons which boasted 3,009 households and 
10,458 persons. For both Kanggye and the garrisons the average household size drops to 
well below four in this gazetteer. These numbers certainly do not reflect the actual size of 
the population, but assuming that methods for conducting censuses in the region did not 
change much over this span of time, Kanggye and the four abandoned counties area 
underwent significant population growth in the early nineteenth century. Assuming a 
constant deviation between the actual and reported figures, the population of Kanggye 
grew by a quarter over the first third of the nineteenth century.284  
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The ratio of men to women is an interesting factor as well; in both the Illustrated 
Gazetteer of Seven Counties and Geographic Treatise of Korea it was above 120. While 
the Kanggye Defense Command Gazetteer does not separate the male and female totals, it 
does give a count of the number of men available to serve corvée (changjŏng, described 
in the gazetteer as males 15–69 years old)285 noting that in total there were 30,851 of 
which Kanggye could call upon 22,755 and the garrisons, 5,096. If we consider the 
population of corvée eligible men was at least below 90 percent of the population even in 
those populations experiencing rapid growth, then the ratio in 1834 was above 114.286 
This notable imbalance parallels other frontier regions where the opportunities for 
resource extraction outweighed the appeal of homesteading such as the American West in 
the same era.287 The relative scarcity of agricultural land throughout the region also 
militated against larger agricultural communities. The demographic similarity with such 
frontiers might also explain the decreasing average household size as more single men 
migrated to the region. Unfortunately, without better household data, this is merely 
speculative. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Geographic Treatise of the Great East, but these numbers conform well with trends in the region 
as described by Kang Sŏkhwa which pointed to a strong pull factor in Kanggye. 
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Finally, to return for a moment to the geography of the four abandoned counties, 
the thirty-five-mile distance between Sangt’o and Manp’o garrisons is a rather long 
stretch of river to not have a garrison. For comparison, the distance from the defense 
command of Ch’osan, which abutted Kanggye, to Manp’o garrison is close to forty-five 
miles, but contains eight garrisons. Sangt’o was established in its new position at a time 
of relative financial constraints because of Hong Kyŏngnae’s rebellion and the 
aforementioned natural disasters which probably accounts for the lack of further 
investment in garrisons along the river. But the demographic increases in the region and 
large geographic area under Sangt’o garrison’s patrol meant that this oversight would 
make border control that much harder. 
According to the Kanggye Defense Command Gazetteer, Sangt’o had a 
production of rice near 865 sŏk in total for the capital offices (kyŏngsa), circuit army 
headquarters (sunyŏng), and army headquarters (pyŏngyŏng) and 180 sŏk for its own use, 
these levels placed it squarely in the middle of Kanggye’s ten garrisons in terms of 
production, despite having control of an area that was almost equal to the rest of 
Kanggye’s administrative zone.288 It is not clear if the gazetteer recorded quotas or the 
most recent tallies of production, but either way, they can be used as a proxy to 
understand the size of the populations under each garrison’s control. The total population 
in the garrisons listed in the Kanggye Defense Command Gazetteer was 10,458 and 
Sangt’o’s grain quota was about 8.25 percent from a total of 12,665 sŏk so we can 
surmise the population under direct supervision of Sangt’o garrison was something near 
900 people. With the size of area under its jurisdiction, we must consider whether 
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Sangt’o was underperforming in its duties, underfunded, or the four abandoned counties 
was much more hardscrabble than the magistrates expected when they suggested opening 
it for reclamation. In the following sections I argue that its underperformance was most 
likely a failure on Kanggye officials’ part to adequately perform their duties, 
compounded the Chosŏn government’s incremental approach to policy. That said, I 
would not entirely discount the argument that an underdeveloped commodities market 
made subsistence farming in the region much less attractive or even feasible than in other 
more developed areas of P’yŏngan province. 
 
IV. A Breach of the Border 
 Through the first half of the nineteenth century the Yalu and Tumen border areas 
faced increasing population pressures from all sides, not only internal Chosŏn migration, 
but Chinese Han migration to Manchuria and Russians to the Tumen River.289 It was 
perhaps inevitable that border violations on both sides increased in frequency and 
severity. This section examines the initial responses to the discovery of illegal settlements 
in 1842 and 1846 and what these reactions might say about how Chosŏn officials 
envisioned borders and border security. 
 In the fourth lunar month of 1842 during Hŏnjong’s reign, the Kanggye 
magistrate, Yi Sijae, sent a report to his superiors in P’yŏngan province who forwarded it 
to the king. In the report Yi noted that the previous year sometime after spring in some 
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ten places he had discovered a number of Qing subjects who had crossed the border and 
were reclaiming land along the river from Sangt’o to Manp’o garrisons. He informed the 
Chinese then that they were on Chosŏn territory and must leave, which they agreed to do 
by winter. Now, in 1842, despite the warnings, Yi and his subordinates had discovered 
more Qing subjects had crossed over again this year in Sangt’o, Manp’o and on the 
Hasŏhae floodplain, building more homes and reclaiming land. Such a brazen disregard 
of a Chosŏn magistrate’s order to leave moved the king’s councilors to notify the Qing 
authorities in Mukden and to request that the emperor enforce his border more 
stringently.290  
 The Qing responded by assuring the diplomatic envoy who brought the missive 
that the ministers responsible would be told to strengthen their border enforcement.291 
And, the Board of Rites in Mukden sent a letter informing the Chosŏn king that they had 
dispatched the appropriate officials to help eject the Qing subjects. The reports from the 
P’yŏngan Governor’s Office noted that some two hundred Qing soldiers arrived in mid-
summer to aid with the operation.292 The Qing spent a couple months in the key areas 
around Manp’o destroying houses and crops but did not succeed in arresting any Qing 
settlers.293  
The measures the Qing took in 1842 proved to be inadequate to the task of 
maintaining border security. Perhaps the prosecution of the Opium War and treaty 
negotiations in Nanjing prevented a more serious response or more close supervision of 
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border officials at the time. Whatever the reason, border security remained lax, and so on 
that fateful day in the late spring of 1846 Commander Yi Hŭiryŏm found himself facing 
an even greater breach of Korea’s border. Commander Yi, much like his predecessors, 
tried to speak with the settlers, to tell them that they were breaking numerous laws and 
regulations, but they did not understand, or would not listen. He relayed what he 
discovered to his superiors, who in turn told the Governor and Military Commander of 
P’yŏngan province. Somewhere along the way someone recalled that only four years ago, 
in almost the very same spot a small collection of illegal settlements was forcibly 
removed with the aid of Qing soldiers.294  
In fact, this marked the third time in a decade that Qing subjects had violated the 
P’yŏngan border in large numbers.295 The Border Defense Command feared that if left 
alone for very long it would become impossible to remove the illegal settlers, so the court 
quickly dispatched a missive to the Board of Rites in Mukden.296 The letter very squarely 
placed blame on the Qing authorities’ inability to keep their promises. It referred twice to 
the 1842 incident as well as two more incidents in 1714 and 1748 of Qing subjects 
settling in Chosŏn territory. Further, while the Chosŏn court expressed deep gratitude for 
the extraordinary aid that the Qing gave four years ago, it very clearly reminded the Qing 
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officials that it was their own decree which Korea followed in preventing settlement in 
the border zone and what was more: 
We have enforced it strictly. Now, if we allow people to settle so closely 
that the smoke from their fires [and even their] chickens and dogs 
intermingle, then both your subjects and ours will easily engage in the 
illegal and covert, dare to violate prohibitions, and create wickedness. Is 
this not what would come to pass?297 
 
The letters from the Chosŏn authorities from both 1842 and 1846 suggest that the most 
egregious aspect of the illegal settlement was not in fact crossing the border or reclaiming 
land, but the potential for more serious illegal activities to occur. In the original report of 
1842, the Chosŏn officials were not obviously upset enough about the fact that foreigners 
had reclaimed land for a season in 1841, the ostensible reason for the report was that the 
Qing subjects had returned after saying they would vacate. 
 A most likely chagrined Qing secretary forwarded the 1846 letter to the Daoguang 
emperor (r. 1820–1850), and the reaction was swift. Now the Qing were prepared to 
engage fully in not only clearing their subjects from Chosŏn territory, but also conducting 
a thorough investigation into why such lapses occurred in the first place.298 The initial 
letter from Korea was sent on June 21, 1846; the official response composed on August 
13 and received on August 25, informed the king that the Qing had immediately 
dispatched soldiers to take care of the situation. Satisfied with the apparent alacrity of the 
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Qing response and their reassurances of a commitment to uncovering every detail, the 
Chosŏn court decided to await the arrival of the Qing force.299 
The Chinese certainly did take the illegal settlements more seriously this time and 
may have even sent advance parties to examine the areas where the Chinese had been 
seen in the far north without informing the Koreans first. Not only does one of the higher 
officials commissioned to clear the border, a commander (xiaoqi xiao) at Fenghuang 
Fortress, Gang An, mention such activities when he arrives to Ŭiju in late August, but in 
September, when Qing soldiers appeared across the river from Ch’osan territory, they 
mentioned that an assistant commandant (xieling), Guang Lu, had already arrested fifty 
people in connection with the operation, but since he did not have any Koreans with him 
he could not say where he had captured them.300 Both men do not say they crossed the 
Yalu, so it is possible that the Qing troops were travelling the Chinese side of the river 
looking for signs of illegal settlements in the neutral zone on both sides. It would be easy 
enough since the plains on which the Chinese settled abutted the river, and most valleys 
that the operation searched opened toward it. If they had been operating already in 
Chosŏn territory, this would be an incredible lapse of security on the part of Korean 
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officials who did not report such activities to the P’yŏngan army headquarters (P’yŏngan 
pyŏngyŏng), but the evidence is not conclusive. 
While Gang An, the commander from Fenghuang, arrived at Chunggang (an 
island in the Yalu near Ŭiju where Chosŏn and Qing officials could meet without 
entering foreign territory, not to be confused with the northern area, later called 
Chunggang-jin, in the four abandoned counties) in August, the main force of Qing 
soldiers was a few weeks out. During this time Gang An busied himself travelling up and 
down the lower reaches rooting out smugglers with moderate success. By mid-September 
he had captured a dozen or so smugglers and been joined by about seventy-five men. He 
sent the captured smugglers to Fenghuang Fortress, an indication that they were all Qing 
subjects, and dispatched his men to rendezvous with the larger Qing force which had 
been moving steadily toward Kanggye. By September 20th, the operation was set to 
begin.301 
The following description of this border operation draws mainly from the Records 
of Capital Offices and the reports transcribed therein from the P’yŏngan army 
headquarters (P’yŏngan pyŏngyŏng kyerok). The magistrate of Kanggye, Yi Kyŏngjae, 
sent the majority of the reports which he based on detailed descriptions provided by the 
commander of Sangt’o garrison, Yi Hŭiryŏm, and his subordinates. These reports were 
then collected by the army headquarters and copied out in their records, later undergoing 
a further collation for storage. Currently many of these collations are housed at Seoul 
National University’s Kyujanggak Archive, from which the Records of Capital Offices 
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was produced in the 1980s. While these copies of the army headquarters’ records offer us 
one of the closest views of action on the ground at the time, they are certainly filtered, but 
the detail that remains can tell us much.   
One consistent aspect of the reports on the operation is the premium Chosŏn 
officials placed on timely and accurate communication. The magistrates up and down the 
river were informed of the approaching Qing troops and the blockhouses (p’asu) were to 
maintain regular patrols of the border. It suggests that observation was the first priority of 
Chosŏn border security. In this section, one such blockhouse under the jurisdiction of 
Ch’osan just south of Kanggye encountered the Qing troops, but instead of watching and 
reporting the magistrate decided to take initiative. In the context of border security, 
initiative was the last thing the Chosŏn government desired. Not only did initiative lead 
to entanglements and familiarity, it also could embarrass both the Chosŏn officials and 
the Qing, inviting extra scrutiny from the Qing. 
On the evening of September 24, the blockhouse commander (p’asu-jang) of 
Hoŭm-dong, Pak Hyobŏm, reported seeing a large number of Chinese soldiers appear in 
the Bozhu River valley across from his outpost. They set up their tents and camped for 
the night. As it was late in the evening, he could not make out what was happening 
clearly. The next morning the magistrate of Ch’osan, Kim Sŏnmyŏng, assuming the 
Chinese were with the border operation, sent men to the river to inquire as to why they 
unexpectedly appeared where they were not supposed to be. The Chinese did not respond, 
so the magistrate sent men across the river to communicate in writing. In their exchange, 
the Qing soldiers confirmed that they were part of the border clearing operation and 
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tallied their numbers at four hundred sixteen with three hundred fifty horses, one hundred 
tents, one hundred fifty matchlocks and fifty cannon. Kim Sŏnmyŏng then informed the 
garrisons and towns upriver of these numbers to prevent further surprises or problems. 
The army headquarters concluded their own report with a warning:  
In the areas where we observe each other on the border lands, no one can 
communicate through speaking, so inevitably we resort to this kind of 
letter exchange, in an exchange of words, there is an exchange of 
sentiment, and if the border restrictions are not strictly kept, we worry 
about future abuses. It is about these that we must be especially mindful 
and not permit such easy crossing over in the future.302  
 
This report was written a few days after the initial encounter and so the army 
headquarters may have already received word of subsequent and more troubling events 
while writing this. 
 On the 26th, the original group of some four hundred Qing decamped and moved 
north along the river. While later that afternoon two officers and fifty Qing border 
soldiers again appeared at Commander Pak’s border, this time calling out loudly for the 
commander. When Pak, along with a captain (sugyo), Yi Hyŏng, approached the border 
the Qing officials became excited and called even louder. Fearing something had gone 
wrong Pak and Yi crossed over without an official interpreter. When the Koreans 
inquired as to the reason for calling them, the Chinese replied that their rations were 
running out, with only a day’s worth left of food. They presented the Chosŏn officials 
with a list of necessary supplies. Captain Yi replied that such out of the way towns could 
not suddenly prepare and send over these items for a personal need, and further the 
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magistrate would not dare requisition it on his own but had to speak to the higher 
authorities (sang sagwan). The Qing Commander became enraged and in great agitation 
yelled that he was a member of the royal clan, and not like the Fenghuang commander 
(Gang An). Yi and Pak left to discuss this with the magistrate, Kim Sŏnmyŏng.303  
 The army headquarters in transcribing Magistrate Kim’s report expressed great 
concern, noting that this was a bad situation and could only get worse. They were 
flummoxed that a magistrate would so cavalierly allow Koreans to cross the river without 
first obtaining permission from the Qing, and not only that, this was a highly unusual 
request from the Chinese. In 1842, the army headquarters claimed, “the Chinese did not 
request anything from us and if they needed to there is [a process],” but now since the 
Chinese were already expecting their cooperation there was no way that Chosŏn officials 
could deny the request without angering them.304 The reported behavior of the Ch’osan 
officials was odd, but there was more to this story the officers at army headquarters were 
soon to discover when the Chinese arrived at the border with Kanggye.  
 On September 30, the first group of Chinese soldiers arrived at the border near 
Pŏltŭng garrison. The garrison was located slightly south of a moderately large island in 
the middle of the Yalu. This was a convenient point to interdict those travelling upriver 
with facilities to inspect boats and interact with foreign agents. The Qing also placed a 
border station near to the island.305 The Chinese sent a group of men to the river and 
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called for an interpreter, so the Kanggye magistrate dispatched a translator (yŏkhak), Yun 
Segŭn. The Chinese informed him that they had arrived to take care of the illegal 
settlements across the border and that their group numbered four hundred fifty with three 
hundred horses, and they were followed by two commissioners who had two hundred 
men and would arrive tomorrow (October 1). They wished that the Koreans responsible 
for guiding them would be ready to act. The Chosŏn officials were not satisfied and 
wished to know why the Chinese had arrived here unseen by anyone since Ch’osan and 
why their force was some two hundred fifty more men, but fifty less horse, than reported 
to them by Kim Sŏnmyŏng. The Qing soldiers responded that the path they took was not 
along the river so that they could come directly to Kanggye and that the original numbers 
must have been incorrectly calculated. The author of the report is disturbed by this fact, 
but remarks that whether or not it was Kim Sŏnmyŏng’s improper handling as to the 
figures, “maintaining the border is very weighty [business], and we will amend the record 
with careful attention to detail.”306 
 These four hundred fifty soldiers then continued north on the Chinese side of the 
river toward Jixiang valley across from Manp’o garrison about six miles upriver. After 
arriving and setting up camp in Jixiang valley, a new group of soldiers who had 
apparently bypassed the checkpoint at Pŏltŭng, joined them. The Koreans assume that 
they are the commissioners mentioned before, but the numbers do not match, again. The 
new group consisted of about three hundred with three hundred horse. The combined 
group now numbered seven hundred seventy-five men and six hundred fifty horse. The 
discrepancy in numbers was a worrisome matter for the army headquarters which decided 
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to investigate. If it appeared to be a problem of the translators or the copyists they would 
be severely punished for mishandling these affairs.307  
The investigator concluded that the fault rested with the magistrate, Kim 
Sŏnmyŏng. Magistrate Kim pleaded that the assistant commandant, Guang Lu, with 
whom he exchanged letters was responsible for not just the Korean side of the border, but 
also for searching the neutral zone on the Chinese side, and Guang Lu originally did not 
differentiate between the men tasked with either side, so by the end of their exchange of 
letters it was hopelessly confused. Therefore, he, Kim, could not provide an accurate 
account. This excuse did not dissuade the army headquarters who determined that meting 
out severe punishment was necessary as a warning to others.308 Not only did his errors in 
calculation merit punishment, but the magistrate also engaged in diplomacy without 
authorization. Such initiative, even in the service of the state and to aid the Qing would 
lead to familiarity, something the army headquarters had warned against. Magistrate Kim 
was immediately removed from office. The Chosŏn officials also consistently note 
throughout the operation that the severity of the punishments assessed are not tied to the 
crime itself, but rather to the deterrent effect on others who might contemplate similar 
actions. 
 
                                                             
307 KSTN 35:536, Pyŏngo 8/16 misi. 
308 KSTN 35:537, Pyŏngo 8/19 sinsi. 
153 
 
 
V. Ch’osan’s Mistakes Exposed 
A day after the Chinese had moved on from Pŏltŭng garrison, in the late afternoon, 
seven men in white approached the border and called out for the outpost soldiers (p’agun). 
They claimed that they were with the Ŭiju interpreter and had been detained by the 
Chinese and they needed to cross the river. The subarea commander of Pŏltŭng, Chŏng 
Tongik, listened to their story, but denied them the ability to cross back over, instead he 
had them arrested and dispatched a captain (sugyo) to interrogate the prisoners. The 
captain, Kim Naesu, reported his findings: the seven included two clerks (hyŏngni) and a 
few aides and conscripts from Ch’osan and had been tasked with carrying the 
magistrate’s reply to the Qing request of September 26 along with the supplies they had 
requisitioned. However, these men only crossed to the Chinese side on the 29th, by which 
time the main group had moved on. Instead, they were met by nineteen Qing soldiers 
who were more than likely left behind to keep watch for the Koreans. These soldiers took 
note of the fact that the Koreans were bringing the supplies and told them to quickly 
catch up to the commissioners. When the Koreans protested that they had come too far 
into Chinese territory and were already in violation of Chosŏn laws, the soldiers arrested 
them and forced them to come along. In their depositions, the seven men argued for their 
innocence by claiming they were merely following orders and had operated in the open 
without fear.309 Kim Naesu was not impressed by their dissembling, in which he found 
too many inconsistencies to be credible.  
 The seven criminals were remanded to Kanggye and further interrogated there 
along with two higher officials of Ch’osan, the director (suhyang), Ch’oe Ch’iho, and Yi 
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Hyŏng, the captain who was one of the first to cross with Pak Hyobŏm; they had crossed 
over in search of a Korean by the name of Cho Ch’il, also known as Cho Manyŏng, 
sought for crimes in Ch’osan. The Chinese claimed to have arrested Cho, but by the time 
the Koreans arrived Cho had escaped and neither the Chinese nor Koreans could find him. 
The Records of Capital Offices does not record how the two ended up at Pŏltŭng, whether 
arrested by the Chinese or in search of the criminal. 
A month after the events in question (October 25), the Kanggye magistrate 
produced a report on all nine depositions and recommendations for punishment. The full 
investigation revealed that there had been greater communication between the Chosŏn 
officials and Qing soldiers, including a communication of troop movements, that put the 
lie to much of what the Ch’osan officials had said.310 The egregiousness of the cover-up 
thoroughly upset the army headquarters, and they laid blame on the initiative of 
magistrate of Ch’osan, Kim Sŏnmyŏng, who had already been stripped of his office for 
poorly accounting for the number of soldiers, then punished after Kim Naesu’s report for 
violating prohibitions on engaging in diplomacy without authorization.311 The army 
headquarters feared that the initiative of Korean border officials could not help but have a 
cascading effect in relation to border security as it led those underneath them to imagine 
                                                             
310 KSTN 35:542, Pyŏngo 9/6 sinsi. 
311 KSTN 35:538, Pyŏngo 8/23 haesi. Kim Naesu’s report refers to Sŏnmyŏng as the former 
magistrate, so the reason for removal preceded Kim’s report. He may have been removed from 
office because his crimes were obviously serious, but the extent not fully known. However, the 
idea that he was removed for an accounting error does have some precedent: earlier in July, a 
clerk mislabelled the address of a communique about Gang An’s request for river ships in pursuit 
of smugglers to the army headquarters (pyŏngyŏng) instead of the defense command (pangyŏng) 
and was punished with removal and lashes, KSTN 35:531, Pyŏngo 7/15 sinsi.  
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they could also act independently, but those local officials could not possibly understand 
the full ramifications of their actions. 
The army headquarters recommended that the crimes committed by the seven 
men led by the two clerks fell under the statutes for border violations which included the 
possibility of death even though they were acting on orders from their magistrate. The 
headquarters recommended a reduced sentence to imprisonment, though the length of 
their sentence was not delineated. The men avoided death because their crimes were for 
public duty, not private gain. The director and captain comprised a special case in that 
their actions not only violated the border, but they could not even catch the criminal they 
had sought in the first place, or his supposed accomplices, and by enlisting the Chinese in 
their efforts made the Chinese look incompetent. The army headquarters noted that 
among these multiple crimes the court had to consider the most significant in 
adjudicating punishment (chongjung kwach’i), but while their crimes could merit death, 
the army headquarters recommended a reduction in sentence because of their status.312 
 
VI. Destruction in Earnest 
  From October 1 when Commander Yi Hŭiryŏm met the Chinese at Pŏltŭng 
garrison, he, along with an officer and captain (kyori and sugyo), guided them through the 
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territory of Sangt’o garrison. They moved steadily up the Yalu River and encountered the 
first major group of settlements on October 5th just south of the Chasŏng River across 
from the Sangt’o garrison. So close in fact—within two miles—it is a wonder that the 
garrison troops did not prevent the settlers from reclaiming the land in the first place. The 
Chinese troops stayed in the area south of the garrison for nine days clearing houses in 
twenty areas, burning crops, and trampling fields. On the ninth day they headed north of 
the Chasŏng River and destroyed four more farmsteads within a few miles of the garrison. 
On October 16 the group disappeared deeper into the four abandoned counties region as 
Commander Yi sent no reports over the next three days.313 
 When Commander Yi resumed sending reports, the group had reached a long spit 
of flat land in an oxbow that was probably long recognized as a strategic weak point as it 
was called “Long Wall” (Changsŏng). Even topographical maps of the region produced 
by the Japanese in the early twentieth century note the remains of this titular wall.314 
Along a near six mile stretch of river Yi Hŭiryŏm recorded that the Chinese troops 
destroyed houses in eight areas. The reports on the destruction of these farmsteads record 
that troops began to set fire to harvested grains in addition to trampling and burning the 
fields which is the first suggestion in the Chosŏn reports that there are still Qing settlers 
on the land.315 Harvest is the most labor intensive time in dry field agriculture, so noting 
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that only some of the crops had been harvested means it is highly likely that most settlers 
were present in or around the fields when this action occurred.316 While the cruelty of 
torching already harvested crops was more than likely an accident of timing, it must have 
also served as warning to any of those who managed to escape the dragnet. 
 On October 23, the troops moved upriver a few miles to the apex of P’yŏngan 
province at the approximate midpoint of the Yalu River appropriately named Chunggang. 
Commander Yi sent his captain upriver a few miles to rendezvous with more than two 
hundred Chinese soldiers who had been operating in the neutral zone. The captain guided 
this splinter group another ten miles or so upriver over the next five days while Yi 
remained in Chunggang and the surrounding valleys with one hundred and fifty men. 
Together these two groups destroyed farmsteads in fourteen areas. Yi’s captain guided 
the splinter group back to Chunggang, meeting with Commander Yi and his group on the 
28th. Just before dawn on October 29, the Chinese commissioners woke Yi and his men 
and declared the operation over and a success. They informed him that the route along the 
river was steep and treacherous, so they would not return by the river but instead intended 
to travel through Chosŏn territory. They presented Commander Yi with a list of supplies 
they would need requisitioned for the trip home. The commander guaranteed them a writ 
that they could use to get supplies from the garrison. The Kanggye magistrate, who 
                                                             
316 Alan L. Olmstead and Paul W. Rhode, “Beyond the Threshold: An Analysis of the 
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compiled Commander Yi’s descriptions, ends his report promising the army headquarters 
that he will send notice to the towns and counties along the river to keep watch for the 
Chinese as they return and report on their movement.317 These reports, if they were ever 
sent, are not recorded in the Records of Capital Offices.  
  Both the Qing commissioners and Chosŏn officials were in regular contact with 
their respective supervisors, but I have only been able to examine the Korean reports. The 
Collection of Diplomatic Documents, however, does include some interim 
communications from the Qing based on reports from their field officers. While these two 
sources do not allow a one to one comparison, the differences in what they report 
illuminate some important conceptions of borders and sovereignty on either side.  
First, there are no illegal settlers mentioned at all in Magistrate Yi’s domestic 
reports. This is at odds with an interim message sent to the Qing by its own dispatched 
commandant, Li Cun, and forwarded to the Chosŏn court that reported the Qing soldiers 
covered over two hundred li with the Korean officials to the forty-two known areas of 
settlement and arrested those they found.318 The absence of Qing settlers may be a 
deliberate choice by Chosŏn officials to avoid reinforcing the seriousness of the breach, 
but the punishments meted out to Kim Sŏnmyŏng for poor record keeping make this a 
conspicuous omission. Commander Yi may have felt that since the illegal settlers were 
Qing subjects, they were not technically Chosŏn officials’ responsibility, whereas razing 
structures and reclaimed land were part of his duties to return the buffer zone to its 
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original empty state. As with the 1842 incident, the illegal settlers were more threatening 
in their potential for greater criminality than in their original actions of reclaiming land. 
Similarly, there is a woeful under representation of the number of houses the Qing 
settlers had built. The Collection of Diplomatic Documents reports that over two hundred 
houses were destroyed along with five thousand mu of farmland (approximately 835 
acres), but these are reduced to sixty-two areas (ch’ŏ) in the Chosŏn reports.319 It is 
possible Commander Yi may not have actually been observing all the troops and may not 
have known anything more specific. In some of the entries it is apparent that the soldiers 
have been split up into smaller units, which would make it hard for Yi to keep an eye on 
every aspect, but then this would mean that Qing troops were not well communicating 
with the Chosŏn minders, a worrisome development in itself. It is possible that the 
Chinese, who were clearing the neutral zone at the same time, may have conflated some 
of the numbers in their debrief. However, the Qing report listed the confiscated and 
destroyed goods from the neutral zone separately, so it is unlikely that this is the case. We 
must imagine that some of the omission was self-protection on the part of Chosŏn 
officials. Yet, I would argue that in a conception of the border as a buffer, the specific 
crimes mattered less than the evidence that the buffer was being maintained. It was long 
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term exposure to foreign contaminants unmitigated by official sanction that would cause 
the breakdown of society, not any one individual’s action. 
Further, in reading the Collection of Diplomatic Documents, the Qing had greater 
concern for the costs of the breach than the Koreans. The Board of Rites informed the 
Chosŏn court that their troops confiscated over 12,000 “logs” (jian, Ko. kŏn, a generic 
counter that frustrates attempts to determine the full scope of illegal logging), but the 
Chosŏn reports do not mention logging at all or ginseng for that matter of which the Qing 
confiscated twenty yang (a little over 1.5 pounds).320 Commander Yi again must have had 
either a strong incentive to avoid mentioning this criminal activity, or it did not even 
occur to him to account for these goods. I would argue that it is the latter. The aspects on 
which the reports focus highlight the disparate conceptions of the inherent harm of border 
violations. For the Qing, resource extraction figured prominently as a theft and a concrete 
cost of border violation, while the Koreans stressed land use and its potential for 
entrapping its subjects in greater wickedness. The Qing also cashiered and punished more 
than fifty border officials who were accused of bribery over this issue, but the Korean 
investigations focused on a failure to perform duties and obey orders. 
Chosŏn ministers’ decisions on punishments relied more on status than other 
considerations. The omissions in reporting did not factor as significantly in the 
punishment of higher officials as it did in the cases of technical officials. In the end, Yi 
Hŭiryŏm received a sentence of three years of exile in Kangwŏn province, along with the 
previous magistrate of Kanggye, Yun Uhyŏn, who was contemporaneously serving a 
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sentence for killing while intoxicated.321 Magistrate Yi Kyŏngjae did not receive any 
punishment, perhaps because he had been appointed to the position only a couple months 
before Commander Yi reported the illegal settlements. After exile, Yi Hŭiryŏm was 
restored to favor in part because Chief State Councilor Chŏng Wŏnyong (1783–1873), 
argued that his crimes were not the same as private crimes.322 The concept that 
Commander Yi’s crimes were not private or for personal gain marks a contrast with two 
unfortunate Koreans who were found on the Qing side of the river at about the same time. 
They both claimed that they were visiting family in the area when a man asked them to 
help collect reeds. They obliged but did not know the area well and crossed over the river 
accidentally. They were sentenced to death.323 
Despite the effort expended, the problems of the four abandoned counties 
persisted. In May 1847, in the same extreme northern areas that the Qing had just cleared, 
Magistrate Yi Kyŏngjae discovered more settlers again necessitating a response from the 
Qing and resulting in the magistrate’s removal.324 The persistence of the issue of illegal 
settlement inspired the Qing to recommend seasonal inspection tours of the border, which 
the Chosŏn court approved in 1848.325 The frequency of these patrols is an aspect I have 
not yet been able to ascertain, but the number of border violations and illegal settlement 
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324 Ilsŏngnok 55:920 [1847/4/18]. 
325 George McCune, “Korean Relations with China and Japan,” 77. 
162 
 
 
drops off dramatically after the end of the 1840s, so they must have had some effect. At 
least until Kojong’s reign when mounting pressures, again particularly from Chinese Han 
settlers in Manchuria, drove people across the border. The apparent inability of the 
Kanggye magistrates to administer such a large region led the Chosŏn court to elevate the 
Sangt’o garrison once more to the level of county (kun), giving it the old title of Chasŏng, 
incorporating into it the four remaining garrisons that once formed its now southern 
border with Kanggye, and split off the old area around the Much’ang outpost, folding that 
into Huju county to the east.326 
 
Conclusion 
The urge to depict the upper reaches of the Yalu River as a wild and lawless zone 
undergoing a ginseng or timber rush is a reading back of history from the late nineteenth 
or early twentieth century visions of Manchuria. Much like America’s wild west, it is an 
invention of a certain strain of history that privileged the rugged, individualistic, and 
mostly male view and intentionally highlighted a romantic ideal of the freewheeling and 
raucous frontier town. The border between the Qing empire and Chosŏn Korea was 
remarkably stable throughout the early modern era. Even so, the upper reaches of the 
Yalu River remained wild and unsettled on either side for quite some time after the 
official survey of the border in 1712. The relatively large scale of internal migration and 
the increasing frequency of border violations in the nineteenth century may suggest that 
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this area was more an amorphous borderland than a border line,327 but this is not accurate. 
These sources clearly show that both countries paid much attention to the importance of 
the border and a border zone, a Chosŏn DMZ. In reality, the border operation swept up 
over three hundred Qing subjects who had farmed an average of two and a half acres. 
Such investments were not conducive to getting rich and avoiding the notice of the state. 
In many ways these are stories that could be written today about many borders, despite 
the fiction that we live in a world of borders not borderlands. 
While the demographic changes occurring in Kanggye around this time suggest a 
parallel with frontier regions that are resource rich, this is not the description that the 
Chosŏn officials present in their reports. The Korean account is mostly focused on illegal 
settlement and land reclamation, noting not the number of people caught with poached 
ginseng or illegally felled logs, but rather the destruction of fields and harvested grains 
along with the burning of grass and mud huts. The frontier was anathema to Chosŏn 
officials. By definition, the frontier invited exchange. Border security required those 
tasked with watching the border to empty those regions and observe them, engaging as 
little as possible.  
Chosŏn officials approached border security measures incrementally, protesting, 
making small changes and, importantly, not allowing their attention to drift too far. The 
Chosŏn policy of cautious distance did not mean disengagement, at least four magistrates 
were cashiered in the Kanggye and Ch’osan region over border security in Hŏnjong’s 
reign alone. The Koreans could only be effective as long as the Qing were responsive to 
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the Chosŏn government’s desires. The demographic changes that had begun in the early 
nineteenth century did not abate, and the Chosŏn court’s decision to increase its 
administrative presence in the region showed that it was looking for ways to manage the 
issue of border violations. The unfortunate reality for Korea was that Qing policies on 
settlement in Manchuria and increasing population pressures in northern P’yŏngan meant 
border security issues would quickly outstrip the Chosŏn government’s incremental 
approach. 
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Maps 
 
Map 3.1. Kanggye Defense Command. 
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Map 3.2. Four abandoned counties region. 
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Chapter 4: A Life so Ordinary 
The Defense Commands of Kanggye and Hoeryŏng 
 
 In 1691, Left Minister (Chwaŭijŏng) Mok Naesŏn (1617–1704) came before King 
Sukchong in a state of agitation. Recently the six garrisons along the Tumen River had 
had problems with illegal border crossers seeking ginseng. The issue had been discussed 
and to Mok, the clear solution was to reinstitute the Five Guards system (Owi) in the 
northwest because back when all the garrisons were staffed with military men, this 
problem did not exist. Mok also bemoaned the changing character of the people in the 
north. To him the problem was simple. The people in the six garrisons originally did not 
care to cross the border or to illegally harvest ginseng. Rather, it was the exile of 
criminals to the region which poisoned the peoples’ minds and caused them to become 
corrupted. Mok therefore suggested the king no longer exile such criminals to the six 
garrisons.328 Unfortunately for Mok, Sukchong was not convinced, and the court did not 
act upon his suggestions. Whether or not the solutions presented would have worked to 
quell the insatiable desire for ginseng that drove the border crossers, or ameliorated the 
corruption of the people is unclear, but Mok’s lament and border crossings’ disruption of 
the expected order continued throughout the end of the dynasty.329  
 Mok’s two arguments encapsulate the unique problems the border presented in 
the court’s estimation. First, protecting the border was rightly military work, and the six 
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garrisons in particular were a key area for border protection. But, with the built-in bias 
against military examination graduates in the central bureaucracy, finding qualified 
candidates for posts on the border was not easy. Sukchong’s solution, followed by his 
successors Yŏngjo and Chŏngjo, was to promote martial talent within the region by 
creating special provincial divisions and local military competitions that would allow 
high performers to bypass some of the prerequisites for the military examination. These 
policies had the added benefit of bolstering royal power at the expense of officialdom 
dominated by the aristocracy.330 Second, the border itself presented a challenge to the 
residents and magistrates there. The susceptibility of residents at the border to corruption 
is a theme that runs through many ministers’ discussions of the border from Mok’s 
criticisms to the ministers who protested Qing settlement to the border region in 1846.  
 Kanggye and Hoeryŏng were two sides of the border defense coin. Kanggye sat at 
the northern extreme of P’yŏngan province where its duty was to stop illegal traffic, 
whether it was smuggling or settlement. Hoeryŏng was responsible for managing legal 
traffic in the form of open markets, while at the same time maintaining a deterrent for 
smugglers or other illegal activity. The vigilance and virtue required of the men who 
served at the border in any capacity were standards nearly impossible to meet. 
Nevertheless, the defense commands of Kanggye and Hoeryŏng served as important 
proving grounds for men of martial talent. In fact, until the middle of the nineteenth 
century, men who served well in these areas were often promoted to higher level 
positions within the Chosŏn government. 
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I. Hoeryŏng Defense Command 
 Much like Kanggye and Ch’angsŏng in P’yŏngan province, the defense command 
of Hoeryŏng was the key county along the northern border of Hamgyŏng province. By 
the end of the sixteenth century, Hoeryŏng straddled the neck of the far northeast of the 
peninsula from the Tumen River to the coast, effectively becoming the backstop for the 
counties of Chongsŏng, Onsŏng, Kyŏngwŏn, and Kyŏnghŭng, which lay along the lower 
reaches of the Tumen where the land flattened and the river was easier to cross. The 
Essentials of Administration (Man’gi yoram) noted that the eastern part of Hamgyŏng 
province was a key strategic point and that Hoeryŏng was the area where digging 
fortifications could protect the province.331 The city of Hoeryŏng lay in a valley only six 
ri, about three miles, from the Tumen.332 The location so close to the river was essential 
not only for preventing illegal border crossing, but also because it hosted a yearly market 
for goods and horses that, in the nineteenth century, regularly attracted over two hundred 
merchants and Qing military officials from Ningguta and Wula in Manchuria. The 
markets played a central role in the economic development in the area and were an 
essential source of much needed horse for cavalry units in the northern provinces.333 
Managing these markets well was the defining duty of the Hoeryŏng magistrate, and 
much of Hoeryŏng agriculture and other industry was geared toward providing goods and 
fodder for the merchants, their horses, and the cattle brought to sell from Hamgyŏng 
province. 
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The economic development that the open markets brought also spurred 
population growth from the seventeenth through most of the eighteenth century, but, by 
the end of Chŏngjo’s reign, the growth had stopped. Published in the late eighteenth 
century, the Hamgyŏng Counties Gazetteer (Kwanbuk ŭpchi) lists a total of 7,730 
households and 35,227 people with a breakdown of 17,649 men and 17,578 women.334 
Subsequently, the official census figures in the Hamgyŏng Gazetteer (Kwanbukchi), 
privately published in 1859, recorded 7,727 households (ho) for a total of 35,221 people, 
the division of men to women was 16,321 to 18,890.335 The authors of neither gazetteer 
cite the source from which the census numbers were drawn, but a comparison with tables 
created by Kang Sŏkhwa drawn from the Gazetteer for All Areas and the Geographic 
Treatise on the Great East (Taedong chiji) suggests that the population had plateaued in 
the late eighteenth century. Kang notes that Hoeryŏng’s population between 1759 and 
1828 grew, in official census figures, from 24,074 to 34,830, for an average annual 
growth rate of about .65 percent over the sixty-nine years.336 As noted before in the 
discussion of Kanggye, men tended to be under reported in official census figures and 
other groups were completely elided, but assuming a consistent error in accounting 
suggests that unlike the Kanggye region the Hoeryŏng population had reached a stasis 
point. Hoeryŏng’s population trends matched well for overall population trend in Korea 
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during the same period.337 Another Hamgyŏng Gazetteer (Pukkwanji), privately compiled 
in the late seventeenth century, reported population figures for the command from the 
household census of 1690 at 2,088 households with 6,834 men of corvée age and 6,487 
women, a linear projection of the growth puts the average annual growth rate from 1690 
to 1760 at the same .65 percent. This is probably a coincidence, but it does reinforce the 
notion that all the population figures should be taken with a grain of salt.  
 Although each individual counties population figures are not reliable for precise 
statistical analysis, the aggregate totals can shed some light on the macro trends of 
Korean demographics.338 Whatever the total population was in the first half of the 
nineteenth century, historians generally agree that it had ceased to grow by the end of the 
eighteenth century or shortly after.339 The stagnation of population growth in much of the 
peninsula introduced a host of problems from tax collection and corvée labor shortages, 
to a breakdown of social cohesion and disaster recovery efforts.340 The disruption was 
especially acute in Hoeryŏng due to the added obligations of the open markets. Ko 
Sŭnghŭi, in her work on Hamgyŏng’s commercial development, documents the number 
and size of transfers of animal feed that Hoeryŏng required from surrounding 
magistracies from the middle of the eighteenth century to the beginning of the nineteenth. 
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Her numbers show that Hoeryŏng magistrates faced increasing problems with procuring 
the necessary amount of grain.341  
The steady increase in the number of Qing merchants and their animals during 
the same period further exacerbated the problem. Although the markets must have 
continued to be profitable enough to overlook the difficulties for a time, much of the 
peninsula struggled with famines and natural disasters in the early nineteenth century, 
and Hoeryŏng was no exception. The 1840s were particularly cold, and the region saw a 
number of poor harvests.342 In 1850, the Hoeryŏng magistrate, Yu Ch’anggŭn (1790–
n.d.), finally complained to the Qing officials that their delegations had been exceeding 
the prescribed quotas, which had been set in 1789, for a number of years. The 
requirements to house and feed all the men and animals had become too onerous for the 
region. The market the previous year saw over four hundred Qing merchants and 
accompanying porters, over one thousand horses sold (not to mention mounts for the 
Qing retinue), and about two thousand head of cattle exchanged, all of which Hoeryŏng, 
as host, was required to feed and shelter while the market was happening. This time 
around, the numbers were slightly lower, but still high, and unacceptable to the Korean 
hosts. The Qing officials were indignant: if these problems went back decades, then why 
were the Koreans only now complaining? It was impolite to broach the subject now, and 
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it put the Qing in a difficult spot. Yu did not back down though, and the following year 
the Qing officials reduced their entourage to a quarter the size.343  
Hoeryŏng magistrates needed diplomatic skills to manage negotiations with Qing 
officials, but also administrative talents to coordinate the collection and transfers of large 
amounts of taxes, goods, and labor for the markets. Managing the population and the 
markets were essential skills for the military men appointed there, and Kanggye was a 
prime place for a magistrate to display their skills in population management and patrol 
without the risk of creating a diplomatic headache by mishandling the Qing delegations. 
As the next most common border post for Hoeryŏng magistrates, Ch’angsŏng 
undoubtedly served a similar purpose. The bureaucratic connections between the two 
defense commands will be explored in later sections, but first painting a clearer picture of 
the character of both is in order. 
   
II. Local Life 
 Despite topographic and environmental similarities, the economics of the two 
regions were quite different. Both Kanggye and Hoeryŏng had steep mountains and small 
valleys with little room for agriculture or husbandry. They shared similar climates, 
though Kanggye being on the west of Mount Paektu receives warmer winter winds from 
the Yellow Sea than Hoeryŏng where Siberian winds are stronger. Neither area is ideal 
for farming with a growing season no more than six months.344 With agricultural pursuits 
being less profitable, life in the defense commands revolved around different 
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opportunities. Hoeryŏng’s open markets spurred commercial development while frequent 
contact with the Qing necessitated more defense and soldiering. Kanggye on the other 
hand had greater concentrations of regulated resources like ginseng, timber, and precious 
minerals, whose regulation limited the amount of commercial activity for fear of 
smuggling, but had a wealth of other legal resources too. In the gazetteers for Kanggye, 
the local products (t’osan) are extensive, totaling almost one-hundred and seventy. None 
of the lists, however, includes any mineral resources. While some small scale operations 
for precious minerals did exist, their legality was suspect.345 The list of tribute products 
also makes clear that the Kanggye economy was primarily geared toward products of the 
land. The defense command was responsible for providing almost fifteen kŭn of ginseng, 
as well as high grade cotton cloth (chŏngmok), which may have been paid in cash 
equivalent, weasel tails (hwangmo), and deer pelts and antlers.346  
In contrast, the Hoeryŏng gazetteers list twenty-five local products with iron 
being the first. The other products were mostly medicinal plants and products from the 
ocean. The minimal tribute required from Hoeryŏng was only in weasel tails.347 The 
lighter duties imposed on Hoeryŏng likely stemmed from the more onerous duties 
required during the open markets which fell disproportionately on Hoeryŏng. The oldest 
gazetteer on Hoeryŏng also lists ginseng as originally a local product, but notes that by 
the author’s time, the late seventeenth century, it was no longer produced.348 Ginseng 
could be commercially grown, but the wild grown variety was considered more medically 
                                                             
345 Sun Joo Kim, Marginality and Subversion, 84–85; O Such’ang, Chosŏn hugi P’yŏngan-do 
sahoe, 319–320.  
346 Kanggyebu ŭpchi, 28–33, and Ch’ilgun togyŏng, 55–56 
347 Kwanbuk ŭpchi, 44, 56. 
348 Pukkwanji, in CSSU, 44:370. 
175 
 
 
effective and fetched significantly higher prices.349 That Hoeryŏng was no longer 
producing ginseng by the eighteenth century reflects the social development and over-
extraction that the locale underwent rather quickly as it transitioned from outpost of both 
the Jurchens and Chosŏn dynasty to a fully integrated defense command and trading hub 
in under two hundred years.  
While Kanggye, and more specifically the four abandoned counties region, had 
many of the qualities of a frontier region outlined in Chapter 3, Hoeryŏng was much 
more established. In part this was due to the yearly markets, but Hoeryŏng was also 
situated in one of the larger valleys in northern Hamgyŏng province. Its climate is 
somewhat temperate because of its proximity to the East Sea, though the growing season 
is short, and as with most of the rest of the north it is almost impossible to double crop.350 
Even so, data on the amount of land under cultivation in the nineteenth century reveals 
more differences between Kanggye and Hoeryŏng. In Kanggye, according to the 
Kanggye Defense Command Gazetteer produced in the middle of the nineteenth century, 
there were a little over 1,800 kyŏl of dry-field agricultural land, 250 kyŏl of which was 
reclaimed land (kagyŏngjŏn) probably in the Sangt’o region, and a little over seventeen 
kyŏl of wet-field.351 Since kyŏl measured productivity and not acreage, the percentage of 
Kanggye’s land under cultivation is unclear. Regardless, the county is an extremely 
mountainous area of northern Korea so geographic constraints would limit the amount of 
land available to farm generally, and it was not considered a productive region for 
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agriculture. The sheer volume of local products listed in the gazetteer also points to an 
economy developed toward more intensive resource extraction than crop cultivation.  
Hoeryŏng, with a smaller population and total area than Kanggye nonetheless 
had over triple the number of kyŏl under cultivation. The Hamgyŏng Gazetteer from 1859 
records Hoeryŏng’s dry-field total at over 6,750 kyŏl, and the wet-field agriculture yield 
only amounted to just over two kyŏl, though a third of this, 2,393, was designated 
supplemental tax fields (sokchŏn) which were only taxed when the land was worked 
because of its poor quality. The gazetteer recorded that Hoeryŏng submitted more than 
289 sŏk of rice in taxes, or its cash equivalent, on over 4,206 kyŏl of dry-field 
production.352 Of the six garrisons, Musan, Hoeryŏng, Chongsŏng, Onsŏng, Kyŏngwŏn, 
and Kyŏnghŭng, it was only superseded in cultivation by Musan which had over 7,502 
kyŏl, though Musan was considerably larger.353 Hoeryŏng’s tribute burdens for the Qing 
delegations during the markets, and obligations to provide feed for cattle and horses, also 
suggest it was one of the more productive counties on the Tumen River.354 The duties 
related to running the open market undoubtedly spurred agricultural development in the 
region as well since, by the mid-eighteenth century, Hoeryŏng and the surrounding 
counties were responsible for the lion’s share of the costs as the central government 
provided only a tenth of the cost for grain to feed the delegations.355 
Though both Kanggye and Hoeryŏng were defense commands, their military 
capabilities reflected their priorities. Hoeryŏng was roughly 560 square miles in area 
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compared to Kanggye’s 1824 total of 2,750 square miles. The area under just Sangt’o 
garrison control was larger than all of Hoeryŏng at approximately 700 square miles. Yet, 
Hoeryŏng required an outsized military presence in relation to its geographic size. 
According to the gazetteer for Hamgyŏng province, the Hoeryŏng magistrate could 
command a total of 6,489 soldiers including 2,415 for the city itself.356 For comparison, 
around 3,000 soldiers were on call to defend Kanggye, while the eight forts could call 
upon about 2,750.357 Hoeryŏng’s smaller forts, including the Tumen River forts of 
Koryŏng, Porha (or Poŭrha), and P’ungsan, each had a contingent of a few hundred local 
soldiers (t’obyŏng) that theoretically could be called up in time of need. The deputy 
magistrate (suho) was tasked with making a circuit throughout the command from the 
third month to the ninth, inspecting the blockhouses and seeking out criminal activity. 
The Kanggye magistrate on the other hand had to rely on fewer soldiers to patrol a larger 
area. With the underexploited resources of the Sangt’o region, and sparser population, the 
potential for criminal activity in Kanggye was great. The Kanggye magistrate and his 
army second deputy commander’s task seems all but unmanageable. While the census 
figures are not reliable enough to calculate population densities or the percent of the 
population that was in military service at any given time, it is clear that the two 
magistracies required very different skills to manage. 
For Kanggye, with such a large area and a small population, as well as a border 
with the Qing empire that stretched for 120 miles, patrolling the border and preventing 
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illegal harvesting or logging was a difficult if not impossible task. In addition, the wilds 
of Kanggye were home to tigers which posed a consistent danger to the population. In 
fact, the magistrates, military commanders, and sheriffs of the northern provinces spent a 
considerable amount of time catching tigers, one of their most important duties during the 
long peace of the eighteenth and early nineteenth century.358 The Illustrated Guide to the 
Seven Counties makes note of this in its section on “Ginseng Regulations (kŭmsam 
chŏlmok).” In referencing a discussion in the 1694 between Sukchong and his ministers 
about removing guns from the populace in the north to prevent illegal ginseng harvesters 
from using them to harm the people and soldiers, the gazetteer cites a report from an 
unnamed former magistrate of Kanggye that argued against taking away the people’s 
guns because they had a credible fear of tigers, and without guns the tigers would kill 
them or their livestock.359 The court decided not to take private guns though it is not clear 
how many guns were in private possession. With or without weapons, commanders in 
Kanggye had a daunting task in trying to stamp out smuggling. 
Besides tiger hunting, the primary duty for northern border magistrates, and 
Kanggye commanders in particular, was preventing the illegal harvesting of ginseng. The 
original ginseng regulations listed in the Illustrated Guide to the Seven Counties were 
established in the seventeenth century. But as the Qing’s voracious appetite for ginseng 
led to the depletion of wild ginseng in Manchuria, Chosŏn regulations became inadequate 
to stem border crossings in search of the valuable resource.360 Chosŏn regulations on 
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preventing illegal ginseng harvesting were revised during Yŏngjo’s reign to increase the 
frequency of patrols all along the Yalu River. For the magistracies from Ŭiju to Kanggye, 
the magistrates were to appoint a team of two commissioners (ch’asawŏn), one each from 
Sakchu and Ch’angsŏng, Pyŏktong and Ch’osan, and Wiwŏn and Kosalli garrison. These 
two commissioners were tasked with calling up the local corvée soldiers (t’ojol) to patrol 
the blockhouses (p’asu) and forts, making three circuits every thirty days in their 
combined area. The patrols began in the third month with the first spring of ginseng 
(myosam) and continued until the leaves died back (hwangsam) in the ninth month. The 
soldiers on duty at the blockhouses were also to be rotated every five days to prevent 
them from getting lax.361 For Kanggye, the regulations were even more stringent. The 
northern area was divided into even smaller regions with Manp’o and Sangt’o garrisons, 
Pŏltŭng and Oetkoe, and the five garrisons of Chongp’o, Ch’up’a, Mamahae, P’yŏngnam, 
and Sin’gwang making up three groups that could call up local soldiers for patrols. The 
patrols began in the third month and were conducted three times a month, but from the 
sixth month when ginseng fruited (tansam) until the leaves died back the patrols were to 
occur six times a month. The commissioners were to send reports to the magistrates after 
every patrol with a record of what they found.  
By the nineteenth century, this onerous patrol schedule was no longer followed. 
The illegal settlements described in the previous chapter would not have been possible 
with patrols combing the area every ten days. The reasons for the breakdown of patrols 
and lax duties were probably similar to the breakdown of the Sogo Army and cancellation 
of military training exercises: the common people were too poor to take time out every 
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month to patrol. However, the reports of deputy commanders during the 1846 border 
sweep do suggest that the blockhouses were manned at least somewhat regularly. As the 
north relied less on slave labor compared with the south, most of the blockhouse 
attendants and patrol soldiers were undoubtedly local, impoverished commoners or 
runaway slaves, who, even if they received meals while on duty, probably resented the 
time away from their livelihoods.362 
Life in Kanggye in the nineteenth century was difficult. The data on agriculture 
suggest that most residents probably could not support themselves with the produce of 
farms alone. Many would have tried to collect other resources whether legally, such as 
hunting boar, or illegally by logging or gathering ginseng. The difficult circumstances 
come into stark relief in the story of Hŏ Kwangch’un and Kim Sangsil. In the tenth 
month of 1846, the Qing authorities returned two Chosŏn subjects to the special city of 
Ŭiju. Hŏ and Kim were caught that summer on the Qing side of the river by a platoon of 
Qing soldiers who had come to remove the Qing settlements. Hŏ was from a small village 
in the Sangt’o area of Kanggye who claimed he was on his way to stay with his father’s 
first cousin Ma P’an who resided in Wiwŏn. On his way he stopped at his relative Kang 
Sulchong’s house in the village of Ch’udong. While there a man he did not know with the 
family name Song asked if Hŏ would accompany him to cut reeds, and Hŏ agreed. Kim 
Sangsil was also from Kanggye, near Chasŏng. He had gone to stay with his elder second 
cousin Kim Taebyŏk for a few months starting in the third month. In the seventh month 
there was a disastrous flood and he had to leave to obtain a burial quilt. On the way, in 
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the same village of Ch’udong, he was approached by Song and agreed to go cut reeds as 
well. The trio left for their task in the middle of the night one day late in the eighth month, 
and because of the dark, the two claimed they got confused as to where they were and 
somehow ended up on the wrong side of the river. When the sun came up, a small 
platoon of Qing soldiers with guns surprised them, and each fled in a different direction. 
Kim was caught rather quickly, but Hŏ managed to evade the soldiers and found a safe 
place to sleep for the night. In the morning however, he woke to find he was surrounded 
by more than a hundred Qing soldiers. Song was not found.363  
After being returned to Chosŏn they were imprisoned and questioned again by 
Chosŏn officials. Governor Cho Hangnyŏn (1786–n.d.) and P’yŏngan Army Commander 
Hŏ Kye (1798–1866) reviewed their testimony, obtained through torture, and reported an 
entirely different story, one these Chosŏn officials considered more reliable. Hŏ and Kim 
had in fact crossed over the river in the second month, when it was covered in ice and did 
not realized they were on the wrong side of the river until they were caught by the Qing 
soldiers. The governor and army commander were incredulous, they could not believe 
that any Chosŏn subjects were ignorant of the law prohibiting crossing the river without 
permission, and that they could be on the wrong side for so long. The officials had a 
strong belief in the efficacy of torture and believed the men could not be hiding anything 
about their crime. Neither Hŏ nor Kim appeared on any household register; rather, Hŏ 
Kye suspected that the two were itinerants, easily duped by the viciously cruel Mister 
Song. Unfortunately, despite their return from the Qing with a letter that suggested 
leniency in their sentencing, Cho and Hŏ Kye argued that it would not do to let the men 
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free. On the contrary, their execution would serve as a warning to the other residents at 
the border who might be tempted to cross.364  
The truth about these men cannot be known. The idea that they had accidentally 
crossed over in the middle of the night or in the middle of winter are both equally 
unbelievable. Both men claimed to be from Kanggye in the area beyond the Majŏn ridge 
that had been open for settlement only a little over twenty years before, Hŏ Kwangch’un 
suggested he was from a village not more than a few miles from the river itself. Travel 
from Kanggye to Wiwŏn was not easy, so the men must have had a fairly good sense of 
direction and knew the lay of the land. The surest way to travel from Kanggye to Wiwŏn 
would have been along the river as it was flatter from reports of the officials who patrol 
the border, anyone caught wandering along the river was immediately suspected of 
smuggling. The men may have realized that revealing family names of the relatives they 
were supposed to meet even to Qing authorities could have brought trouble for their 
relatives. Also, the fact that they were not listed in a census form anywhere is not 
surprising considering the lengths to which families went to avoid taxation, military 
service, or corvée. Their accomplice, Song, lends some credence to the story they told to 
the Qing as Song is the only family name listed in the Illustrated Guide to the Seven 
Counties as local gentry in Wiwŏn. Song, being from the area, may have more easily 
been able to avoid capture and known places to hide if surprised.  
Moreover, their stories suggest that they knew what they were doing was wrong. 
They first told the Qing questioners they had crossed the Yalu River in the middle of the 
night, but then told the Chosŏn authorities that they had crossed in the middle of winter. 
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Either way, the men’s stories suggest that the blockhouses were manned at least 
somewhat consistently throughout the ginseng season, since the men knew they would 
have been arrested by trying to cross during the day, or were afraid enough of the 
possibility to avoid it. The men were caught with reeds, so neither Hŏ Kye nor Cho 
Hangnyŏn suspected them of illegal ginseng harvesting or any other more nefarious 
activity. The sense from Hŏ’s report is that he thought the men were not smart enough to 
engage in anything worse, or torture would have surely gotten it out of them.  
Life in Kanggye was certainly hardscrabble, but afforded a certain amount of 
freedom for men like Hŏ and Kim. The Sangt’o region was a suspected haven for 
runaway slaves since the early-eighteenth century, and P’yŏngan province, especially 
along the Kanggye Direct Route had more than its fair share as well.365 Suspicions that 
these men were runaway slaves may have also led to the harsh punishment of the two 
men, since the seven men who went over from Ch’osan at the same time all survived with 
their heads. Kanggye’s frontier character and its draw as a haven for runaways probably 
made callups of Sogo units or other corvée obligations difficult, patrols and other duties 
probably suffered as a result. Hoeryŏng, on the other hand, had a more developed 
infrastructure and more frequent callups for ad-hoc and corvée labor. Jurchen tribes had 
occupied the area since Koryŏ times, and under Chosŏn control, many of the forts and 
roads continued to survive, unlike in the Sangt’o region where early Chosŏn era 
infrastructure was abandoned.366 Furthermore, the yearly open markets in Hoeryŏng and 
the biennial market in Kyŏngwŏn drove economic and social development of the 
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northeast region both for Chosŏn and Manchuria.367 Being able to manage them well was 
a key consideration in the appointment of magistrates. 
 The open market at Hoeryŏng was originally established in 1637 immediately 
after the Pyŏngja War. The Qing used them to obtain supplies and other necessities for 
the northeast regions of Wula and Ningguta as they continued to battle the Ming for 
control of the rest their empire.368 The market at Kyŏngwŏn, which opened only every 
other year, began in 1646, and quickly, these markets became essential to the economic 
development of both Manchuria and northern Hamgyŏng province.369 The markets were 
referred to as the “single open market” (tan’gaesi) or “double open market” (ssanggaesi) 
depending on whether it was held in just Hoeryŏng or both commands. The markets were 
held over about ten days, starting at the end of the twelfth month for Hoeryŏng (after the 
new year in Kyŏngwŏn), and included a public market for the exchange of cattle, 
ploughshares, and salt, followed by a horse market, and, finally, a private market.370 
These markets drew merchants from throughout the province and Manchuria who helped 
develop local markets in the surrounding counties, which by the beginning of the 
eighteenth century were integral to the society of the six garrisons.371 The markets proved 
popular, and from the start, Chosŏn officials encountered issues with excessive numbers 
of merchants participating in the markets. In 1660 regulations limiting the number of 
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participants at the Hoeryŏng market to 320 people went into effect.372 Qing regulation of 
the markets also banned private merchants from participating, but the regulations were 
not effective, and as the region developed, more and more private merchants participated 
in the markets. As it proved impossible to stop, the Qing and Chosŏn developed more 
detailed regulations and introduced a three-day private market in addition to the public 
and horse markets, codifying the changes in the Regulations on the Hoeryŏng and 
Kyŏngwŏn open markets in Hamgyŏng Province (Hamgyŏng-do Hoe-Wŏn kaesi 
chŏngnye) printed in 1759.373 The popularity of the markets continued throughout the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, with participants consistently exceeding the quota of 
330 in the 1759 regulations. Ko Sŭnghŭi notes that the public market was a reflection of 
political and military dynamics, and the concern the Qing had in developing Manchuria’s 
agricultural economy.374 For instance, the markets originally exchanged somewhere 
around two hundred ploughshares in the mid-seventeenth century, but it quickly escalated 
to over seven hundred by 1660 and two thousand by 1680.375 In the 1759 regulations, 
Chosŏn officials were responsible for exchanging 2,600 ploughshares for a reciprocal 
number of bolts of third grade cotton cloth.376 Salt had the opposite experience. As 
Ningguta’s development allowed it to start its own salt production and rely less on 
Chosŏn salt in the eighteenth century, the public exchanged dropped from a high of one 
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thousand sŏk in 1730 to 855 in 1759.377 The private and horse markets, on the other hand, 
reflected the economic development of the region, even as the people protested the 
hardships of hosting the markets and the providing the public market goods, which they 
argued was equivalent to another tax, their participation in the private and horse market 
increased.378 The horse market was especially critical to the Chosŏn’s northern cavalry 
units because of the lack of horses on the peninsula in general and the low quality of 
horse that domestic stables could produce. The Hoeryŏng market was the only place the 
cavalry units could obtain military grade horses. Regulations even prohibited officers 
from taking Qing horses out of the region, though they did not always abide by them. In 
1773 because the cost of Chejudo horses to stock post stations throughout the peninsula 
had become so expensive, Yŏngjo allowed Qing horses purchased at the markets to be 
used instead, which further encouraged illegal trading.379 In the nineteenth century, the 
horse and private markets at Hoeryŏng saw the exchange of around nine hundred horse 
and seventeen hundred cattle every year.380 It would be fair to say that life in Hoeryŏng 
revolved around the markets, not only for the twenty days from when the Qing arrived, 
but throughout the year as the magistracy and surrounding counties tried to amass the 
necessary tribute goods of one hundred fourteen cattle, twenty six hundred ploughshares, 
and eight hundred fifty-five sŏk of salt, but also the large amount of food for humans and 
livestock, much of it provided as an obligation of the hosts. 
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All levels of government participated in the open markets. The Hoeryŏng 
magistrate was assisted by another magistrate, often from Puryŏng, Chongsŏng, or 
Musan; the local elite provided officers to greet the Qing delegations and provide 
hospitality including a semi-permanent translator stationed at Koryŏng fort for the 
purpose; and the provincial governor’s office sent other translators and officials who 
brought further tribute in the form of sea cucumbers and mussels. The reports of the 
magistrates during the open markets allow a small glimpse of the local officials as well. 
Since the magistrates and the army second deputy commander of Koryŏng, who greeted 
the Qing once they crossed the river, were usually only in office for one market, the local 
officials were the greatest continuity. Officials such as the Koryŏng and Hoeryŏng 
translators (t’ongsa) could be in their positions for over a decade. Other posts that did not 
have technical requirements, such as the director of the local council (chwasu), were 
staffed by men who rotated every few years in positions as noncommissioned military 
officers (changgyo) and secretaries (pyŏngbang), welfare officers (munan kun’gwan), or 
other officials in charge of tax collection and corvée (pokchik ponggun). Many of these 
local functionaries (hyangni) appear frequently in the reports in different offices. The 
local administration reflected the central bureaucracy in short tenures with frequent 
transfers of position.381 
The markets were important, but Hoeryŏng was still a defense command, and 
one that, because of frequent Qing interaction, required its defensive fortifications to be 
well maintained. The locations of Hoeryŏng’s forts were closer to the river than in other 
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areas, which meant they occasionally encountered destruction from floods. In the late 
1840s, the northern border counties had undergone a few poor years of harvest, and some 
extra cold winters. In the summer of 1846 the Tumen watershed also received torrential 
rains. The Tumen overran its banks in the upper reaches at Ch’ŏnsu harbor across from 
Fort Koryŏng, washing up to the fort and destroying parts of the northern and eastern 
walls. The Koryŏng commander Yi T’aesŏng (1789–n.d.) and Ku Chaeyong (1782–n.d.), 
the magistrate of Hoeryŏng, wrote to the governor’s office requesting authority to call up 
local military corvée to repair the fort. For them, it was obvious that since the Chinese 
passed this way every year, the fort should be in good repair. The officials also noted five 
other floods that required calling up corvée labor from three to nine other towns in the 
recent past.382 
The governor, Yu Sŏnghwan (1788–n.d.), after back and forth with the 
magistrate, recommended an immediate call up of laborers because that area on the 
border was vital to border defense. Even so, the governor was concerned that with the 
recent poor harvests the burden would be too great on the people.383 A corvée tax was 
authorized for the six garrisons, but midway through the callup, four of the six ceased 
their efforts. Hoeryŏng and Musan continued the work. Attendance at the market that 
year was particularly sparse, so one must suspect that the burdens were indeed too 
great.384 
For the Hoeryŏng magistrates, effective control of the defense command meant 
they had to be qualified managers, coordinators, diplomats, as well as being 
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knowledgeable about  construction and defense. These qualities were difficult to assess in 
younger candidates for the position, which is why the appointees tended to be older and 
more experienced. Kanggye with its sparser population and frontier like responsibilities 
gave magistrates the chance to showcase a different, but no less important set of skills for 
border defense in the Chosŏn dynasty. The combination of both skills would allow those 
military men that they were capable of handling greater responsibility in the bureaucracy. 
 
III. Bureaucratic Connections 
The defense commands of Hoeryŏng and Kanggye were connected by more than 
just their location at the border. The importance of these two positions in the bureaucracy 
from the seventeenth to the middle of the nineteenth century also shows deeper 
connections. The magistrate posts analyzed in Chapter 2 revealed a connection between 
these two defense commands that was not fully explored. In delving deeper into the 
careers of magistrates who were appointed to both positions it becomes clear that there 
are loose paths that these officials followed in developing skills to manage these border 
magistracies. 
Despite its location so far from the capital, the Hoeryŏng magistrate was a 
prominent post. Nearly one quarter of the men appointed to the post from the fifteenth to 
the end of the seventeenth century were promoted directly from the position to army 
commander, generally in north or south Hamgyŏng.385 Kanggye’s importance to border 
security is reflected in the growing importance and elevation of the magistrate to the 
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concurrent post of protector (pangŏsa Jr. 2) from the reign of King Injo (1623–1649).386 
The Amended Great Code also notes that the military graduates who were specially 
appointed as royal messengers (sŏnch’ŏn) who finish their tenure as magistrates of 
Kanggye, Samsu, and Kapsan should be promoted to a position in the central 
bureaucracy.387 
Hoeryŏng was listed in the Great Code and the Amended Great Code as a 
defense command under the rank of Jr. 3. However, in the two gazetteers of Hoeryŏng 
published after the Amended Great Code  in 1746, the position of magistrate is listed as a 
Jr. 2 position.388 The reason for this discrepancy is not clear. It could be that the first 
gazetteer in the Hamgyŏng Counties Gazetteer accidentally left out a stroke on the 
number and the subsequent Hamgyŏng Gazetteer, which copied much of its content from 
the two earlier gazetteers, may have simply copied the error without correction. The 
seventeenth-century gazetteer does not list a rank for any of the local positions in the 
defense command. In the privately compiled gazetteers, there was not a consistent format 
for listing local officials, so it is not possible to crosscheck extensively, but the other 
defense commands were Jr. 3, when a rank was included in the description. It would be 
problematic if the Hoeryŏng magistrate were Jr. 2 as he would be an equivalent rank of 
the governor and army commander. However, the importance of Hoeryŏng and its open 
market and attendant diplomatic skills would have required a more highly skilled 
magistrate. Added to this, the post was exclusively reserved for military examination 
passers, and quite far from the capital. Possibly, the government provided greater 
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incentive for magistrates appointed there by increasing the rank of the post. This might 
also explain the shorter tenure of officials as upper hall posts (tangsanggwan) were 
supposed to be only 700 days, like Ŭiju. The gazetteers, however, note that the tenure 
was still 30 months. The most likely explanation is a misprint, but the need to incentivize 
officials to assume distant posts by elevating the rank of the post occurred with some 
frequency, so it cannot be discounted.389 
There were forty-six magistrates who were appointed to both Kanggye and 
Hoeryŏng between 1623 and 1861. The Records are extant from 1623, so only forty-three 
officials, whose careers began after that year, could be reliably traced. The first 
appointment to the bureaucracy of the oldest entrant was 1636, and the last entrant was 
appointed to their first post in 1830. The chronological distribution of officials across this 
near two hundred year period was about even, though there was a slightly higher ratio of 
men who started their careers between 1680 and 1780. Hŏ Kye (1798–1866), who has 
made a few appearances in this study, had a career that exemplified those military 
examination graduates who were posted to these two defense commands. 
Hŏ Kye began his career as a royal messenger in 1815, and passed the military 
examination the following year.390 Two-thirds of the forty-three officials began their 
careers as royal messengers (sŏnjŏn’gwan), which as Eugene Y. Park noted was a 
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position of “bright prospects most often given to military examination candidates or 
recent graduates from prominent descent lines.”391 The other sixteen officials obtained 
appointments in ten different types of posts including company commander (ch’ogwan) 
and other types of military officer, including low-level Five Guards officers (Pusayong, 
Pusajŏng). Hŏ subsequently obtained an appointment as a registrar of the Royal Cuisine 
office (Saongwŏn Chubu, Jr. 6) and then as registrar of military supplies (Kun’gisi Chubu, 
Jr. 6). Most of the officials analyzed here spent a few years in the central military 
divisions as registrars of military supplies or in the Military Training Agency 
(Hullyŏnwŏn Chubu, Jr. 6) or bailiffs (Kamch’al, Sr. 6) of the Office of the Inspector-
General (Sahŏnbu). Because there were fewer positions at lower ranks than in 
comparable civil bureaus, military men tended to enjoy somewhat rapid advancement in 
rank, though they rarely obtained higher ranks in the central bureaucracy, upper senior 
third-rank officials and higher, as there were considerably fewer available to them.392  
Hŏ was elevated after a year to auditor (Tosa, Jr. 5) of the State Tribunal 
(Ŭigumbu) prison in 1819, and then as an administrator (P’an’gwan, Jr. 5) in the Military 
Training Agency. His first provincial appointment came soon after in 1821 when he was 
selected as magistrate of the defense command of Hadong on the southern coast at the 
border of Kyŏngsang and Chŏlla provinces. This was also his adoptive father’s first 
provincial posting in 1799. However, his appointment was not unanimous, and so the 
king ordered a new selection.393 Hŏ spent the next few years as a battalion commander 
(p’ach’ong) in the Military Training Directorate. Like Hŏ, military examination graduates 
                                                             
391 Park, Between Dreams and Reality, 75. 
392 Palais, Confucian Statecraft, 347. 
393 SJW 2143:50b [1821/7/15 11th entry] 
193 
 
 
with promise generally obtained their first appointment as a magistrate or garrison 
commander in the provinces around their sixth or seventh posting, though I do not have 
complete data on the frequency of a rescission of one’s first post, anecdotally, Hŏ’s 
experience was atypical in that regard. The average time they spent in official service 
from initial posting to a provincial appointment was only four years and four months. The 
time from initial post to a provincial post lengthened throughout the late Chosŏn, 
however, with an average of under three years for those whose first post was between 
1630 and 1680 to over six for those between 1780 and 1830, which tracks well with Hŏ’s 
career.  
A military official’s first magistrate appointment tended, like Hŏ Kye’s, to be on 
the coast, but there was not a recognizable pattern otherwise. The forty-three officials 
analyzed here obtained thirty-four different magistracies as their first posting. Five men 
were appointed magistrate of Changyŏn on the central coast of Hwanghae province, or as 
port commander of Paengnyŏngdo, an island within Changyŏn’s jurisdiction. Three were 
appointed to Tŏgwŏn on the southern coast of Hamgyŏng province. Of the rest, thirteen 
took posts in P’yŏngan province, eight in Chŏlla, eight in Kyŏngsang, three in Kangwŏn, 
two additional posts in Hamgyŏng, and one more in Hwanghae. The posts do tend 
slightly toward appointments in the northern provinces of Hamgyŏng, Hwanghae, and 
P’yŏngan, which had twenty-four, while the southern provinces of Chŏlla, Kangwŏn, and 
Kyŏngsang had only nineteen. But, the greater commonality of these posts is that two-
thirds were located on the coasts or at the northern border. 
The military examination graduate could expect a significant amount of their 
career would be spent rather far from the capital. Firstly, the majority of posts available 
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to military examination graduates were outside the central provinces. Second, the military 
posts in Kyŏnggi province and around Seoul were reserved for more experienced or more 
well-connected graduates, and even those from elite military families needed to spend 
some time as a magistrate in the northern or southern provinces before appointment to 
central posts.394 Defined career paths are not immediately visible in these officials’ 
appointments. The pattern of appointments for the forty-three magistrates did not overlap 
much, but a few magistracies appeared in their careers fairly consistently. Those 
magistracies tended to be concurrent posts as a military division commander (yŏngjang, 
Sr. 3). For example, nearly a third of the magistrates were appointed to Changdan, a 
landlocked defense command on the border between Kyŏnggi and Hwanghae provinces. 
Another third were appointed to Ch’ŏrwŏn in Kangwŏn province. Eight were appointed 
to Yŏngbyŏn, a landlocked defense command in P’yŏngan province that lay athwart the 
strategic Inland Ridge Road (Naeryuk yŏngno) and the Kanggye Direct Route (Kanggye 
chingno) that ran from Kanggye to Anju, and nine to Ch’angsŏng, the defense command 
at the border between Sakchu and Pyŏktong. Ch’angsŏng was not a concurrent military 
division commander post, but rather was a concurrent protector (pangŏsa, Jr. 2) post, a 
step in rank above military division commander. Table 4.1 shows the regional breakdown 
of the men’s career provincial posts at the rank of Sr. 3 and under.  
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Province Number of Postings Percent of Total 
Central Provinces   
Ch’ungch’ŏng 14 3 
Kangwŏn 20 5 
Kyŏnggi 55 14 
Southern Provinces   
Chŏlla 31 8 
Kyŏngsang 38 9 
Northern Provinces   
Hamgyŏng 94 23 
Hwanghae 24 6 
P'yŏngan 126 31 
Total 402 100 
Table 4.1. Career posts Sr. 3 and below by province.  
Data on appointments drawn from SJW. 
 
 Over two-thirds of the lower ranked provincial posts throughout the men’s careers 
were to the northern provinces. The majority of these posts were as magistrates, but the 
list also included other postings such as subarea commanders, deputy or port 
commanders, and post-station horse supervisors. The lower numbers for the central 
provinces reflect the fewer number of posts available there to military examination 
graduates. Through the late Chosŏn era, the posts available to military men overall 
increased, though those posts were mostly outside Kyŏnggi, Kangwŏn, and 
Ch’ungch’ŏng provinces. Even so, the over-representation of the northern two provinces 
in these men’s careers stands out. The magistrates of Kanggye and Hoeryŏng were from 
more elite families, who often went from a central post in a military division as a 
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commander, or administrator to higher ranking provincial posts such as sub-area 
commander, deputy commander, or magistrate rather than lower ranking posts as 
subordinates to commanders. Below is a table (4.2) that illustrates the regional makeup of 
magistracies available to military men, and the magistrate postings.  
 
Province Posts Available Percentage of 
Total 
Number of 
Appointments 
Percent of 
Total 
Central 
Provinces 
    
Ch’ungch’ŏng 9 7 3 1 
Kangwŏn 6 4 17 5 
Kyŏnggi 15 11 51 15 
Southern 
Provinces 
    
Chŏlla 21 15 23 7 
Kyŏngsang 23 17 17 5 
Northern 
Provinces 
    
Hamgyŏng 17 13 87 26 
Hwanghae 15 11 17 5 
P’yŏngan 30 22 116 35 
Total 136 100 331 100 
Table 4.2. Magistracies available to military examination graduates by province. 
Data from tables based on the Gazetteer for All Areas in Ku Wanhoe, “Sŏnsaengan ŭl t’onghae 
pon.” 
 
The career magistrate postings to the northern provinces of Hamgyŏng and 
P’yŏngan far outweighed those provinces’ relative representation in available posts. Even 
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the postings to Hwanghae which were six percent of the total were below its available 
distribution, though not by much. The total shows that even with the balance of posts 
available to military men tilting toward the northern provinces, the men who were 
appointed to Kanggye and Hoeryŏng tended to have more experience in the northern 
provinces than the distribution of posts would imply. The only other province that had 
appointments significantly above the percentage available was Kyŏnggi. Available 
information on the backgrounds of these officials does not reveal whether descent was 
the primary factor in their ability to gain posts in Kyŏnggi province. The reference in the 
Amended Great Code to specially appointed messengers, however, does mean that 
Kanggye magistrates were more likely to be from more elite families. The higher rate of 
Kyŏnggi postings could also be a reflection of the importance of Kanggye and Hoeryŏng, 
either skilled magistrates gained these posts more frequently or these posts were given to 
promising officials to test their abilities. The evidence of age and time in the bureaucracy 
for Hoeryŏng and Kanggye specifically shows that the likelihood is that these posts went 
to more experienced, and hopefully more talented, magistrates (figure 4.1) 
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Figure 4.1. Age and time in bureaucracy of magistrates for Kanggye and Hoeryŏng. 
Data from SJW and the Han’guk yŏktae inmul chonghap chŏngbo sisŭt’em at http://people.aks.ac.kr. 
 
The ages for all magistrates in both defense commands were fairly equal, with Kanggye 
perhaps having slightly older individuals. The time in bureaucracy shows that the 
magistrates had been working in the Chosŏn government for some time, and combined 
with the age data, it is likely that the magistrates’ skills were well established. Hoeryŏng 
magistrates had also spent more time in the bureaucracy throughout the late Chosŏn, 
which is consistent with the fact that the forty-three magistrates appointed to both defense 
commands were usually posted to Hoeryŏng after Kanggye. One caveat is that Kanggye 
was an alternating civil and military post, so the time in bureaucracy may be skewed by 
the longer time civil examination graduates spent in preparation for the exam. Even so, an 
analysis of time in bureaucracy by examination over broader time segments revealed that 
Kanggye magistrates only exceeded Hoeryŏng magistrates’ time in the bureaucracy from 
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1800 to 1864, 32.9 years for Kanggye to 29.6 for Hoeryŏng. Hoeryŏng and Kanggye 
were posts reserved for older, experienced magistrates as the average length of time in 
the bureaucracy exceeded the other border magistracies by four to five years on average, 
except for Ch’angsŏng.  
Hŏ was next appointed as military division commander in Kongju in 
Ch’ungch’ŏng province a jump in rank to Sr. 3 and a sign that he had impressed his 
superiors. Posts to the central provinces were rarely an official’s first provincial posting. 
His subsequent posts rotated between provincial and capital positions as was customary 
for members of the elite military families. Officials like Hŏ would often return to the 
capital and assume positions as commanders in one of the Five Military Divisions 
(Ogunyŏng) or in the Five Guards (Owi), or as ministers in the Office of Ministers-
without-Portfolio (Chungch’ubu). As mentioned in chapter two, this rotation was 
designed to prevent central officials in the countryside from developing power centers or 
networks that could challenge central authority. While not all the positions carried 
stipends, it was difficult if not impossible for military examination graduates to 
successfully compete for positions in the bureaucracy without living in or around 
Seoul.395 The repeated returns to the capital thus prevented officials from accumulating 
wealth by transferring from provincial post to provincial post, while making the officials 
also dependent on networks in the capital for surviving the periods without stipends. Hŏ 
spent a couple years in this way before obtaining a posting to Changjin in Hamgyŏng 
province on the border with P’yŏngan.  
                                                             
395 Park, Between Dreams and Reality, 112–113. 
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For men who were destined to advance in the bureaucracy, the next elevation 
would generally be to a naval commander post (Sugun chŏltosa) or a military division 
commander, both at Sr. 3 rank. There were naval commander posts in all provinces, but 
one was always a concurrent appointment with the governor, almost exclusively 
appointed from civil examination graduates, and in P’yŏngan and Hamgyŏng provinces 
the army commanders held the naval posts concurrently. Hwanghae and Kangwŏn only 
had one in the first half of the Chosŏn dynasty.396 Thus there were only five naval 
commander posts available to military examination graduates. In the eighteenth century, 
Hwanghae’s growing size and importance in stopping illegal fishing in the Yellow Sea 
necessitated a second naval commander post, and Chŏlla province gained a second as 
well. The military division commanders were more evenly spread through the country 
with twenty in the northern provinces and twenty-five in the central and southern 
provinces, but since governors and magistrates could also hold some of the military 
division commands concurrently as well, the percentage of available posts to officials at 
this level tended to favor the south.397 Ch’a Munsŏp also found that the concurrent 
posting rule was adjusted in Yŏngjo’s time because some magistracies were not available 
to military men, so the military division command was split (paech’i) enabling military 
men to hold the post. This type of post was exclusive to the central and southern 
provinces.398 It was unavoidable that a few years of a promising military man’s career 
would be spent in the southern provinces. Hŏ was no exception, receiving the post of 
                                                             
396 Kyŏngguk taejŏn 4:7a–13, “Pyŏngjŏn: oegwanjik.” 
397 Sok taejŏn 4:14b–19, “Pyŏngjŏn: oegwanjik.” 
398 Ch’a, Chosŏn sidae kunje yŏn’gu, 250–252. 
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naval commander in Chŏlla province in 1831, then in 1834 was appointed as Ch’angwŏn 
magistrate along the southern coast of Kyŏngsang.  
The officials analyzed here consistently achieved a few naval and military 
division commander posts, as well as the next elevation to army commander at Jr. 2 rank. 
There were army commanders posted in all the provinces, but again, one position was 
concurrently held by the governor. In the first half of the dynasty, Hwanghae, Kangwŏn, 
and Kyŏnggi each had only one army commander position held by the governor. But by 
the eighteenth century, Hwanghae and Kangwŏn had added an army commander. These 
posts were not all the same however. The army commander posts in Chŏlla, Hwanghae 
and Kyŏngsang were not as prestigious. In analyzing all the army commander postings 
for Hoeryŏng magistrates from 1623–1894, these magistrates consistently held the Chŏlla 
and Kyŏngsang army commander postings first, usually directly from a naval command 
post. The positions of northern Hamgyŏng and P’yŏngan army commander almost always 
occurred after the official was appointed to Hoeryŏng. The importance of holding the 
Hoeryŏng magistracy before obtaining the position of northern Hamgyŏng army 
commander is illustrated in Table 4.3. 
Army Commander 
Post 
Hoeryŏng magistrates appointed 
to position 
Percent of all Hoeryŏng 
magistrates 
Northern Hamgyŏng 88 31 
Southern Hamgyŏng 75 26 
P’yŏngan 70 24 
Hwanghae 89 31 
Ch’ungch’ŏng 57 20 
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Chŏlla 81 28 
Left Kyŏngsang 60 21 
Right Kyŏngsang 73 25 
Table 4.3. Hoeryŏng Magistrates’ appointments as army commander, 1623–1894. 
Data from SJW. 
 
 As noted above, nearly a quarter of Hoeryŏng magistrates from the fifteenth to the 
end of the seventeenth century were promoted directly army commander overwhelmingly 
in northern or southern Hamgyŏng. Only thirty-eight magistrates appointed to Hoeryŏng 
did not receive an appointment as army commander from 1623 to 1894. The Kangwŏn 
army commander post was a concurrent appointment with the Ch’unch’ŏn magistracy, 
which was an alternating civil and military post, its numbers were much lower. The 
percentages do not add to one hundred because the magistrates were appointed to an 
average of 2.1 army commander posts throughout the dynasty with the most common 
number of appointments being three. The importance of Hoeryŏng to military careers 
increased from the eighteenth century to the first half of the nineteenth with the number 
of army commander promotions topping fifteen during Sunjo’s reign. The numbers 
collapsed during Ch’ŏlchong’s reign, and by Kojong’s time there was little likelihood a 
posting to Hoeryŏng meant an official was destined for higher posts. The average 
dropped to 1.4 army commander postings with most only receiving one from 1849–1894.  
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Figure 4.2. . Hoeryŏng magistrates’ army commander appointments over the late Chosŏn. 
Data from SJW. 
 
What is not visible here is the timing of the positions. While Hwanghae appointments 
closely matched those to northern Hamgyŏng, it was much more likely that the magistrate 
would be appointed Hwanghae army commander just a few years before Hoeryŏng than 
after.  
Hŏ’s career trajectory closely followed these trends. He was appointed army 
commander of Kyŏngsang province in 1835. After Kyŏngsang, the rest of his career was 
spent almost exclusively in the northern provinces and Seoul. He was appointed southern 
Hamgyŏng provincial army commander in 1837, then in 1839 spent three years 
successively serving in Kanggye, Hoeryŏng, and northern Hamgyŏng provincial army 
commander. He served for a short time as supreme commander of three provincial naval 
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forces, and then returned to the north as magistrate of Yŏngbyŏn and then P’yŏngan army 
commander, his last provincial post. 
Hŏ Kye’s family history also hints at specialization in border affairs across 
generations. He was the adopted son of Hŏ Chŭp (1748–n.d.), a military examination 
graduate who received a few provincial appointments late in his career including as 
magistrate of Wiwŏn county. His biological father, Hŏ Yong (n.d.), was appointed to 
both Kyŏnghŭng and Samsu, but only served in Samsu in 1817. His grandfather in the 
adopted line, Hŏ Im (n.d.), served as magistrate of both Kyŏnghŭng and Hoeryŏng in the 
latter half of the eighteenth century. And Hŏ Ryu (1703–n.d.), one of his great 
grandfathers, also served as magistrate of Hoeryŏng in 1762. And a more distant relative, 
Hŏ Chŏng (n.d.), was appointed to Ch’angsŏng (1728) and Samsu (1734) as well. Of 
course simply being a member of an elite military family could explain much of the 
overlap in regional appointments. Deeper analysis of magistrates’ careers and families 
could show if consistent regionalization within families did exist.399  
In 1870, in the reorganization of the government directed by the Taewŏn’gun, the 
magistrate posts of Kanggye and Hoeryŏng would only be appointed through 
recommendations from military officials.400 After this no official was appointed to both 
Kanggye and Hoeryŏng in their careers again. The prominence of both positions also 
declined dramatically. In 1878, King Kojong ordered a return of Kanggye and Hoeryŏng 
to their traditional roles in the bureaucracy by making their appointments the 
                                                             
399 Genealogical data from “Mubu,” Changsŏgak collection 2-1741, 1:199a. Biographical details 
on the relatives careers came from appointment records in SJW. 
400 Kojong sillok 7:29a [1870/yun10/5]. 
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responsibility of the Ministry of Personnel again. But, by the record of magistrates 
appointed after this order, it does not seem to have changed the magistracies’ status in the 
Chosŏn government.401 
 
Conclusion 
 In the first half of the nineteenth century, the northern border was the area where 
military men were called upon to exercise their education and expertise the most. The 
border was both the site of the most frequent interaction with foreign agents and the area 
most susceptible to the chaos brought about by corruption and criminality. For residents 
of many border magistracies, especially of Kanggye and Hoeryŏng, they faced a double 
hardship. Not only did they have to eke out an existence on land that could hardly support 
subsistence farming, they were also called up without notice for public works, patrolling 
for smugglers, or manning an outpost at the border, all of which usually happened in the 
prime growing season when they could least afford to lose the time. The tasks incumbent 
on the commanders in these northern posts were onerous and frequently impossible, but 
the central bureaucracy realized that they were important. The importance was reflected 
in who they sent to man the border. Kanggye and Hoeryŏng may not have been the most 
sought after positions within the bureaucracy, but neither could they be staffed with cast-
offs, rejects, or bestowed on the wealthy of the region in exchange for donations. 
 The military men who served as magistrates at Kanggye and Hoeryŏng were well 
regarded, and their prospects were positive. Men like Hŏ Kye served in important 
                                                             
401 Konggŏ illok 5:7a [1878/2/4]; see also SJW 2847:7b [1878/2/4 7th entry]. 
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positions before and after their time at these key posts on the border. Their opportunities 
continued until the second half of the nineteenth century. At some point in Ch’ŏlchong’s 
reign, Kanggye and Hoeryŏng magistrates no longer could be assured of prominent 
postings after their time, reflecting some loss of status for the defense commands within 
the hierarchy of bureaucratic posts. No magistrate was posted to both Kanggye and 
Hoeryŏng in their careers after 1860, and the frequency of higher posts after service there 
declined dramatically. It may be that the danger of the Qing had diminished in 
recognition of increasing encounters with the West. An analysis of appointments to the 
magistracies and military division commands on the central and southern coasts might 
shed light on how King Kojong, or more accurately the Taewŏn’gun, attempted to rework 
the bureaucracy to enact his vision of military and border defense. 
With or without the attention of the central authorities, Kanggye and Hoeryŏng remained 
sites of contestation and between Chosŏn subjects and the Qing. Residents continued to 
resist the authority of provincial magistrates and commanders as well by increasingly 
violating prohibitions on illegal border crossing throughout the nineteenth century. 
Hoeryŏng’s markets and commercialization continued to develop into the late nineteenth 
century and played an important role in the development of Manchuria, which increased 
the draw of life across the Tumen River for Chosŏn subjects.402 Kanggye could not 
prevent greater and more frequent violations of the restrictions around settlement and 
ginseng. Despite the efforts of the military commanders in Hoeryŏng and Kanggye to 
shield Chosŏn subjects from the corrupting influence of the border, they could not help 
but be swept up in the larger currents of development that trade and resources brought. 
                                                             
402 Ko Sŭnghŭi, Chosŏn hugi Hamgyŏng-do sangŏp yŏn’gu, 279–285. 
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Conclusion 
 
 To Chosŏn ministers and officials, Korea’s northern border in the nineteenth 
century was a dangerous area that needed to be managed for the safety of the residents 
and the integrity of the country. The central authorities were concerned not only with the 
security of the border and relations with the Qing on the other side, but also with the 
character and temperament of the Chosŏn subjects who lived there. The dual concern led 
to a policy of strict control overseen by mostly military men. Within the hierarchy of 
bureaucratic positions, the border and military posts in general were not well regarded. 
Even so, there were border positions that did offer some measure of opportunity for 
advancement and recognition by the central government. The posts of Kanggye, 
Ch’angsŏng, and Hoeryŏng were such key posts for military examination graduates.  
Both the throne and officialdom considered the border itself a problem, as they 
believed that the people at the border were susceptible to corruption and crime. This 
meant that the magistrates and commanders sent to manage it needed to be of uncommon 
caliber, but many central bureaucrats were loath to leave the capital. The solution to this 
dilemma was to increase the rank of some posts to make them more appealing while also 
rewarding magistrates there with promotions after service. These positions were at 
strategic points at the border, like Kanggye, Ch’angsŏng, and Hoeryŏng, and required 
more administrative skills than other nearby counties. The king encountered the most 
difficulty staffing these posts in part because of the requirement that these magistrates be 
more skilled. Despite the distance from the center, officials who had passed the military 
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examination found that these posts were an opportunity to showcase their talent and a 
path to higher offices. 
The importance of the character of the magistrate on the northern border was a 
key consideration for Chosŏn ministers. The biannual performance evaluations 
(p’op’yŏm) for magistrates highlighted the ethical character of magistrates, and was one 
of the leading causes of magistrate removal at the northern border. The popular trope of 
the rapacious magistrate, though, has overshadowed the functioning of this system. 
Matthew Lauer, in his study on two years in the Namwŏn magistracy in Chŏlla province, 
places the blame for this more on twentieth century scholarship that was overly focused 
on episodes of violence and revolt in the nineteenth century where mismanagement was a 
central theme of local complaints.403 I would tend to agree that focus on violent events of 
the nineteenth century would highlight the actual incidences of mismanagement and skew 
their representation in histories of the era. All the same, I would go further to note that 
the trope has a long history in East Asia and was the inspiration for the focus on virtuous 
management in the early Chosŏn.404 The high standards and frequent evaluations meant 
that most magistrates were labelled as failing to succor the people at some point in their 
tenure. Frequent magistrate turnover was a feature of the system of virtuous governance, 
and while it probably removed a number of unscrupulous magistrates, it also may have 
exacerbated the problem of exploitation by preventing magistrates from developing local 
connections and obtaining the people’s trust in ethical leadership. Such trust would also 
                                                             
403 Matthew J. Lauer, “Two Years of Encounters in Namwŏn, 1736–1737: Conflict Negotiation 
and the Configurations of Chosŏn Village Society,” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, 
Los Angeles, 2017), 240. 
404 Yi Chonhŭi, Chosŏn sidae chibang haengjŏng chedo yŏn’gu, 162–164. 
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have been key in border counties where the magistrates needed to police and prevent 
illegal crossing and smuggling. 
Through the late Chosŏn, the significance of the border and what was meant by 
“border lands” changed as well. This was not simply a bureaucratic distinction, it was a 
reflection of the concerns of the central authorities and the importance of protecting the 
paths to the capital over other areas of the border. In the early part of the nineteenth 
century, these “border lands” were mostly focused on preventing a northern invasion, and 
only a few were maintained on the coasts to prevent attacks from the sea. By the latter 
half of the century, the arrival of Western militaries and navies reignited debate about the 
best way to protect the country and a reassessment of defensive strategies focused only 
on the north. The key magistracies of Hoeryŏng and Kanggye correspondingly saw their 
importance in the bureaucracy decline as reflected in the advancement prospects and later 
careers of officials who served there. The decline in importance of the northern border in 
the bureaucracy coincided with a resurgent monarchy in the form of the Taewŏn’gun. 
Beyond the management of the border, Chosŏn officials and literati were 
concerned with the people there, both their organization and control. While the ministers 
and kings of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries let military preparedness of the 
population decline, whether through neglect or a concern for the burdens such service 
required of its subjects, many literati who did not occupy high positions of power 
regularly advocated for a renewal of the military and reform of such long disused 
provincial units as the Sogo Armies. The arguments for reform occasionally found a 
sympathetic ear, and in the first half of the nineteenth century, some of the strongest 
advocates like Pak Kyusu, Kim Segyun, and Sin Hŏn enjoyed a brief access to the levers 
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of power when Prince Hyomyŏng (Posthumous King Ikchong) became a regent for his 
father, King Sunjo. The prince’s untimely death again derailed the push for reforms but 
not entirely, as many, especially Sin Hŏn continued to memorialize the throne in an effort 
to institute the people’s bastion and increase military preparedness to counter new, 
unanticipated threats particularly from the Western powers. The efforts of these thinkers 
finally bore fruit in the ascendance of King Kojong and his father, the Taewŏn’gun, who 
led significant reforms of the government and elevated officials from backgrounds long 
shut out of power.405 The progress of military and bureaucratic reforms in the second half 
of the nineteenth century is an important part of the story of Korea’s advancement into 
the realm of Western politics, but it lies beyond the scope of this study.  
Life along the border was difficult, the area mountainous and the soil quite 
infertile. Further, many settlers practiced slash and burn farming (hwajŏn) which can 
rapidly deplete what nutrients are in the soil and ultimately make long term agricultural 
less sustainable.406 For commoners in such less developed magistracies as Kanggye, 
Musan, and Wiwŏn, the profit of agriculture paled in comparison to the profits from 
collecting the products of the land such as ginseng, whether gained licitly or illicitly. The 
duties of magistrates for these counties was necessarily oriented toward preventing the 
illegal harvesting of many goods but primarily timber and ginseng. In areas of the border 
where interaction with the Qing was frequent and trade more developed, livelihoods 
revolved around markets and trade. Combating illicit activity was still a problem, but 
                                                             
405 Palais, Politics and Policy, 43. 
406 Kang Sŏkhwa, Chosŏn hugi Hamgyŏng-do wa pukpang yŏngt’o ŭisik, 143; Ko Sŭnghŭi, 
Chosŏn hugi Hamgyŏng-do sangŏp yŏn’gu, 253–254. Ko notes that the prevalence was greater in 
Hamgyŏng during the eighteenth century for some areas of the province, while Kang discusses 
the nineteenth century and the area around Huju. 
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required magistrates skilled in managing people, not resources. In all the counties along 
the border, taxation and obligations for corvée and military service weighed heavily on 
the people. And while the threat of invasion was almost nonexistent in the first half of the 
nineteenth century, both the throne and officialdom still recognized the northern border 
as a key strategic area and one that required strong forts and well-maintained walls. 
These demands meant that northern commoners and slaves were more likely to be called 
upon to perform nominal military duties in the Sogo units to repair fortifications or patrol 
the border areas. Such duties unfortunately did not prepare them for soldiering, whether 
in drill or combat. 
Chosŏn kings and ministers did not imagine the responsibilities of border 
protection fell solely, or at times even principally, on their own officials. The Qing were 
considered a partner in border control, and as the larger country and the suzerain, the 
Chosŏn ministers reminded the Qing it was their duty to expend the greater resources. 
The border crossing incidents in 1842 and 1846 led to a protocol of biannual joint border 
sweeps which was mostly maintained for the next twenty years.407 In the border sweep of 
1846 the Chosŏn officials were sensitive to maintaining distance between the Qing and 
Chosŏn in part because it limited the obligations of the lesser state to provide funds and 
support for the Qing soldiers. Chosŏn policies emphasized both the fear of its officials’ 
and residents’ interactions with the Qing and the fear of obligations incurred through 
such unsanctioned interaction. The delicate balance of power that the Chosŏn authorities 
wished to maintain, and the distrust of its own people at the border, further reinforced the 
desire to separate the Qing and Chosŏn subjects as much as possible.  
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Separation did not mean isolation. Chosŏn kings and officials were receptive to 
foreign ideas and recognized the utility of trade.408 The open markets showcased the 
opportunities for diplomacy and trade, and reorganized social and commercial realities in 
the northern region. The yearly exchanges also provided an opportunity for gaining 
knowledge of local conditions and events in Manchuria and beyond that was outside the 
heavily scripted and less frequent embassies to the capital. Each year the Hoeryŏng 
magistrates asked the Qing representatives about the state of political and agricultural 
affairs in Ningguta, Wula, and Beijing as well as the time it took to travel and the 
condition of the roads. These were formalized questions, but did offer a glimpse into 
development in the region. The Qing’s recorded responses were mostly dry, but 
considering the markets lasted ten days or more, the officials probably engaged in more 
detailed exchanges. The ability to manage these contacts was an important qualification 
for Hoeryŏng magistrates, and a successful market often led to a promotion to army 
commander in P’yŏngan or Hamgyŏng. 
The overwhelming concern of Chosŏn ministers was unregulated contact 
between its subjects and those of the Qing. The character of the people at the border was 
often noted to be kind and gentle, but highly susceptible to influence. It was imperative 
that all precautions were taken to neutralize the negative influence of the border, while 
maintaining the ability to conduct exchange and strengthen national defense. It was a 
nearly impossible task. Not only was the length and topography of the border a daunting 
obstacle, the support and training of military men and subjects in the border area was 
lacking. The expense of patrols, where men on duty required weapons and meals, were 
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prohibitive in the nineteenth century as tax revenues steadily declined and a series of 
natural disasters decimated the population. Nonetheless, magistrates continued to manage 
the border and attempted to stymie the efforts of those who would cross it. The end of the 
century saw a change in the bureaucracy and the perception of the border that negatively 
affected the status of the northern border magistrates. The collapse in the bureaucratic 
attention to the border led to a deterioration of Chosŏn border policies that occurred just 
as Chosŏn subjects began crossing into Manchuria in greater numbers. 
 This collapse also coincided with the arrival of Western powers. That the two 
occurred simultaneously cannot be simply a coincidence, but rather reflect the concern 
Chosŏn leaders had for its sovereignty in the face of Western imperialism. Chosŏn border 
policies focused on the security of land and people. Smuggling, illegal harvesting, and the 
like were concerns only as much as these activities corrupted the people and caused 
greater disorder and rebellious sentiment in the magistracies. These policies worked well 
in an environment where the partner on the other side was engaged in active deterrence as 
well.  
Chosŏn border control was also about centralization and protection of the capital. 
Border lands were designated based on their access to the paths that led to the heart of the 
kingdom. This meant that for most of the late Chosŏn, the only paths to the capital that 
concerned Chosŏn kings were those that ran from the northern border and the one from 
Pusan. As no state in East Asia had much naval capacity in the eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries, coastal area were no longer considered weak points. But, in the 
latter half of the nineteenth century, Western navies exposed the weakness of Chosŏn 
coastal defense, and its leaders were forced to reckon with an uncomfortable reality that a 
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much larger area of the peninsula was exposed to attack. The policy of containment could 
not work on such a large scale. The centralization of military forces compounded the 
issue as well, since attacks could, and did, occur close to the capital without warning, the 
traditional mobilization model was hopelessly slow, as the Taewŏn’gun discovered in the 
French incursion.  
Where the experienced border magistrates ended up within the Chosŏn 
bureaucracy after the arrival of the West is an important question to answer that points to 
future research. In the absence of the confounding factors of foreign intervention, the 
campaign to strengthen the monarchy in the face of bureaucratic power may have turned 
out similar to Yŏngjo and Chŏngjo’s efforts: a renaissance with greater mobility for the 
lower strata. As it was the disruption of the bureaucracy and the knowledge it represented 
compounded with the timing of Western and Japanese intervention to create a crisis. 
Those military men who had spent time on the northern border may have been reassigned 
to new coastal counties that were once again more relevant in the age of naval power. Or 
they may have been passed over as bureaucrats who owed their allegiance to the new 
monarch took up more positions within the bureaucracy. What happened to the 
knowledge of the border and managing these populations could shed light on the 
increasingly problematic border in the latter half of the century as well. The breakdown 
of control at the border as more and more Koreans flooded over the Tumen and Yalu 
rivers to reclaim land in Manchuria has been attributed to growing pains as the Qing 
relationship to the Chosŏn transitioned from tributary to modern international relations.409 
But, the altered relationship between the center and the border may also be to blame. As 
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regionalism was challenged and the lower strata of Chosŏn society like merchants gained 
more opportunities for status, the border no longer held the same threat of corruption. The 
border represented new opportunity, and with those experienced at containment no longer 
managing the area, control was no longer possible, or even the policy.  
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Sinograph Glossary 
 
People 
An Chŏngbok (Sunam) 安鼎福 (順菴) Kim Ch’wiro 金取魯 
Ch’oe Ch’iho  崔致灝 Kim Chŏnghŭi 金正喜 
Ch’oe Sinyŏp  崔信燁 Kim Chungman 金重萬 
Cho Ch’il (Manyŏng)  曺七 (萬禜 ) Kim Naesu  金鼐壽 
Cho Hangnyŏn 趙鶴年 Kim Ro 金鏴 
Cho Hyŏnmyŏng 趙顯命 Kim Sangsil 金上實 
Cho Sasŏk 趙師錫 Kim Segyun 金世均 
Chŏng Chaewŏn 丁載遠 Kim Sihyŏng 金始炯 
Chŏng Haŭng 鄭夏應 Kim Sŏnmyŏng  金善命 
Chŏng Inhong 鄭仁弘 Kim Taebyŏk 金大碧 
Chŏng Tongik  丁東翼 Ku Chaeyong 具載龍 
Chŏng Wŏnyong  鄭元容 Li Cun  豊存 
Chŏng Yagyong (Tasan)  丁若鏞 (茶山) Ma P’an  馬判 
Fan Ye 范曄 Mao Yuanyi 茅元儀 
Gang An 剛安 Min Hyŏngmuk 閔亨默 
Guang Lu  廣祿 Mister Song 宋哥 
Han Kyo 韓嶠 Mok Naesŏn  睦來善 
Han Myŏnghoe 韓明澮 No Kyejŏng 盧啓禎 
Han Pŏmsŏk 韓範錫 Paek Sagŭn 白師謹 
Han Pongch’un  韓奉春 Pak Chega 朴齊家 
Hŏ Chŏng 許晶 Pak Hyobŏm  朴孝凡 
Hŏ Chŭp 許濈 Pak Kyusu 朴珪壽 
Hŏ Im  許任 Pak Sŏngsŏk 朴星錫 
Hŏ Kwangch’un 許廣春 Pak Tongch’u 朴東樞 
Hŏ Kye 許棨 Qi Jiguang 戚繼光  
Hŏ Ryu  許瑬 Shao Yong 邵雍  
Hŏ Yong  許溶 Sin Chongik (Chongnak) 申從翼 (從洛) 
Hong Kyŏngnae 洪景來 Sin Hŏn (Kwanho) 申櫶 (觀浩) 
Hong Tŭkku 洪得龜 Sin Rip 申砬 
Hwang Sayŏng 黃嗣永 Sŏ Misu  徐美修 
Im Paekkwan 任百觀 Yi Ch’angsu 李昌壽 
Im Sich’ŏk 任時倜 Yi Ch’ŏnjun 李天駿 
Kang Sulchong 姜述宗 Yi Hŭiryŏm  李希濂 
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Yi Hyŏng  李夐 Yi Yongsang 李容象 
Yi Hyŏngwŏn 李馨遠 Yu Ch'anggŭn 柳昌根 
Yi Il 李鎰 Yu Hyŏngwŏn 柳馨遠 
Yi Kyŏngjae  李經在 Yu Ŏm 柳儼 
Yi Manyu 李萬囿 Yu Sŏnghwan 兪星煥 
Yi Sehwa 李世華 Yun Chŏngsŏn 尹定善 
Yi Sijae 李時在 Yun Myŏnggŏm 尹明儉 
Yi Sŏnghyo 李性孝 Yun Qing 尹耕 
Yi Suryang 李遂良 Yun Segŭn  尹世根 
Yi T’aesŏng  李台成 Yun Uhyŏn 尹禹玄 
Yi Tŏngmu 李德懋 Zhu Fengji 朱逢吉 
 
Places 
Anhyŏp 安峽 Hasŏhae floodplain 河西海坪 
Anju 安州 Hoeryŏng 會寧 
Bozhu River valley 波猪江洞 Hoŭm valley 號音洞 
Ch’angsŏng 昌城 Huju 厚州 
Ch’angwŏn 昌原 Jixiang valley 棘項洞 
Ch’ŏngch’ŏn River 淸川江 
Kalp’aji (or Kaŭlp’aji) 
garrison 
乫波知鎭 
(加乙波知) 
Ch’ŏrwŏn 鐵原 Kanggye 江界 
Ch’osan (Isan) 楚山 (理山) Kanggye chingno 江界 直路 
Ch’udong 楸洞 Kapsan 甲山 
Ch’unch’ŏn 春川 Kilsŏng (Kilchu) 吉城 (吉州) 
Ch’up’a garrison 楸坡鎭 Kimhae 金海 
Changdan 長湍 Kongju 公州 
Changhang valley 獐項洞 Koryŏng garrison 高嶺鎭 
Changjin 長津 Kyŏnghŭng 慶興 
Changsŏng 長城 Kyŏngwŏn 慶源 
Changyŏn 長淵 Majŏn ridge 麻田嶺 
Chasŏng 慈城 Mamahae garrison 馬馬海鎭 
Chŏndŭng-sa 傳燈寺 Manp’o garrison  滿浦鎭 
Chŏngju 定州 Much’ang 茂昌 
Chongp’o garrison 從浦鎭 Musan 茂山 
Chongsŏng 鐘城 Myŏngch’ŏn 明川 
Chunggang 中江 Naeryuk yŏngno 內陸嶺路 
Fenghuang Fortress 鳳凰城 Ningguta 寧古塔 
Hadong 河東 oe Kyujanggak 外奎章閣 
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Oetkoe garrison 夞怪(恠)鎭 Sŏnch’ŏn 宣川 
Onsŏng 穩城 Taegu 大邱 
P’ungsan garrison 豊山鎭 Tanch’ŏn 端川 
P’yesagun  廢四郡 Tŏgwŏn 德源 
P’yŏngnam garrison 平南鎭 Ŭiju 義州 
Paengnyŏng garrison 白翎鎭 Unsan 雲山 
Pŏltŭng garrison 伐登鎭 Uye 虞芮 
Porha (also Poŭrha) 
garrison 
乶下(甫乙下)鎭 Wiwŏn 渭原 
Puryŏng 富寧 Wula 烏喇 
Pyŏktong 碧潼 Xingjing 興京 
P'yŏngsan 平山 Yŏngbyŏn 寧邊 
Sakchu 朔州 Yŏngbyŏn 寧邊 
Samsu 三水 Yongch’ŏn 龍川 
Sangt’o garrison 上土鎭 Yŏyŏn 閭延 
Sin’gwang garrison 神光鎭   
 
Offices 
amhaeng ŏsa  暗行御史 Kwanch’alsa (Jr. 2) 觀察使 
Ch’ogwan 哨官 kyori 校吏 
Ch’ŏmjŏlchesa  (Jr. 3) 僉節制使 Manho (Jr. 4) 萬戶 
changjŏng 壯丁 Moksa (Sr. 3) 牧使 
Changyongyŏng 壯勇營 Mubu 武府 
chengshouwei 城守尉 Ogunyŏng 五軍營 
Chibŭi (Jr. 3) 執義 Owijang 五衛將 
Chungch’ubusa 中樞副使 P’ach’ong 把摠 
Chwach'amch'an 左參贊 p’agun 把軍 
Chwaŭijŏng 左議政 p’asu chang 把守將 
Chwayun (Jr. 2) 左尹 Pangŏsa (Jr. 2) 防禦使 
Hanwŏn-gun 韓原君 pangyŏng 防營 
Hullyŏn chubu 訓鍊主簿 poch'ong 堡摠 
Hullyŏn p’an’gwan (Jr. 5)  訓鍊判官 pojang 堡將 
Hullyŏn togam 訓鍊都監 Pusa (Jr. 3) 府使 
Hyŏn’gam (Jr. 6) 縣監 Pusajŏng 副司正 
hyŏngni 刑吏 Pusayong 副司勇 
Kamch’al 監察 Puyun (Jr. 2) 府尹 
Kun’gi chubu 軍器主簿 Pyŏlgunjik 別軍職 
Kunsu (Jr. 4) 郡守 pyŏnggyo 兵校 
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Pyŏngma chŏltosa (Jr. 2) 兵馬節度使 t'op'osa 討捕使 
pyŏngyŏng 兵營 Tosa (Jr. 5) 都事 
Saongwŏn chubu (Jr. 6)  司饔院主簿 Tosŭngji (Sr. 3) 都承旨 
Sŏnjŏn’gwan 宣傳官 Uŭijŏng 右議政 
Sugun chŏltosa (Sr. 3) 水軍節度使 xiaoqi xiao 驍騎校 
sugyo 首校 xieling 協領 
Suho 守護 yŏkhak 譯學 
suhyang 首鄕 Yŏngjang (Jr. 2) 營將 
Taejang (Jr. 2) 大將 Yŏngjang (Sr. 3) 營將 
Tangsanggwan 堂上官 Yŏngŭijŏng 領議政 
 
